This book provides an innovative account of how the globalization of production and the emergence of global value chains impacts on trade preferences, lobby strategies and the political influence of EU firms. It sheds new light on the complex EU-China trade relations
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AbstractThis article looks at political mobilization and the influence of import‐dependent firms in the context of theEuropeanUnion's (EU) trade defence instrument (TDI) policy. By looking at this increasingly relevant set of economic actors during (unilateral)TDIdecision‐making, the article provides a much needed complement to the existingEUtrade policy literature, which is dominated by analyses of the trade policy preferences and involvement of import‐competing and export‐dependent firms during multilateral and bilateral trade co‐operation. The article defines import‐dependent firms and theorizes the circumstances under which they are capable of lobbying and of wielding influence inEU TDIcases. The argument is discussed with case study evidence drawn from a series of recentEU TDIepisodes.
In: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES FOR EU-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY - THE PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT, Ch. 6, pp. 151-172, J. Men, G. Balducci, eds., Brussels: Peter Lang, 2010
AbstractThe COVID pandemic highlighted the interdependence which the expansion of global value chains (GVCs) has fostered across the world economy. Perceived fragilities in the supply of key products led to a growing global debate about the wisdom of high levels of reliance on overseas sources, with several commentators suggesting that the pandemic will foster 'de‐globalisation'. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the economic disruption which accompanied it, have only served to strengthen concerns about interdependence, especially in Europe. In this paper, we draw on analysis of EU policy responses and GVC governance theory to inform the question of whether it is likely that there will be a major reduction in the geographical reach of GVCs due to the COVID‐19 pandemic. We argue that, although changes in certain GVCs are likely to be fostered (and reinforced) by the response to the pandemic, it does not make widespread 'de‐globalisation' inevitable. Some GVCs will likely reduce in geographic scope, becoming more regional or national, especially in industries which are considered 'strategic'. However, pressures to de‐globalise and their practical impacts will vary significantly across countries and industrial sectors, depending not only on public policy responses, but on variations in the governance of GVCs themselves.
AbstractIn the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis and, more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic, scepticism on the merits of trade and globalization has increased across several key developed countries. This poses major challenges for multinational enterprises (MNEs) and other trade dependent firms (TDFs). This paper develops a framework to explore corporate nonmarket strategies (NMS) to address this backlash, covering both corporate political activity (CPA) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). We firstly provide an overview of the existing research within international economics, business strategy, and international political economy on the antiglobalization backlash and MNEs/TDFs strategy in the face of protectionism. Building on this scholarship, we formulate propositions for CPA and CSR actions, which are likely to be deployed by TDFs in developed economies to counter protectionism and address the criticisms of the antiglobalization movement. On this basis we propose an interdisciplinary analytical framework that can be used to study corporate strategy in times of growing antitrade sentiments. Finally, we provide initial proposals for testing these propositions and highlight the challenges researchers may face when carrying out such research.
AbstractSince the beginning of the 21st century we have witnessed a proliferation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) in Asia Pacific. China has been at the forefront of this development. Initially, China's PTAs were very shallow and mainly aimed at building friendly relationships with developing countries. However, over time, China has started to negotiate deeper PTAs with developing and developed countries alike. This notable shift has thus far been understood to result from four broad motivations: China's desire to access key export markets; the facilitation of regional production networks; to address resource security concerns; and/or to further geostrategic interests and political influence. We propose that these motives are not sufficient to fully account for China's new generation trade agreements. We suggest that China is increasing its integration into the world economy to push for domestic marketization and reform by credibly committing to trade liberalization through PTAs. Deep and comprehensive PTAs oblige a country to follow a set of rules that leave little leeway to violate the terms. In order to successfully implement and enforce PTA commitments, China has also gradually strengthened its regulatory state by investing in regulatory capacity and capability in the field of trade policy. We test the plausibility of our argument through an in‐depth analysis of the PTAs signed by China since 2000 and find evidence that China's PTAs are indeed in part driven by a desire to lock in domestic economic reform, which has gone hand in hand with a strengthening of its regulatory state.
AbstractThe conventional view in the literature is that only the largest and most productive firms in a country benefit, and hence support the signing of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), as they are able to take advantage of the key benefits such agreements offer. In this paper we argue that such firms may indeed be generally supportive of PTAs, but that their preferences often differ when it comes to the exact design of PTAs. These different preferences stem from the ways that firms have organized their value chains. We focus on one crucial issue where firms may hold different preferences, depending on the organization of their value chains: Rules of Origin (RoO). We test the plausibility of our argument through a detailed analysis of the preferences and political strategies of tobacco firms in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations.
AbstractThis article introduces and summarizes the key questions and findings of this special issue of Global Policy on the role of domestic and international institutions in the study of global value chains (GVCs). The article starts by briefly introducing the concept of GVCs and the state‐of‐the‐art of the existing literature focusing on the political implications of these landmark changes in the global economy. Then, we make a case for grounding this emerging literature more strongly into an 'institutionalist' perspective. More specifically, we argue that while a great deal of attention has been paid to intra‐chain governance modes – that is, the different ways in which firms organize their cross‐border production arrangements – the role external institutional forces play in structuring chain dynamics remains surprisingly under‐researched. These observations invite an analytical perspective that brings institutions back into the study of GVCs. The contributions to the special issue focus on multiple causal pathways linking GVCs and various types of domestic‐ and international institutions. Altogether, these contributions underscore that the politics engendered by GVCs, as well as how they evolve, can only be fully understood by paying attention to the external institutional context in which they are embedded.
The article introduces and summarizes the key questions and findings of this special issue of Global Policy on the role of domestic and international institutions in the study of Global Value Chains (GVCs). The article starts by briefly introducing the concept of GVCs and the state-of-the-art of the existing literature focusing on the political implications of these landmark changes in the global economy. Then we make a case for grounding this emerging literature more strongly into an "institutionalist" perspective. More specifically, we argue that while a great deal of attention has been paid to intra-chain governance modes – i.e. the different ways in which firms organize their cross-border production arrangements – the role external institutional forces play in structuring chain dynamics remains surprisingly under-researched. These observations invite an analytical perspective that brings institutions back into the study of GVCs. The contributions to the special issue focus on multiple causal pathways linking GVCs and various types of domestic- and international institutions. Altogether, these contributions underscore that the politics engendered by GVCs, as well as how they evolve, can only be fully understood by paying attention to the external institutional context in which they are embedded.
AbstractThe increasing impact of the international trade governance regime on the domestic regulatory sphere and the growing inter-linkages between international companies through their involvement in global value chains, have complicated corporate political activity (CPA) in the trade arena and changed the way companies interact with governments in this context. This paper draws on several recent examples of novel forms of CPA in trade conflicts at both multilateral and regional (E.U.) level, to provide an updated conceptual framework of trade policy CPA, which takes account of the increasing complexity and interconnectedness in the world economy. We highlight, in particular, the fact that this changing context means that "domestic" interests are often heterogeneous. The international linkages of a firm may dictate trade policy preferences more than its nationality. In addition, non-government actors increasingly react to globalization by mobilizing transnationally, with positive and negative impacts for CPA. CPA strategy has adapted to that reality, in both home and host country contexts, leading to novel cross border alliances and even political activity in countries where, although their local presence is relatively low, companies find common interests.