Regions and Innovation: A Reflection
In: Regional Advantage and Innovation, S. 151-168
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In: Regional Advantage and Innovation, S. 151-168
In: The Australian economic review, Band 36, Heft 2, S. 193-202
ISSN: 1467-8462
In: Australian journal of public administration, Band 59, Heft 2, S. 109-114
ISSN: 1467-8500
This essay examines 'What is a policy?' from the viewpoint of a public servant trying to make sense of the maze of official statements, procedures, guidelines and various other expressions of intra‐governmental opinion that might bear upon a discretionary decision. It seeks to clarify the meaning and status of policy, to explain how to determine cases which are not covered by explicit statements of policy, and to decide how much relative weight to accord to various policy documents and circumstances. Although it does not set out to rehash the old debate about the distinction between politics and administration (often misunderstood as a distinction between policy and administration), it finds Woodrow Wilson's 1886 aphorism on this subject a good place to start.
In: Australian journal of public administration: the journal of the Royal Institute of Public Administration Australia, Band 59, Heft 2, S. 109-114
ISSN: 0313-6647
In: Australian economic history review: an Asia-Pacific journal of economic, business & social history, Band 34, Heft 1, S. 91-93
ISSN: 1467-8446
SSRN
In: Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Band 60, Heft 4, S. 573-589
SSRN
In: Agenda: a journal of policy analysis & reform, Band 6, Heft 3
ISSN: 1447-4735
To what extent can market participants affect the outcomes of regulatory policy? In this paper, we study the effects of one potential source of influence – campaign contributions – from competing interests in the local telecommunications industry, on regulatory policy decisions of state public utility commissions. Using a unique new data set, we find, in contrast to much of the literature on campaign contributions, that there is a significant effect of private money on regulatory outcomes. Indeed, this result is robust to numerous alternative specifications and persists with instrumentation. We also assess the extent of omitted variable bias that would have to exist to obviate the estimated result. We find that for our result to be spurious, omitted variables would have to explain more than five times the variation in the mix of private money as is explained by the variables included in our analysis. We consider this to be very unlikely.
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