Female Desire in Chaucer's "Legend of Good Women" and Medieval English Romance
In: Medieval feminist forum: MFF ; journal of the Society for Medieval Feminist Scholarship, Band 58, Heft 1, S. 152-154
ISSN: 2151-6073
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In: Medieval feminist forum: MFF ; journal of the Society for Medieval Feminist Scholarship, Band 58, Heft 1, S. 152-154
ISSN: 2151-6073
In: Postmedieval: a journal of medieval cultural studies, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 119-148
ISSN: 2040-5979
In: Medieval feminist forum: MFF ; journal of the Society for Medieval Feminist Scholarship, Band 44, Heft 2, S. 144-146
ISSN: 2151-6073
The scarcity of novel antibiotic compounds in a time of increasing resistance rates has begun to ring alarm bells at the highest echelons of government. Large new financial incentives to accelerate antibiotic research and development, such as market entry rewards (MERs), are being considered. However, there is little focus on how to sustain the efficacy of new, promising antibiotics reaching the market. Currently, inappropriate use of antibiotics is commonplace, which has accelerated resistance development. In an attempt to halt this trend, antibiotic stewardship policies are being implemented in many resource-rich settings. Unfortunately, this has not yet had an impact on the amount of antibiotics being prescribed globally. One important hurdle is misalignment of incentives. While governments and health services are incentivized to promote prudent use of this common good, pharmaceutical companies are incentivized to increase volume of sales to maximize profits. This problem must be addressed or else the major efforts going into developing new antibiotics will be in vain. In this paper we outline an approach to realign the incentives of pharmaceutical companies with wider antibiotic conservation efforts by making a staged bonus a component of an MER for antibiotic developers when resistance to their drug remains low over time. This bonus could address the lack of stewardship focus in any innovation-geared incentive.
BASE
Neglected tropical disease research has changed considerably in recent decades, and the German government is committed to addressing its past neglect of NTD research. Our aim was to use an innovative social network analysis of bibliometric data to map neglected tropical disease research networks that are inside of and affiliated with Germany, thereby enabling data-driven health policy decision-making. We created and analysed co-author networks from publications in the SCOPUS database, with a focus on five diseases. We found that Germany's share of global publication output for NTDs is approximately half that of other medical research fields. Furthermore, we identified institutions with prominent NTD research within Germany and strong research collaborations between German institutions and partners abroad, mostly in other high-income countries. This allowed an assessment of strong collaborations for further development, e.g., for research capacity strengthening in low-income-countries, but also for identifying missed opportunities for collaboration within the network. Through co-authorship network analysis of individual researcher networks, we identified strong performers by using classic bibliometric parameters, and we identified academic talent by social network analysis parameters on an individual level.
BASE
The scarcity of novel antibiotic compounds in a time of increasing resistance rates has begun to ring alarm bells at the highest echelons of government. Large new financial incentives to accelerate antibiotic research and development, such as market entry rewards (MERs), are being considered. However, there is little focus on how to sustain the efficacy of new, promising antibiotics reaching the market. Currently, inappropriate use of antibiotics is commonplace, which has accelerated resistance development. In an attempt to halt this trend, antibiotic stewardship policies are being implemented in many resource-rich settings. Unfortunately, this has not yet had an impact on the amount of antibiotics being prescribed globally. One important hurdle is misalignment of incentives. While governments and health services are incentivized to promote prudent use of this common good, pharmaceutical companies are incentivized to increase volume of sales to maximize profits. This problem must be addressed or else the major efforts going into developing new antibiotics will be in vain. In this paper we outline an approach to realign the incentives of pharmaceutical companies with wider antibiotic conservation efforts by making a staged bonus a component of an MER for antibiotic developers when resistance to their drug remains low over time. This bonus could address the lack of stewardship focus in any innovation-geared incentive.
BASE
The scarcity of novel antibiotic compounds in a time of increasing resistance rates has begun to ring alarm bells at the highest echelons of government. Large new financial incentives to accelerate antibiotic research and development, such as market entry rewards (MERs), are being considered. However, there is little focus on how to sustain the efficacy of new, promising antibiotics reaching the market. Currently, inappropriate use of antibiotics is commonplace, which has accelerated resistance development. In an attempt to halt this trend, antibiotic stewardship policies are being implemented in many resource-rich settings. Unfortunately, this has not yet had an impact on the amount of antibiotics being prescribed globally. One important hurdle is misalignment of incentives. While governments and health services are incentivized to promote prudent use of this common good, pharmaceutical companies are incentivized to increase volume of sales to maximize profits. This problem must be addressed or else the major efforts going into developing new antibiotics will be in vain. In this paper we outline an approach to realign the incentives of pharmaceutical companies with wider antibiotic conservation efforts by making a staged bonus a component of an MER for antibiotic developers when resistance to their drug remains low over time. This bonus could address the lack of stewardship focus in any innovation-geared incentive.
BASE