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On the 29th of May 2001 Kees B. was found guilty for the rape and murder of Nienke Kleiss, a ten year old Dutch girl. There was virtually no forensic evidence that he had committed this crime, but he had confessed, and so the police was convinced of his guilt. The fact that he retracted his confession soon after his crucial interrogation was not heavily weighted by the police. After four years of imprisonment, Kees B. was released, because Wik H. admitted he was the one who killed Nienke (van Koppen, 2003). Indeed, DNA of Wik H. was found at the crime scene. How come Kees B. was found guilty while, besides a striking lack of evidence, DNA found at the crime scene did not match his DNA? And why does one conclude so easily that someone is guilty once his DNA is found at the crime scene? Put shortly, how come one ignores evidence of absence so easily, whereas one gives so much weight to physically present evidence? The phenomenon described above (i.e., ignoring absent information while putting a lot of weight on present information) has been named the 'feature positive-effect' (FPE; Jenkins & Sainsbury, 1969), and it is the topic of this dissertation. The FPE originates from literature on Pavlovian conditioning. It was found that pigeons learn associations more quickly when the presence of a stimulus predicts (e.g., blue light is on) the presence of another stimulus (e.g., food can be obtained) rather than when the absence of a stimulus (e.g., blue light is off) predicts the presence of another stimulus. This difficulty with absent information relative to present information has also been described in other domains (e.g., omission bias). The fact that people seem to treat present and absent information differently is not necessarily a bad thing. However, as the example above illustrates, underweighting absent forensic evidence can have severe consequences. Sometimes, the underweighting of absent evidence is irrational and thus constitutes a bias. Unlike other biases that can influence the process of legal decision making, such as the confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998), the FPE is relatively unknown and unstudied. However, given its possible severe consequences, studying this effect is important

Embodied cognition research has shown how actions or body positions may affect cognitive processes, such as autobiographical memory retrieval or judgments. The present study examined the role of body balance (to the left or the right) in participants on their attributions to political parties. Participants thought they stood upright on a Wii(™) Balance Board, while they were actually slightly tilted to the left or the right. Participants then ascribed fairly general political statements to one of 10 political parties that are represented in the Dutch House of Representatives. Results showed a significant interaction of congruent leaning direction with left- or right-wing party attribution. When the same analyses were performed with the political parties being divided into affiliations to the right, center, and left based on participants' personal opinions rather than a ruling classification, no effects were found. The study provides evidence that conceptual metaphors are activated by manipulating body balance implicitly. Moreover, people's judgments may be colored by seemingly trivial circumstances such as standing slightly out of balance.

Current approaches on cognition hold that concrete concepts are grounded in concrete experiences. There is no consensus, however, as to whether this is equally true for abstract concepts. In this review we discuss how the body might be involved in understanding abstract concepts through metaphor activation. Substantial research has been conducted on the activation of common orientational metaphors with bodily manipulations, such as "power is up" and "more is up" representations. We will focus on the political metaphor that has a more complex association between the concept and the concrete domain. However, the outcomes of studies on this political metaphor have not always been consistent, possibly because the experimental manipulation was not implicit enough. The inclusion of new technological devices in this area of research, such as the Wii Balance Board, seems promising in order to assess the groundedness of abstract conceptual spatial metaphors in an implicit manner. This may aid further research to effectively demonstrate the interrelatedness between the body and more abstract representations.

Embodied cognition research has shown how actions or body positions may affect cognitive processes, such as autobiographical memory retrieval or judgments. The present study examined the role of body balance (to the left or the right) in participants on their attributions to political parties. Participants thought they stood upright on a Wii™ Balance Board, while they were actually slightly tilted to the left or the right. Participants then ascribed fairly general political statements to one of 10 political parties that are represented in the Dutch House of Representatives. Results showed a significant interaction of congruent leaning direction with left- or right-wing party attribution. When the same analyses were performed with the political parties being divided into affiliations to the right, center, and left based on participants' personal opinions rather than a ruling classification, no effects were found. The study provides evidence that conceptual metaphors are activated by manipulating body balance implicitly. Moreover, people's judgments may be colored by seemingly trivial circumstances such as standing slightly out of balance.

Does cognitive motivation influence how people gather and interpret information about COVID-19 and their adherence to measures? To address these questions, we conducted a longitudinal survey among European and American respondents. Wave 1 (N = 501) was conducted on March 27, 2020 and Wave 2 (N = 326) on July 1, 2020. We assessed COVID-19 knowledge, endorsement of COVID-19 conspiracy theories, media use, Need for Cognition (NC), Need for Cognitive Closure (NCC), and self-reported adherence to governmental measures taken. Results showed that nearly three-quarters of our respondents actively searched for information about COVID-19. Most at least once a day. Information seeking behaviour was not influenced by cognitive motivation (i.e., NC and NCC). However, cognitive motivation was related to (1) knowledge about COVID-19, (2) conspiracy rejection, and (3) change in knowledge over time. Respondents with more knowledge on COVID-19 also indicated to adhere more often to measures taken by their government. Self-reported adherence to measures was not influenced by cognitive motivation. Implications of these findings will be discussed.

Embodied cognition research has shown how actions or body positions may affect cognitive processes, such as autobiographical memory retrieval or judgments. The present study examined the role of body balance (to the left or the right) in participants on their attributions to political parties. Participants thought they stood upright on aWii™ Balance Board, while they were actually slightly tilted to the left or the right. Participants then ascribed fairly general political statements to one of 10 political parties that are represented in the Dutch House of Representatives. Results showed a significant interaction of congruent leaning direction with left-or right-wing party attribution. When the same analyses were performed with the political parties being divided into affiliations to the right, center, and left based on participants' personal opinions rather than a ruling classification, no effects were found. The study provides evidence that conceptual metaphors are activated by manipulating body balance implicitly. Moreover, people's judgments may be colored by seemingly trivial circumstances such as standing slightly out of balance.

Does cognitive motivation influence how people gather and interpret information about COVID-19 and their adherence to measures? To address these questions, we conducted a longitudinal survey among European and American respondents. Wave 1 (N = 501) was conducted on March 27, 2020 and Wave 2 (N = 326) on July 1, 2020. We assessed COVID-19 knowledge, endorsement of COVID-19 conspiracy theories, media use, Need for Cognition (NC), Need for Cognitive Closure (NCC), and self-reported adherence to governmental measures taken. Results showed that nearly three-quarters of our respondents actively searched for information about COVID-19. Most at least once a day. Information seeking behaviour was not influenced by cognitive motivation (i.e., NC and NCC). However, cognitive motivation was related to (1) knowledge about COVID-19, (2) conspiracy rejection, and (3) change in knowledge over time. Respondents with more knowledge on COVID-19 also indicated to adhere more often to measures taken by their government. Self-reported adherence to measures was not influenced by cognitive motivation. Implications of these findings will be discussed.

Does cognitive motivation influence how people gather and interpret information about COVID-19 and their adherence to measures? To address these questions, we conducted a longitudinal survey among European and American respondents. Wave 1 (N=501) was conducted on March 27, 2020 and Wave 2 (N=326) on July 1, 2020. We assessed COVID-19 knowledge, endorsement of COVID-19 conspiracy theories, media use, Need for Cognition (NC), Need for Cognitive Closure (NCC), and self-reported adherence to governmental measures taken. Results showed that nearly three-quarters of our respondents actively searched for information about COVID-19. Most at least once a day. Information seeking behaviour was not influenced by cognitive motivation (i.e., NC and NCC). However, cognitive motivation was related to (1) knowledge about COVID-19, (2) conspiracy rejection, and (3) change in knowledge over time. Respondents with more knowledge on COVID-19 also indicated to adhere more often to measures taken by their government. Self-reported adherence to measures was not influenced by cognitive motivation. Implications of these findings will be discussed.

Despite the increasing availability of Open Science (OS) infrastructure and the rise in policies to change behaviour, OS practices are not yet the norm. While pioneering researchers are developing OS practices, the majority sticks to status quo. To transition to common practice, we must engage a critical proportion of the academic community. In this transition, OS Communities (OSCs) play a key role. OSCs are bottom-up learning groups of scholars that discuss OS within and across disciplines. They make OS knowledge more accessible and facilitate communication among scholars and policymakers. Over the past two years, eleven OSCs were founded at several Dutch university cities. In other countries, similar OSCs are starting up. In this article, we discuss the pivotal role OSCs play in the large-scale transition to OS. We emphasize that, despite the grassroot character of OSCs, support from universities is critical for OSCs to be viable, effective, and sustainable.