Search results

The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/.o0r.g1/107.171/0772/705270570470410818775599435 ; Since the 1980s, state governments have been using private debt collection agencies as facilitators and expediters in the delinquent tax collection process. The use of private collection agencies incorporates administrative effectiveness, efficiency, and procedural fairness, which can lead to an increase in revenues without affecting either the tax base or rate while protecting taxpayers. Using state-level panel data for the years 2000 to 2011, the administrative effectiveness outcome is that private collectors do not reduce the aggregate delinquent tax inventory, but the administrative efficiency outcome is that private collectors reduce collection cost. For procedural fairness, private collectors have a positive effect on the number of tax appeals filed in a state tax department with a Republican governor; however, they decrease the number of tax appeals filed with an outside-independent tax appeal agency.

Draft: Do not cite without author permission ; The (draft) article of record as published may be found at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3562735 ; Cooperative budgeting arrangements between state and local governments jointly fund local programs. The mix of state and local revenues contributed to these arrangements can change as budget priorities shift over time. This study examines the strategic choices public officials make as they determine their contributions to jointly-funded programs. Using a game theory model known as the "Diner's Dilemma", the analysis explores how each level of government considers how much revenue to contribute and whether it can induce its partner to increase their level of support. This analysis applies primarily to local programs with regional externalities. The model illustrates how local efforts to aggressively try to shift costs to the state government can backfire, particularly during periods of state fiscal stress.

We study the capital structure choices and resultant operating consequences of American special-purpose governments. In the United States, special-purpose governments have approximately $1 trillion of outstanding debt. These entities are established with Congressional authorization, rendering taxpaers ultimately responsible for satisfying their obligations. However, their debt is not recorded on any local, state, or Federal financial statements. Despite the enormity of these quasi-governmental units and the implications of their operating choices on the country's fiscal health, surprisingly little is known about their underlying decisions and attendant consequences. This dearth of knowledge motivates our study. We find that special-purpose governments follow a modified pecking-order theory of capital structure, first exhausting internal funding before issuing debt. These units then use an equity-like instrument to fund investment. Moreover, their capital structure is associated with operating outcomes, providing evidence that the financing decisions of these entities have operational consequences of import for the country's fiscal position.

We study the capital structure choices and resultant operating consequences of American special-purpose governments. In the United States, special-purpose governments have approximately $1 trillion of outstanding debt. These entities are established with Congressional authorization, rendering taxpaers ultimately responsible for satisfying their obligations. However, their debt is not recorded on any local, state, or Federal financial statements. Despite the enormity of these quasi-governmental units and the implications of their operating choices on the country's fiscal health, surprisingly little is known about their underlying decisions and attendant consequences. This dearth of knowledge motivates our study. We find that special-purpose governments follow a modified pecking-order theory of capital structure, first exhausting internal funding before issuing debt. These units then use an equity-like instrument to fund investment. Moreover, their capital structure is associated with operating outcomes, providing evidence that the financing decisions of these entities have operational consequences of import for the country's fiscal position.

The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/027507h4t0tp1s6:/6/d8o2i.8o6rg8 ; This study sheds light on the effects of policies that introduce competition into the marketplace of the provision of government services. The outcomes indicate that both nonprofit and government market share in a state are negatively affected by for-profit entry, a substitution relationship. The framing of the article in the New Public Management era and the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 provides context in which to assess the policy consequences in hospice care. Given the budgetary challenges and growing cost of health care, this analysis begins a discussion of the effects of for-profit entry into the provision of government services,providing a glimpse into what the future holds for hospice care in the reforms of the AffordableCare Act (ACA) of 2010.

The article of record as published may be found at https://doi.org/10.1177/027507h4t0tp1s6:/6/d8o2i.8o6rg8/ ; This study sheds light on the effects of policies that introduce competition into the marketplace of the provision of government services. The outcomes indicate that both nonprofit and government market share in a state are negatively affected by for- profit entry, a substitution relationship. The framing of the article in the New Public Management era and the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 provides context in which to assess the policy consequences in hospice care. Given the budgetary challenges and growing cost of health care, this analysis begins a discussion of the effects of for-profit entry into the provision of government services, providing a glimpse into what the future holds for hospice care in the reforms of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010.

17 USC 105 interim-entered record; under temporary embargo. ; Using 34 years of data from Florida counties, we examine the effect of multiple fiscal stressors on expenditures over time to test theoretical propositions in Charles Levine's seminal study on cutback management. We demonstrate support for Levine's stages model and his claims on linkages between the causes of fiscal stress and managerial responses. Specifically, unemployment levels produce differential effects by service area (e.g., human services bear the most significant share of the reductions), especially in relation to the persistence of the stressor. We cannot support the stages model with other stressor measures. We expand the literature to include county governments, enhancing the contemporary literature on local government fiscal stress. ; U.S. Government affiliation is unstated in article text.