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This article summarizes the contribution in fisheries economics by the Danish economist Jens Warming. Warming provides an early reference on the problem of open access, precedes Arthur Pigou in suggesting an optimal tax as a correction measure, which I refer to as a Warming landing tax in fisheries, and explains how property rights in fisheries will lead to maximized resource rent and prevent overfishing. What is missing in Warming's description of the problem is the dynamic aspect and that the economics of natural resources should be analyzed in a capital theoretic framework, which was later established in the 1950s by Anthony Scott.

The translator thanks the Nationaløkonomisk tidsskrift for permission to publish this translation.

The purpose of the present article is to consider optimal trade policies for biofuels, taking into account the potential for carbon leakage and the complex set of policies used or discussed for biofuels. First, the authors consider the case of optimal trade policies and find that the combination of an import standard and a border carbon adjustment welfare dominates using only a border carbon adjustment (BCA). The import standard should be set such that the emissions per unit of output is as if the foreign biofuels industry were subject to the globally optimal green house gas (GHG) emission tax. Second, the authors study the same trade policies in the context of a blending mandate, which significantly alters the way the market works. Given the suboptimal implementation of a blending mandate, the optimal BCA depends on the domestic subsidy to biofuels production. High levels of subsidies may in fact imply a negative BCA; that is, the optimal policy would be to subsidize imports.

ABSTRACTThis paper analyzes the causes for regulatory compliance, using traditional deterrence variables and potential moral and social variables. We use self-reported data from 459 Tanzanian artisanal fishers in Lake Victoria. The results indicate that the decision to be either a non-violator or a violator, as well as the violation rate – if the latter – are influenced by changes in deterrence variables like the probability of detection and punishment and also by legitimacy and social variables. We also identify a small group of fishers who react neither to normative aspects nor to traditional deterrence variables but persistently violate the regulation.