Suchergebnisse

This article analyzes patterns of collective action in the field of immigration by looking at relational dynamics in two different local political settings. Drawing on a relational approach to the study of collective action, the general assumption is that the specific political opportunity structure (POS) in the field of immigration shapes the logics of interaction of migrants' associations. To test this hypothesis, we compare migrants' organizational networks in two cities characterized by two different opportunity structures—Lyon and Zurich. We thus apply network analysis to examine the density, the structural patterns, and the distribution of ties amongst organizations in the two cities. Results suggest that specific opportunities in the two contexts, by providing differential institutional access to migrant associations and publicly recognizing different collective identities, partly shape the relational patterns in the field and thus the modes of coordination of collective action adopted by migrants' organizations.

This article analyzes patterns of collective action in the field of immigration by looking at relational dynamics in two different local political settings. Drawing on a relational approach to the study of collective action, the general assumption is that the specific political opportunity structure (POS) in the field of immigration shapes the logics of interaction of migrants' associations. To test this hypothesis, we compare migrants' organizational networks in two cities characterized by two different opportunity structures-Lyon and Zurich. We thus apply network analysis to examine the density, the structural patterns, and the distribution of ties amongst organizations in the two cities. Results suggest that specific opportunities in the two contexts, by providing differential institutional access to migrant associations and publicly recognizing different collective identities, partly shape the relational patterns in the field and thus the modes of coordination of collective action adopted by migrants' organizations. Adapted from the source document.

This article examines the role of social class for individual participation in social movements, more specifically in street demonstrations. The authors use protest survey data in order to avoid the limitations of previous research by contextualizing the effect of social class on participation in protest. The analysis focuses on demonstrations addressing redistributive and cultural issues, reflecting a well-known distinction between old and new social movements. The authors show that participants in these two types of demonstrations, as well as in a third, mixed category, present a similar class structure, which casts some doubts on this distinction, although slight differences remain. Furthermore, a comparison of three countries that differ in terms of the strength of the class cleavage (Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland) suggests that this cleavage acts as a moderator of the relationship between social class and participation in street demonstrations.

AbstractThis article investigates networks and political actions by migrant organisations in five European cities. It examines how political opportunity structures moderate the impact of organisational networks on organisations' political contacts and protests using data from organisational surveys undertaken between 2005 and 2008 in Budapest, Lyon, Madrid, Milan and Zurich. Results suggest that the political context moderates the role that different types of networks have on mobilisation. It is found that migrant organisational networks may be sources compensating for the lack of contextual opportunities, thus fostering the use of protest by migrant organisations. However, migrant organisational networks can also favour the creation of political subcultures, marginalised from mainstream politics. Finally, migrant networks are likely to foster migrant organisations' political integration in multicultural contexts through conventional as well as non‐conventional politics.

Guest editing a special issue on networks and collective action could be interpreted as a response to the ubiquitous use of these terms in both public and academic discourses. As others have noted, thinking that 'networks are everywhere' has become a daily routine (Brandes, Robins, McCranie, and Wasserman 2013: 2). Underpinning such a motto is the diffusion of new information and communication technologies (ICTs), the Internet and social media in particular. ICTs have become a primary global infrastructure for the construction of relations across individuals, organizations, institutions, contents, and information in all domains. Adapted from the source document.

We assess whether the distinction between old and new social movements still holds by examining the social class and value orientations of participants in old and new social movement protests. We argue that new cleavages have emerged from globalization, affecting not only electoral politics, but also contentious politics, and thereby having a homogenization effect on the structural basis of movements of the left. Moreover, we hypothesize that traditional cleavages, such as class mediate the homogenization effect of new cleavages. We look at participants in May Day and climate change demonstrations in Belgium and Sweden, two countries that differ in terms of strength of class cleavage. Results show that there is evidence of homogenization between old and new social movements and that this effect is more important when the class cleavage is stronger.

We assess whether the distinction between old and new social movements still holds by examining the social class and value orientations of participants in old and new social movement protests. We argue that new cleavages have emerged from globalization, affecting not only electoral politics, but also contentious politics, and thereby having a homogenization effect on the structural basis of movements of the left. Moreover, we hypothesize that traditional cleavages, such as class mediate the homogenization effect of new cleavages. We look at participants in May Day and climate change demonstrations in Belgium and Sweden, two countries that differ in terms of strength of class cleavage. Results show that there is evidence of homogenization between old and new social movements and that this effect is more important when the class cleavage is stronger.

We assess whether the distinction between old and new social movements still holds by examining the social class and value orientations of participants in old and new social movement protests. We argue that new cleavages have emerged from globalization, affecting not only electoral politics, but also contentious politics, and thereby having a homogenization effect on the structural basis of movements of the left. Moreover, we hypothesize that traditional cleavages, such as class mediate the homogenization effect of new cleavages. We look at participants in May Day and climate change demonstrations in Belgium and Sweden, two countries that differ in terms of strength of class cleavage. Results show that there is evidence of homogenization between old and new social movements and that this effect is more important when the class cleavage is stronger. Adapted from the source document.

Religion has often been found to be a strong predictor of political behaviour (Broughton and ten Napel, 2000; Lijphart, 1979; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rose and Urwin, 1969; Rokkan, 1979; Tresch and Nicolet, 2010). Alongside social class and place of residence, religion was thought to be one of the primary sociological determinants of political behaviour and, especially, voting (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Converse, 1974). However, during the past few decades, it has become almost commonplace to stress the declining saliency of the religious cleavage and its diminishing impact on politics. In particular, a number of authors have pointed to the loss of influence of religion on voting and political attitudes (Dalton et al., 1984; Franklin, 1992; Norris and Inglehart, 2004). This diminished relevance would be the outcome of a process of secularization that has affected the entire western world (Berger, 1967; Bruce, 2002). At the same time, a process of individualization has produced a change in the forms of religious expression (Hervieu-Léger, 1999; Luckmann, 1967; Pollack and Pickel, 2007), leading to post-traditional forms of religiosity.

This article looks at the determinants of the political integration of migrants at the local level, focusing on two dimensions of political integration: political interest (attitudinal dimension) and political participation (behavioral dimension). Based on a representative survey among Italians, Kosovars, and Turks in the city of Zurich, we tested the thesis advanced by the social capital approach which posits a link between membership in voluntary associations and political integration. Our findings suggest that membership in voluntary associations favors the political integration of the three groups under investigation. Furthermore, we find an impact of both ethnic and cross- ethnic membership. However, while the effect of associational involvement on the behavioral dimension of political integration is strong and consistent across national groups, the attitudinal dimension displays a weaker and differential impact. Political attitudes and socio-demographic characteristics play a less important role, except for the effect of the former on political interest, and also tend to have a differential impact on the three groups.

This article looks at the determinants of the political integration of migrants at the local level, focusing on two dimensions of political integration: political interest (attitudinal dimension) and political participation (behavioral dimension). Based on a representative survey among Italians, Kosovars, and Turks in the city of Zurich, we tested the thesis advanced by the social capital approach which posits a link between membership in voluntary associations and political integration. Our findings suggest that membership in voluntary associations favors the political integration of the three groups under investigation. Furthermore, we find an impact of both ethnic and cross‐ethnic membership. However, while the effect of associational involvement on the behavioral dimension of political integration is strong and consistent across national groups, the attitudinal dimension displays a weaker and differential impact. Political attitudes and socio‐demographic characteristics play a less important role, except for the effect of the former on political interest, and also tend to have a differential impact on the three groups.