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The universe of actors involved in international cybersecurity includes both state actors and semi- and non-state actors, including technology companies, state-sponsored hackers, and cybercriminals. Among these are semi-state actors - actors in a close relationship with one state who sometimes advance this state's interests, but are not organizationally integrated into state functions. In Semi-State Actors in Cybersecurity, Florian J. Egloff argues that political relations in cyberspace fundamentally involve concurrent collaboration and competition between states and semi-state actors. To understand the complex interplay of cooperation and competition and the power relations that exist between these actors in international relations, Egloff looks to a historical analogy: that of mercantile companies, privateers, and pirates. Pirates, privateers, and mercantile companies were integral to maritime security between the 16th and 19th centuries. In fact, privateers and mercantile companies, like today's tech companies and private cyber contractors, had a particular relationship to the state in that they conducted state-sanctioned private attacks against foreign vessels. Pirates, like independent hackers, were sometimes useful allies, and other times enemies. These actors traded, explored, plundered, and controlled sea-lanes and territories across the world's oceans - with state navies lagging behind, often burdened by hierarchy. Today, as cyberspace is woven into the fabric of all aspects of society, the provision and undermining of security in digital spaces has become a new arena for digital pirates, privateers, and mercantile companies. In making the analogy to piracy and privateering, Egloff provides a new understanding of how attackers and defenders use their proximity to the state politically and offers lessons for understanding how actors exercise power in cyberspace. Drawing on historical archival sources, Egloff identifies the parallels between today's cyber in-security and the historical quest for gold and glory on the high seas. The book explains what the presence of semi-state actors means for national and international security, and how semi-state actors are historically and contemporarily linked to understandings of statehood, sovereignty, and the legitimacy of the state.

Offensive cyber capabilities (OCCs) are the combination of people, technologies, and organizational attributes that jointly enable offensive cyber operations: the adversarial manipulation of digital services or networks. Most works on OCCs focus on their (de-)escalatory potential in terms of diplomatic tension, instability, or power. This article argues for a re-orientation toward the normatively prior question of their relative violence. It asks: how are OCCs integrated into violent state capacities and what are the consequences? The article proposes three logics of integration by which OCCs are included in violent state actions, in both repressive and interstate situations. These logics—substitution, support, and complement—weigh the benefits of using OCCs against an adversary instead of, as part of, and in addition to other means of violence, respectively. The article argues that the violence of OCCs depends on two things: first, whether one adopts a narrowly physical or a more expansive definition of violence and, second, which logic of integration governs their use. On a narrow definition of violence, substitutive and supportive uses of OCCs are less likely to be violent than conventional alternatives, and complementary uses of OCCs are not violent at all. On a wider definition, both substitutive and supportive uses of OCCs can lead to more violence than conventional alternatives, while complementary uses of OCCs are highly likely to increase violence overall. Acknowledging the different logics of integration for OCCs, and understanding their violent effects, has important analytical and policy benefits for global security studies.

Abstract
Offensive cyber capabilities (OCCs) are the combination of people, technologies, and organizational attributes that jointly enable offensive cyber operations: the adversarial manipulation of digital services or networks. Most works on OCCs focus on their (de-)escalatory potential in terms of diplomatic tension, instability, or power. This article argues for a re-orientation toward the normatively prior question of their relative violence. It asks: how are OCCs integrated into violent state capacities and what are the consequences? The article proposes three logics of integration by which OCCs are included in violent state actions, in both repressive and interstate situations. These logics—substitution, support, and complement—weigh the benefits of using OCCs against an adversary instead of, as part of, and in addition to other means of violence, respectively. The article argues that the violence of OCCs depends on two things: first, whether one adopts a narrowly physical or a more expansive definition of violence and, second, which logic of integration governs their use. On a narrow definition of violence, substitutive and supportive uses of OCCs are less likely to be violent than conventional alternatives, and complementary uses of OCCs are not violent at all. On a wider definition, both substitutive and supportive uses of OCCs can lead to more violence than conventional alternatives, while complementary uses of OCCs are highly likely to increase violence overall. Acknowledging the different logics of integration for OCCs, and understanding their violent effects, has important analytical and policy benefits for global security studies.

AbstractTransformations in state violence are intimately associated with technological capacity. Like previous era-defining technologies, global digital networks have changed state violence. Offensive cyber capabilities (OCCs) appear to constitute a major technological development that offers the potential for reducing state violence. This article asks: are OCCs really the better angels of our digital nature? Current scholarship in strategic studies, adopting a narrow definition of violence, conceives of OCCs as largely non-violent. This ignores how technology has given rise to new forms of harm to individuals and communities, particularly in the context of violent state repression. We propose using an expanded definition of violence, including affective and community harms, and argue that OCCs relocate, rather than reduce, state violence towards non-bodily harms. Even though their lethal effects are limited, OCCs are not, as is supposed, a non-violent addition to state arsenals. This conclusion has important implications for international affairs, including re-orienting defensive cybersecurity efforts and altering calculations around the perception of OCCs by adversaries.

AbstractThis contribution to the SPSR debate about technology and security in Switzerland looks at how and by whom cyber‐security is constructed in Swiss security politics. Using three securitization logics as developed by reflexive Security Studies – hyper‐securitization, everyday security practices, and technification – it illustrates how Swiss actors have sorted out roles and responsibilities over the years. The article suggests that all three logics are present in the political process, but that 'technification' – a way to construct the issue as reliant upon technical knowledge and the supposition that this serves a political and normatively neutral agenda – is currently the dominant one. For democratic politics, technification is a big challenge. Assigning an issue to the technical realm has a depoliticizing influence and makes contestation from those with less technical expertise very hard.