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Why have social spending levels and social policy trajectories diverged so drastically across labour-abundant Middle Eastern and North African regimes? And how can we explain the marked persistence of spending levels after divergence? Using historical institutionalism and a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods Social Dictatorships: The Political Economy of the Welfare State in the Middle East and North Africa develops an explanation of social spending in authoritarian regimes. It emphasizes the importance of early elite conflict and attempts to form a durable support coalition under the constraints imposed by external threats and scarce resources. Social Dictatorships utilizes two in-depth case studies of the political origins of the Tunisian and Egyptian welfare state to provide an empirical overview of how social policies have developed in the region, and to explain the marked differences in social policy trajectories. It follows a multi-level approach tested comparatively at the cross-country level and process-traced at micro-level by these case studies.

Why have social spending levels and social policy trajectories diverged so drastically across labour-abundant MENA regimes? And how can we explain the persistence of social spending after divergence? This books sets out to answer both questions. It develops a theory about the emergence of authoritarian welfare states, arguing that autocratic leaders need both the incentives and the abilities to distribute welfare for authoritarian welfare states to emerge.

Am 25. November 2011 fanden in Marokko vorgezogene Parlamentswahlen statt. Sie waren der vorerst letzte Schritt eines Reformprozesses, der zwar von einer jugendlichen Protestbewegung Anfang 2011 in Gang gebracht, jedoch maßgeblich vom König und loyalen politischen Eliten gestaltet wurde. Den Kern des Reformprozesses bildete die Ausarbeitung einer neuen Verfassung, welche von einer Reform des Parteiensystems begleitet wurde. Angesichts des erfolgreichen Verfassungsreferendums vom 1. Juli 2011 und der leicht gestiegenen Wahlbeteiligung bei den Parlamentswahlen kann die monarchische Stabilisierungsstrategie vorerst als erfolgreich bewertet werden. Offen bleibt, ob die Wahl einer PJD-geführten Regierung das Ende oder vielmehr den Anfang eines weiterreichenden politischen Wandels darstellt ; Ferdinand Eibl

Why do some, but not all oil-rich states provide generous welfare to their populations? Building on a case study of Oman in the 1960s and 1970s, we argue that anti-systemic subversive threats motivate ruling elites in oil states to use welfare as a tool of mass co-optation. We use the generalized synthetic control method and difference-in-difference regressions for a global quantitative test of our argument, assessing the effect of different types of subversion on a range of long-term welfare outcomes in oil-rich and oil-poor states. We demonstrate that the positive effect of subversion appears limited to center-seeking subversive threats in oil-rich countries. The paper addresses a key puzzle in the literature on resource-rich states, which makes contradictory predictions about the impact of resource rents on welfare provision.

What are the most efficient strategies to prevent military coups d'état? The answer depends on coup agency, that is, who attempts to overthrow the regime: elite officers or lower-ranking combat officers. Elite officers and lower-ranking combat officers have different incentives, opportunities, and capacities when it comes to perpetrating coups. Using original data on coup agency, public spending, and officer salaries in the Middle East and North Africa, we find that counterbalancing—a strategy designed to increase barriers for coup plotters' coordination efforts—and higher shares of defense spending prove more effective at preventing coups by elite officers. However, higher social spending reduces the risk of coups by combat officers. Political liberalization has mixed effects on military agents. It decreases the risk of coups by combat officers, but makes elite officers more likely to mount coups. Our findings suggest that the study of coups needs to better incorporate variation and that we need to rethink the image of coups as purely elite-led power grabs.

What are the most efficient strategies to prevent coups d'état? The answer depends on whether the coup is attempted by elite officers or by lower ranking combat officers. Elite officers and lower ranking combat officers have different incentives, opportunities, and capacities to perpetrate a coup. As a result, the success of coup-proofing critically depends on coup agency. Using original data on coup agency, public spending and officer salaries in the Middle East and North Africa, we find counter-balancing and higher shares of defense spending to be effective for preventing elite officer coups. Combat officer coups are best prevented by increasing social spending. Political liberalization has an ambivalent effect on military agents, decreasing coup risk for combat officer, but making elite officer coups more likely. Our findings suggest the necessity to differentiate between specific coup types and rethink coups as purely elite-led power grabs to fully explore the rationale of junior coup plotters.

The literature on political budget cycles (PBCs) does not offer a full-fledged theory about the effect of democratization. However, it does imply a non-linear effect along the regime spectrum: positive at the autocratic end, negative at the democratic end. We theoretically develop and empirically test this implication by pointing to two countervailing effects of democratization:executive constraintsandpolitical competition. While the former contains PBCs, the latter stimulates them. Because of their empirical covariation, PBCs occur primarily in hybrid regimes where the decision-making powers of the executive are relatively unrestricted and politics is relatively competitive. We also show that while executive constraints and political competition condition PBCs, what triggers the fluctuations iselectoral competitiveness. Only when incumbents fear electoral defeat, do they create PBCs. The study is based on novel data on public spending in 112 countries, covering the entire regime spectrum over the period from 1960 to 2006.