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AbstractThis research note presents three newly interconnected and expanded datasets on interest groups' (IGs) access to the Swiss political decision‐making process: (1) extra‐parliamentary committee seats occupied by IGs (1980, 2000, 2010), (2) parliamentary (committee) seats occupied by IG representatives (1992‐2015), and (3) consultation replies submitted by IGs (2008‐11). We show that the Swiss system of interest intermediation adapted to the multiplication and organizational consolidation of citizen groups, which defend non‐producer interests and do not provide selective benefits to their members (e.g. environmental groups). The share of access granted to citizen groups has increased in both the administration and parliament, across all federal departments and most legislative committees. Moreover, citizen groups benefit from a larger share of access in the recently revitalized parliament, compared to the administration. This suggests that economic groups' decline in power is also related to the rise of citizen groups.

Ce chapitre vise à répondre aux questions suivantes : Qu'est-ce qu'un groupe d'intérêt ? Quels types de groupes d'intérêt sont mobilisés dans les systèmes politiques ? Quelle stratégie d'influence politique développent-ils et avec quel succès ? En plus de résumer la littérature existante sur ces trois questions centrales, ce chapitre discute aussi quelques développements sur les liens entre groupes d'intérêt et partis politiques, ainsi que sur les défis que pose l'internationalisation des politiques publiques aux groupes d'intérêt.

A variety of direct democratic instruments allow "policy-making at the ballot box" (Gerber, 1999, p. 3), with the citizens having the last word on policy adoption and change. Criteria for the classification of direct democracy devices include who initiates a popular vote, who has control over the content of the proposal, whether it addresses statutory or constitutional law, or whether the result is binding or not. Interest groups use two main direct democracy instruments to influence policy-making: the initiative to put a new policy issue on the political agenda and the referendum to veto a policy adopted by the legislature. This chapter scrutinizes the effects of these tools on the policy process, on policy outputs, and on interest group populations. It shows that citizen groups benefit more than business groups from the initiative and referendum.

This study analyses how information provided by different types of interest groups influences the ability of members of parliament (MPs) to accurately perceive the preferences of those citizens who voted them into office. To study how information provision by interest groups affects MPs' perceptions, we combine unique data from a citizen survey and face-to-face meetings with 151 federal MPs in Switzerland, thus enabling a comparison of actual voter preferences with MPs' estimations of these preferences. Ties to citizen groups, as self-reported by MPs in our survey, relate to more accurate perceptions by MPs, even when controlling for MPs' partisan affiliation. Ties to business groups, as declared in the official registry, relate to less accurate perceptions. These findings suggest that interest groups can both tighten and weaken MPs' link to their party voters, which might have repercussions on substantive representation and democratic accountability.

This study analyses how information provided by different types of interest groups influences the ability of members of parliament (MPs) to accurately perceive the preferences of those citizens who voted them into office. To study how information provision by interest groups affects MPs' perceptions, we combine unique data from a citizen survey and face-to-face meetings with 151 federal MPs in Switzerland, thus enabling a comparison of actual voter preferences with MPs' estimations of these preferences. Ties to citizen groups, as self-reported by MPs in our survey, relate to more accurate perceptions by MPs, even when controlling for MPs' partisan affiliation. Ties to business groups, as declared in the official registry, relate to less accurate perceptions. These findings suggest that interest groups can both tighten and weaken MPs' link to their party voters, which might have repercussions on substantive representation and democratic accountability.

This study analyses how information provided by different types of interest groups influences the ability of members of parliament (MPs) to accurately perceive the preferences of those citizens who voted them into office. To study how information provision by interest groups affects MPs' perceptions, we combine unique data from a citizen survey and face-to-face meetings with 151 federal MPs in Switzerland, thus enabling a comparison of actual voter preferences with MPs' estimations of these preferences. Ties to citizen groups, as revealed in a survey, relate to more accurate perceptions by MPs, even when controlling for MPs' partisan affiliation. Ties to business groups, as revealed in the official registry, relate to less accurate perceptions. These findings suggest that interest groups can both tighten and weaken MPs' link to their party voters, which might have repercussions on substantive representation and democratic accountability.

Major economic peak-level associations, because of their various resources (in terms of membership, finance and institutional reconnaissance by public authorities) have be-come central political actors of the Swiss neo-corporatist regime. They were considered the dominant actors of the pre-parliamentary phase of the decision-making process (extra-parlia-mentary committees, consultation procedures), identified as the most important phase, whereas the Parliament only marginally modified the proposals of the Federal Council. However, since the beginning of the 1990s, the strategies of interest groups have profoundly changed, leading to a reconfiguration of the traditional neo-corporatist political regime toward a more pluralist system, in which interest groups more actively target the Parliament. Different factors explain these changes: the declining role of the pre-parliamentary phase, the revalorization of the Par-liament, and the increasing role of the media. These changes have weakened the positions of traditional corporatist associations and favored the political rise of new citizen groups. They have also induced interest groups to develop new political strategies, privileging the parliamen-tary venue, especially the new permanent specialized committees. Despite the growing access of new citizen groups to the political system (pre-parliamentary and parliamentary venues), economic groups remain dominant in the domains of economic and social policies.

This study assesses whether economic interest groups (business associations and trade unions) enjoy better access to the policymaking process than citizen groups. It compares the interest group population in Switzerland with those sets of groups present in the administrative and legislative venues. The study devises an aggregate measure of access to policymaking as a whole, which weights access according to different venues' importance. It theorizes the granting of access as a sequential process. Policymakers first decide whether to grant any access at all (selection stage) and then decide on the amount of access (allocation stage). Empirical evidence shows that policymakers do not discriminate between economic and citizen groups at the selection stage, but that they subsequently grant more access to economic groups. These findings qualify existing research, which interprets economic groups' superior access as the resilience of neo‐corporatism, while also questioning the pluralizing effect of multiple policymaking venues.

This study assesses whether economic interest groups (business associations and trade unions) enjoy better access to the policymaking process than citizen groups. It compares the interest group population in Switzerland with those sets of groups present in the administrative and legislative venues. The study devises an aggregate measure of access to policymaking as a whole, which weights access according to different venues' importance. It theorizes the granting of access as a sequential process. Policymakers first decide whether to grant any access at all (selection stage) and then decide on the amount of access (allocation stage). Empirical evidence shows that policymakers do not discriminate between economic and citizen groups at the selection stage, but that they subsequently grant more access to economic groups. These findings qualify existing research, which interprets economic groups' superior access as the resilience of neo-corporatism, while also questioning the pluralizing effect of multiple policymaking venues.

The Swiss Parliament is distinguished in historical international comparison by its tradition of non-professional public service. Although existing literature on interest groups (IGs) mainly treats the influence and pressure they have placed upon members of parliament (MPs), for Switzerland – particularly in light of this non-professional public service tradition – it also appears warranted to study ties between IGs and MPs. These ties, however, whether in the form of MPs being full-time employees or leading members (but not employees) of interest groups, have so far not been studied systematically. This analysis investigates the evolution of these ties from 1970 to 2010. Taking as a point of departure the increased professionalization of the Swiss Parliament, especially due to the intro- duction of permanent and specialized committees and increased compensation for parliamentary work since the beginning of the 1990s, we find that the number of MPs who are also full-time employees of IGs has steadily decreased since the 1990s. The number of MPs serving as outside or "honorary" board members of IGs has, however, actually increased since the beginning of the 1990s. This also reflects the increased importance of the Parliament in the Swiss political system, which gives interest groups with an increased incentive to develop ties to MPs. At the same time, our results show that public IGs now have more MPs as board members than do traditionally corporatist IGs.

AbstractUnder which conditions do politicians listen to scientific experts in a crisis? This study addresses this question by assessing how the Swiss government implemented 186 policy recommendations formulated by the National COVID‐19 Science Task Force (STF) to combat the spread of the virus and alleviate its impact on the health system, society and economy during the first year of the pandemic. Results of multiple regression analyses show that the impact of problem pressure on the propensity of the government to implement experts' recommendations varies over time: it was considerably larger during spring 2020 than afterwards. We argue that this reflects a change in status of the STF during the second phase of the pandemic: it was distanced from the political‐strategic level of the crisis management organization and its epistemic authority was increasingly questioned by political parties and interest groups. Policy scholars should thus give more attention to how rapidly the government's propensity to rely on expert advice can change.