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Alongside representatives of the business world, many Social Democrats reject criticism of President Vladimir Putin's Russia and its record on human rights. They see in this criticism 'attitudes of moral superiority' and a 'know-it-all mind-set'. German guilt for the war urges modesty, as they see it. Dialogue with the Kremlin is for them an obligation. They see themselves in the tradition of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik. But this is wrong. This kind of thinking is based on a fatal interpretation of detente, which of course gambled precisely on social change. Germany's historical responsibility must not be abused to keep us from calling an authoritarian president authoritarian or from accepting the criminalisation of partners as agents. The extreme closeness of German-Russian relations requires intervention. It is necessary to limit the damage that the Putin regime is inflicting on Russia. Adapted from the source document.

The concept of communism is rooted in the state utopias of the modern era. It is amorphous in content. Sometimes, it is connected with social orders and future models; sometimes, it refers to a technique of power. For followers and opponents, it is a fighting word. With the October Revolution of 1917, the term shifted from the realm of ideas to become an element of real history. Lenin declared communism a sustainable strategy of development - and with that turned Marxist thinking on its head. In China, the second main communist power of the 20th century, communism today serves solely to legitimise the rule of the communist party. Adapted from the source document.

Neben Wirtschaftsvertretern weisen viele Sozialdemokraten die Kritik an Putins Russland im Namen der Menschenrechte zurück. In jener Kritik sehen sie eine "Attitüde moralischer Überlegenheit" und "Besserwisserei". Die deutsche Schuld am Krieg mahne zur Bescheidenheit. Der Dialog mit dem Kreml sei Pflicht. Sie wähnen sich damit in der Tradition von Willy Brandts Ostpolitik. Doch das ist falsch. Diesem Denken liegt eine fatale Umdeutung der Entspannungspolitik zugrunde, die ja gerade auf gesellschaftlichen Wandel setzte. Deutschlands historische Verantwortung darf nicht dazu missbraucht werden, autoritäre Präsidenten nicht autoritär zu nennen oder die Kriminalisierung von Partnern als Agenten zu akzeptieren. Die Dichte der deutschrussischen Beziehungen verlangt nach Einmischung. Diese ist nötig, um den Schaden zu begrenzen, den das Putin-Regime seinem Land zufügt. (Osteuropa (Berlin) / SWP)

AbstractThis article provides brief coverage of the Russian-German dialogue since 1991 and the search for solutions about looted art of German ownership seized at the end of the Second World War and still held in Russia. So far, while Russia and Germany regard themselves as partners and friends in political and economic realms, they have been unable to find agreement about the looted art. Germany seems no longer to retain Russian cultural goods plundered during the war, whereas Russia still possesses a significant amount of German cultural assets. On the basis of existing treaties and international law, Germany demands its restitution. Russia, on the other hand, has nationalized the confiscated goods in 1998 as compensation for its own war losses. Nevertheless, not a few citizens of both countries have been returning artworks and books privately, in some cases supported by the governments. A convincing solution for the general problem can only be found if the treasures, which in the past have been understood as trophies, could be transformed into cultural ambassadors, while dialogue and the search for new ways continue within the framework of a policy of reconciliation. This approach also includes further research and analysis of the Russian cultural losses resulting from the war, a project undertaken in the 1990s at the Forschungsstelle Osteuropa (Research Center for Eastern Europe) of the University of Bremen, as briefly described in an appendix to the article.