The effect of monetary policy on exchange rates during currency crises: the role of debt, institutions and financial openness
In: Discussion paper series 6217
In: International macroeconomics
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In: Discussion paper series 6217
In: International macroeconomics
In: Working paper 64
In: Working paper series Center for Economic Studies ; Ifo Institute ; 472
In: The international library of critical writings in economics 98
In: An Elgar reference collection
In: International library of critical writings in economics 82
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 50, Heft 6, S. 912-921
ISSN: 0021-9886
World Affairs Online
In: Challenges for Central Banks in an Enlarged EMU; Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Europaforschung (ECSA Austria) / European Community Studies Association of Austria Publication Series, S. 29-43
In: Discussion paper 6/00
The first part of this paper outlines the concept of democratic accountability of central banks, and compares the legal accountability of the ECB with some other central banks (Bank of Canada, Bank of Japan, Bank of England and the Federal Reserve System). In the second part, we present a theory of central bank accountability. Two aspects of accountability are considered: transparency of actual monetary policy and the question of who bears final responsibility for monetary policy. The paper shows that accountability through transparency leads to a lower expected rate of inflation and less stabilization of supply shocks. Accountability through shifting final responsibility in the direction of the government leads to higher inflationary expectations and more stabilization of supply shocks.
In: Special papers in international economics 19
World Affairs Online
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12678
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Working paper
The paper builds a simplified model describing the economy of a currency union with decentralised national fiscal policy, where the main features characterising the policy-making are similar to those in EMU. National governments choose the size of deficit taking into account the two main rules of the Stability and Growth Pact on public finance. Unlike previous literature the asymmetric working of those rules is explicitly modelled in order to identify its impact on the Nash equilibrium of deficits arising from a game of strategic interaction between fiscal authorities in the union.
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