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AbstractMany observers worry that growing numbers of international institutions with overlapping functions undermine governance effectiveness via duplication, inconsistency and conflict. Such pessimistic assessments may undervalue the mechanisms available to states and other political agents to reduce conflictual overlap and enhance inter-institutional synergy. Drawing on historical data I examine how states can mitigate conflict within Global Governance Complexes (GGCs) by dissolving or merging existing institutions or by re-configuring their mandates. I further explore how "order in complexity" can emerge through bottom-up processes of adaptation in lieu of state-led reform. My analysis supports three theoretical claims: (1) states frequently refashion governance complexes "top-down" in order to reduce conflictual overlap; (2) "top-down" restructuring and "bottom-up" adaptation present alternative mechanisms for ordering relations among component institutions of GGCs; (3) these twin mechanisms ensure that GGCs tend to (re)produce elements of order over time–albeit often temporarily. Rather than evolving towards ever-greater fragmentation and disorder, complex governance systems thus tend to fluctuate between greater or lesser integration and (dis)order.

Many observers worry that growing numbers of international institutions with overlapping functions undermine governance effectiveness via duplication, inconsistency and conflict. Such pessimistic assessments may undervalue the mechanisms available to states and other political agents to reduce conflictual overlap and enhance inter-institutional synergy. Drawing on historical data I examine how states can mitigate conflict within Global Governance Complexes (GGCs) by dissolving or merging existing institutions or by re-configuring their mandates. I further explore how "order in complexity" can emerge through bottom-up processes of adaptation in lieu of state-led reform. My analysis supports three theoretical claims: (1) states frequently refashion governance complexes "top-down" in order to reduce conflictual overlap; (2) "top-down" restructuring and "bottom-up" adaptation present alternative mechanisms for ordering relations among component institutions of GGCs; (3) these twin mechanisms ensure that GGCs tend to (re)produce elements of order over time–albeit often temporarily. Rather than evolving towards ever-greater fragmentation and disorder, complex governance systems thus tend to fluctuate between greater or lesser integration and (dis)order.

This article addresses the puzzle of why, and under what conditions, international organisations cease to exist. International Relations literature offers rich explanations for the creation, design and effectiveness of international institutions and their organisational embodiments, international organizations (IOs), but surprisingly little effort has gone into studying the dynamics of IO termination. Yet if we want to understand the conditions under which international organisations endure, we must also explain why they frequently fail to do so. The article formulates and tests a theory of 'IO death' using a combination of population-wide statistical analysis and detailed historical case studies. My analysis is based on an original dataset covering the period 1815–2016. I find that exogenous shocks are a leading proximate cause of IO terminations since 1815 and that organisations that are newly created, have small memberships, and/or lack centralised structures are most likely to succumb. My analysis leads me to suggest a number of extensions and refinements to existing institutionalist theories.

Under what conditions do international governmental organizations (IGOs) cease to exist? Surprisingly, leading theories of international organization rarely address this question. Across the theoretical spectrum scholars assume that international organizations have a high degree of "staying power". Yet reality looks different. More than one-third of IGOs created since 1815 have since died. This article addresses the puzzle of why IGOs cease to exist. Using a combination of standard statistical and survival analysis, I seek to identify factors associated with IGO termination. My analysis is based on a novel dataset coding detailed information on all IGO created since 1815, including their function, membership, and geographic span. Against prevailing theoretical expectations, my analysis demonstrates i) that overall mortality is high among IGOs, ii) that states often prefer to create new IGOs as opposed reforming existing ones, and iii) that having a large and heterogeneous membership is associated with greater survivability. These findings indicate a need for refinement of existing theories of institutional robustness.

This paper addresses the puzzle of why, and under what conditions, international organizations cease to exist. International relations literature offers rich explanations for the creation, design and effectiveness of international institutions and organizations, but surprisingly little effort has gone into studying the dynamics of IO termination. Yet if we want to understand why and under what conditions international organizations endure, we must also explain why they often fail to do so. The present paper formulates and tests theoretical conjectures about IO termination using a combination of statistical analysis and historical case studies. My analysis is based on an original dataset covering the period 1815-2016. I find that exogenous shocks is a leading proximate cause of IO deaths since 1815 but that international organizations that are well-established, have large memberships and technical mandates have higher survival rates. My analysis leads me to suggest a number of refinements to existing theories institutional robustness.

We theorize the membership, target-selection, and timing of transnational advocacy campaigns as a function of longstanding professional networks between NGOs and individual professional campaigners. Unlike previous scholarship that focuses on the role of powerful "gatekeeper" NGOs whose central position within transnational issue-networks allows them to promote or block specific issues at will, we draw on recent work in sociology and organizational studies to bring into focus a wider community of individuals and organizations whose competition for professional growth and "issue-control" (Henriksen and Seabrooke 2016) shape the transnational advocacy agenda. In doing so we elaborate and qualify existing notions of gatekeeping pioneered by Bob (2005, 2010) and Carpenter (2011, 2014). Highly connected and resource-rich NGOs are often less able to "set" or "vet" agendas than previous scholarship suggests. Instead, porous organizational borders and "revolving doors" imply that advocacy agendas are shaped by professional networks that develop between organizations. Efforts by individual professional staff to steer the agenda towards issues that fit their personal expertise and career ambitions—rather than wider political context or longstanding organizational commitments to specific issues—play a crucial role in transnational agenda-setting.

States' capacity for using information and communication technology (ICT) to inflict grave economic, political and material harm on enemies has been amply demonstrated. In recent years, many states have reported large-scale cyber-attacks against their military defense systems, water supply systems and other critical national infrastructure. Currently there is no agreed-upon set of international rules and norms governing conflict in cyberspace. Many states prefer to keep it that way. They insist that difficulties of verifiability and the challenges raised by rapid technological change preclude international agreement on a formal convention to govern cyber conflict and favor reliance on strategic deterrence to limit conflict. In this article, I review some of the main objections to an international convention regulating the use of cyber weapons. I argue that while there are significant obstacles to effective multilateral arms control in the cyber domain, experience from other areas of international arms control suggest none of these obstacles are insurmountable. I also argue that whereas most observers insist that cyberspace favors offensive strategies, closer examination of the political dynamics of the cyber domain in fact indicates the dominance of defensive strategies. This in turn improves the prospects for striking effective multilateral agreement(s) to reduce risks of international cyber conflict.