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Adopting a differentiated threat approach, we investigated the relationship between cultural, economic, and criminal threat on attitudes toward four different ethnic minorities in Germany (Muslims, foreigners, refugees, and Sinti and Roma). We hypothesized that the effect of different types of intergroup threats on ethnic prejudice varies with the perceived characteristics of minority groups. Using a representative sample of German adults, we found that cultural and economic threat primarily predicted attitudes toward Muslims and foreigners, while criminal threat played a minor role in attitude formation among the majority population. For refugees and Sinti and Roma, all three types of intergroup threats were found to be equally important for the prediction of attitudes toward these minority groups. These results are only partially in line with the culture-specific threat profiles of these minority groups in the German context. Therefore, we discuss the tenability of the differentiated threat approach to explain the genesis of ethnic prejudice in different cultural contexts.

With a growing Muslim population, many European countries need to integrate Muslims into their societies. One aspect that can hinder successful integration are substantial differences in human values. This is because such values are consequential for attitudes as well as behavior. We compare basic human values between Muslim immigrants and non-Muslim natives in four European countries with distinct immigration histories and integration politics: Belgium, France, Germany, and Sweden. For most insightful comparisons, we contrast values of Muslim immigrants with those of Christian natives as well as those of non-religious natives. We employ data of more than 50,000 individuals based on the first eight waves of the European Social Survey. Our findings reveal significant differences in value priorities between Muslims, Christians and non-religious individuals in all four countries. Amongst other things, Muslim immigrants score particularly high in conservation values (security and tradition/conformity). At the same time, they also score higher in self-transcendence values (benevolence as well as universalism). While many of these findings are in line with theory and previous research, the higher score in universalism is unexpected. A potential explanation is the combination of religious traditionalism and discrimination experiences. In other words, religious traditions are associated with more conservative views, but being subject to marginalization can still result in an appreciation of equal opportunities. We find only limited support for differences in hedonism. Religiosity correlates with values of tradition/conformity for Muslim immigrants as well as for Christian natives. Thus, accounting for religiosity renders differences in these values between Muslims and other groups statistically insignificant. While most of these findings hold in all countries, differences are most pronounced in Sweden and lower in the other three countries, which is also true after accounting for differences in socio-economic status and ...

With a growing Muslim population, many European countries need to integrate Muslims into their societies. One aspect that can hinder successful integration are substantial differences in human values. This is because such values are consequential for attitudes as well as behavior. We compare basic human values between Muslim immigrants and non-Muslim natives in four European countries with distinct immigration histories and integration politics: Belgium, France, Germany, and Sweden. For most insightful comparisons, we contrast values of Muslim immigrants with those of Christian natives as well as those of non-religious natives. We employ data of more than 50,000 individuals based on the first eight waves of the European Social Survey. Our findings reveal significant differences in value priorities between Muslims, Christians and non-religious individuals in all four countries. Amongst other things, Muslim immigrants score particularly high in conservation values (security and tradition/conformity). At the same time, they also score higher in self-transcendence values (benevolence as well as universalism). While many of these findings are in line with theory and previous research, the higher score in universalism is unexpected. A potential explanation is the combination of religious traditionalism and discrimination experiences. In other words, religious traditions are associated with more conservative views, but being subject to marginalization can still result in an appreciation of equal opportunities. We find only limited support for differences in hedonism. Religiosity correlates with values of tradition/conformity for Muslim immigrants as well as for Christian natives. Thus, accounting for religiosity renders differences in these values between Muslims and other groups statistically insignificant. While most of these findings hold in all countries, differences are most pronounced in Sweden and lower in the other three countries, which is also true after accounting for differences in socio-economic status and religiosity between the three groups. This suggests that a combination of a country's history of diversity and national integration policies either encourages the convergence of values or leads to a solidification of value differences between groups. We discuss these political and social implications of our findings.

With a growing Muslim population, many European countries need to integrate Muslims into their societies. One aspect that can hinder successful integration are substantial differences in human values. This is because such values are consequential for attitudes as well as behavior. We compare basic human values between Muslim immigrants and non-Muslim natives in four European countries with distinct immigration histories and integration politics: Belgium, France, Germany, and Sweden. For most insightful comparisons, we contrast values of Muslim immigrants with those of Christian natives as well as those of non-religious natives. We employ data of more than 50,000 individuals based on the first eight waves of the European Social Survey. Our findings reveal significant differences in value priorities between Muslims, Christians and non-religious individuals in all four countries. Amongst other things, Muslim immigrants score particularly high in conservation values (security and tradition/conformity). At the same time, they also score higher in self-transcendence values (benevolence as well as universalism). While many of these findings are in line with theory and previous research, the higher score in universalism is unexpected. A potential explanation is the combination of religious traditionalism and discrimination experiences. In other words, religious traditions are associated with more conservative views, but being subject to marginalization can still result in an appreciation of equal opportunities. We find only limited support for differences in hedonism. Religiosity correlates with values of tradition/conformity for Muslim immigrants as well as for Christian natives. Thus, accounting for religiosity renders differences in these values between Muslims and other groups statistically insignificant. While most of these findings hold in all countries, differences are most pronounced in Sweden and lower in the other three countries, which is also true after accounting for differences in socio-economic status and religiosity between the three groups. This suggests that a combination of a country's history of diversity and national integration policies either encourages the convergence of values or leads to a solidification of value differences between groups. We discuss these political and social implications of our findings.

Conceptually, "group-focused enmity" (GFE, long-term project in Germany, duration: 2002–2011) consists of several different attitudes that constitute a syndrome of group-focused enmity. These attitudes are empirically related to each other and share a common core which is the ideology of inequality. But is GFE really a one-dimensional homogeneous ideology? Over the years there have been considerable doubts about this fundamental assumption. We have two central theoretical argumentations for explicating and revising the concept of GFE. The first is based on the social psychological literature regarding differences between ideologies, attitudes, stereotypes and social prejudices. The second arises from one of the basic conceptual ideas of the GFE project, which states that depending on the respective societies different specific groups become targets of devaluation and discrimination. Therefore, we propose a revised version of the GFE syndrome as a two-dimensional concept: an ideology of inequality (generalized attitudes) and social prejudice (specific attitudes). The measurement models are strictly empirically tested using data from theGFE panel(waves 2006, 2008) as well as the representativeGFE-surveys(cross-sections 2003, 2011) conducted in Germany. To test for discriminant and external validity, we have also included social dominance orientation (SDO). Additionally, within this framework, the methodological focus of the study is to test for several forms of measurement invariance in the context of higher-order factor models considering the issue of multidimensionality of latent variables. Our empirical results support the idea that GFE is a bi-dimensional concept consisting of an ideology of inequality and social prejudice. Moreover, SDO is demonstrated to be empirically distinct from both dimensions and correlates more strongly with the ideology of inequality in comparison to social prejudice. Additionally, the bi-dimensional GFE conceptualization proves to be at least metric invariant both between and within individuals. The impact of our proposed conceptualization and empirical findings will be discussed in the context of international research on ideologies, attitudes and prejudices. The dealing questions are why different explanatory factors have different effects on prejudicial and ideological attitudes and why there are different forms and manifestations of social prejudice in different societies over time.

[Der Verbund Forschungsdaten Bildung] Für den Erkenntnisgewinn, die Qualitätssicherung und letztlich den Erfolg wissenschaftlicher Forschung ist es zentral, einen nachhaltigen und grundsätzlich offenen Zugang zu Forschungsdaten und -ergebnissen für Wissenschaftler/innen zu gewährleisten. Die verlässliche Zugänglichkeit von Forschungsdaten sorgt einerseits für Transparenz und Nachvollziehbarkeit und fördert andererseits den kumulativen Erkenntnisgewinn. Wissenschaftspolitische Akteure und Zuwendungsgeber fordern und fördern daher den Aufbau entsprechender Infrastrukturen zur Archivierung und Nachnutzung qualitätsgesicherter Forschungsdaten (vgl. z. B. Allianz der Wissenschaftsorganisationen 2010, Kommission Zukunft der Informationsinfrastrukturen 2011, Wissenschaftsrat 2012, OECD 2013, Hochschulrektorenkonferenz 2014 und 2015, Rat für Informationsinfrastrukturen 2016). Seit 2008 fordert auch das Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF) durch entsprechende Förderauflagen im 'Rahmenprogramm zur Förderung der empirischen Bildungsforschung' (EBF-Rahmenprogramm) gezielt die Nachhaltigkeit von Forschungsdaten der Bildungsforschung ein. Es ist Bestandteil der Förderbedingungen, dass Projektnehmer/innen die in den Projekten generierten Daten und Instrumente archivieren und der Wissenschaft zur Nachnutzung verfügbar machen. Vor diesem Hintergrund widmet sich der Verbund Forschungsdaten Bildung (VerbundFDB) seit Oktober 2013 im Auftrag des BMBF dem Aufbau und der Gestaltung einer Forschungsdateninfrastruktur für die empirische Bildungsforschung. Die Aufgabe besteht darin, eine vernetzte Forschungsdateninfrastruktur für die empirische Bildungsforschung in ihrer gesamten Breite aufzubauen und im Austausch mit der Fachcommunity bedarfsgerecht zu gestalten. [.]

[Der Verbund Forschungsdaten Bildung] Für den Erkenntnisgewinn, die Qualitätssicherung und letztlich den Erfolg wissenschaftlicher Forschung ist es zentral, einen nachhaltigen und grundsätzlich offenen Zugang zu Forschungsdaten und -ergebnissen für Wissenschaftler/innen zu gewährleisten. Die verlässliche Zugänglichkeit von Forschungsdaten sorgt einerseits für Transparenz und Nachvollziehbarkeit und fördert andererseits den kumulativen Erkenntnisgewinn. Wissenschaftspolitische Akteure und Zuwendungsgeber fordern und fördern daher den Aufbau entsprechender Infrastrukturen zur Archivierung und Nachnutzung qualitätsgesicherter Forschungsdaten (vgl. z. B. Allianz der Wissenschaftsorganisationen 2010, Kommission Zukunft der Informationsinfrastrukturen 2011, Wissenschaftsrat 2012, OECD 2013, Hochschulrektorenkonferenz 2014 und 2015, Rat für Informationsinfrastrukturen 2016). Seit 2008 fordert auch das Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF) durch entsprechende Förderauflagen im 'Rahmenprogramm zur Förderung der empirischen Bildungsforschung' (EBF-Rahmenprogramm) gezielt die Nachhaltigkeit von Forschungsdaten der Bildungsforschung ein. Es ist Bestandteil der Förderbedingungen, dass Projektnehmer/innen die in den Projekten generierten Daten und Instrumente archivieren und der Wissenschaft zur Nachnutzung verfügbar machen. Vor diesem Hintergrund widmet sich der Verbund Forschungsdaten Bildung (VerbundFDB) seit Oktober 2013 im Auftrag des BMBF dem Aufbau und der Gestaltung einer Forschungsdateninfrastruktur für die empirische Bildungsforschung. Die Aufgabe besteht darin, eine vernetzte Forschungsdateninfrastruktur für die empirische Bildungsforschung in ihrer gesamten Breite aufzubauen und im Austausch mit der Fachcommunity bedarfsgerecht zu gestalten. [...]