Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis article scrutinizes the relationship between collective nostalgia and populism. Different populist figures utilize nostalgia by referring to their country's 'good old' glorious days and exploiting resentment of the elites and establishment. Populists instrumentalize nostalgia in order to create their populist heartland, which is a retrospectively constructed utopia based on an abandoned but undead past. Using two original datasets from Turkey, this study first analyzes whether collective nostalgia characterizes populist attitudes of the electorate. The results illustrate that collective nostalgia has a significantly positive relationship with populist attitudes even after controlling for various independent variables, including religiosity, partisanship, satisfaction with life and Euroscepticism. Secondly, the study tests whether nostalgic messages affect populist attitudes using an online survey experiment. The results indicate that Ottoman nostalgia helps increase populist attitudes. Kemalist nostalgia, however, has a weak direct effect on populist attitudes that disappears after controlling for party preference.

The rise of populism presents a challenge to liberal democracy in various countries. This article questions how populist attitudes affect the democratic preferences of the electorate. Using representative survey data fielded from Turkey in 2019, we first tested the effect of populist attitudes on illiberal democratic attitudes. The results show the negative impact of populism on support for illiberal democratic attitudes. Next, we analyzed which dimension of populism correlates with illiberal democratic preferences. Our results pointed to the negative influence of the Manichean outlook on preferences concerning democracy. Contrary to expectations, as anti-elitist and people-centric attitudes increase, support for illiberal democracy decreases. Hence, the relative emphasis on different dimensions of populism is likely to shape the net balance of its influence on democracy. Electoral alliance preferences also shape democracy preferences. The ruling People's Alliance voters are more supportive of illiberal democracy than the opposition blocs and parties.

Populist politicians frequently employ anti-establishment appeals in their discourse by targeting an imagined or real power elite. Do such appeals have a mobilizing effect among voters? What role do the emotional responses of voters play in this process? We address these questions using a vignette experiment embedded into a nationally representative survey fielded in Turkey, a country where a populist party has long been in power. Our research design enables us to assess whether voters respond more positively to a populist framing of a call for mobilization on an issue compared to a non-populist framing, and whether their emotional responses act as mediators. We find that populist rhetoric indeed does have a mobilizing effect, though only for a low-cost form of political participation (signing a petition) and only among the constituency of the populist party. Turning to the role of emotions, we find that the populist framing of the issue led voters to report more discontent, despair, and anxiety, and these emotions mediate the positive influence of the populist message on mobilization. Thus, our study contributes to research on populism by highlighting the role of emotions in the mobilizing effect of populist discourse.

AbstractDiscontent is seen as a critical driver for the appeal of populism, yet studies have typically focused on cases of populism in opposition. We argue that scholars' emphasis on populism in opposition led them to overlook the roles of elite messages and partisanship in the adoption of populist attitudes. Drawing on theories of elite-driven public opinion, we contend that populist attitudes do not need to be rooted in discontent. In cases of populism in power, those who are more satisfied politically and economically, and partisans of the ruling party should display higher levels of populist attitudes. We provide observational and experimental survey evidence in this direction from Turkey, where a populist party has long been in power. We also find that the dominant characteristic of support for populism in power is an emphasis on popular sovereignty at the expense of institutions of horizontal accountability.

Bu çalışma, popülist eğilimlerin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun son döneminden günümüz Türkiye siyasetine kadar hangi liderler ve partiler tarafından ne şekilde benimsendiğini araştırmaktadır. Bu amaçla çalışmamızın kurgusu popülizmi zayıf-merkezli bir ideoloji olarak kabul etmektedir. Görgül zenginliğe olanak sağlayan bu tanımlamanın ışığında Türkiye'deki popülizmin tarihi millet (halk), elitler ve milli irade kavramları çerçevesinde irdelenmiştir. İncelememiz Türkiye'deki popülizmde üç ayrı "halk" kavramını gözlemlemektedir. Bunlar, solda 1970'ler Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin benimsediği "sıradan insanlar;" merkez sağ partilerin 1950'lerden itibaren takip ettiği "milli irade" ile "halkın aklıselimi" ve sağda 1969 itibariyle Milli Görüş ideolojisinin benimsediği "İslam milleti" tanımlamalarıdır. Türkiye'deki popülizm, milletin (halkın) karşısına yerleştirilen elitlerin tanımına siyasal partilerin muhalefette-iktidarda olup olmamalarına ve ideolojik sağ-sol yönelimlerine göre farklılık göstermektedir. Yakın dönemde ise Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Demokrat Parti ve Adalet Partisi çizgisini ve Milli Görüş'ün yaklaşımını harmanlayarak Türkiye popülizmine yeni bir kimlik kazandırmıştır. Bu bağlamda, milletin (halkın) karşısındaki elit tanımı iç siyasetteki dışlayıcı-otoriter yöneticilerden uluslararası siyasetteki dış düşmanlara ve onların iç siyasetteki işbirlikçilerine endekslenmiştir. Sonuçta, incelememiz Türkiye'deki popülist eğilimlerin siyasette sadece belli bir parti ve ideolojiye ait olmadığını tarihsel bir bütünlük içerisinde sunmaktadır. Bu teorik temelli tarihsel bütünlük aynı zamanda diğer nicel ve nitel vaka analizlerine de önemli bir kaynak sağlayacaktır. Millet (halk), elitler ve milli irade kavramlarının tarih içerisinde ve siyasal sağ-sol ideoloji yelpazesinin neredeyse her yerinde geçirmiş olduğu gelişimi ortaya koymanın diğer karşılaştırmalı çalışmalara da hem kuramsal hem de görgül katkılarda bulunacağını düşünmekteyiz.