Suchergebnisse

While cross-sector partnerships are sometimes depicted as a pragmatic problem solving arrangements devoid of politics and power, they are often characterized by power dynamics. Asymmetries in power can have a range of undesirable consequences as low-power actors may be co-opted, ignored, over-ruled, or excluded by dominant parties. As of yet, there has been relatively little conceptual work on the power strategies that actors in cross-sector partnerships deploy to shape collective decisions to their own advantage. Insights from across the literatures on multiparty collaboration, cross-sector partnerships, interactive governance, collaborative governance, and network governance, are integrated into a theoretical framework for empirically analyzing power sources (resources, discursive legitimacy, authority) and power strategies (power over and power in cross-sector partnerships). Three inter-related claims are central to our argument: (1) the intersection between the issue field addressed in the partnership and an actor's institutional field shape the power sources available to an actor; (2) an actor can mobilize these power sources directly in strategies to achieve power in cross-sector partnerships; and, (3) an actor can also mobilize these power sources indirectly, through setting the rules of the game, to achieve power over partnerships. The framework analytically connects power dynamics to their broader institutional setting and allows for spelling out how sources of power are used in direct and indirect power strategies that steer the course of cross-sector partnerships. The resulting conceptual framework provides the groundwork for pursuing new lines of empirical inquiry into power dynamics in cross-sector partnerships.

While cross-sector partnerships are sometimes depicted as a pragmatic problem solving arrangements devoid of politics and power, they are often characterized by power dynamics. Asymmetries in power can have a range of undesirable consequences as low-power actors may be co-opted, ignored, over-ruled, or excluded by dominant parties. As of yet, there has been relatively little conceptual work on the power strategies that actors in cross-sector partnerships deploy to shape collective decisions to their own advantage. Insights from across the literatures on multiparty collaboration, cross-sector partnerships, interactive governance, collaborative governance, and network governance, are integrated into a theoretical framework for empirically analyzing power sources (resources, discursive legitimacy, authority) and power strategies (power over and power in cross-sector partnerships). Three inter-related claims are central to our argument: (1) the intersection between the issue field addressed in the partnership and an actor's institutional field shape the power sources available to an actor; (2) an actor can mobilize these power sources directly in strategies to achieve power in cross-sector partnerships; and, (3) an actor can also mobilize these power sources indirectly, through setting the rules of the game, to achieve power over partnerships. The framework analytically connects power dynamics to their broader institutional setting and allows for spelling out how sources of power are used in direct and indirect power strategies that steer the course of cross-sector partnerships. The resulting conceptual framework provides the groundwork for pursuing new lines of empirical inquiry into power dynamics in cross-sector partnerships.

Résumé La plupart des organisations non gouvernementales du Sud (ONGS) sont tributaires des organismes donateurs pour assurer leur survie. Pour avoir droit à un financement de leur part, les ONGS doivent généralement respecter une série de conditions de financement. Les détracteurs soutiennent que les conditions imposées par les bailleurs de fonds ont parfois des conséquences indésirables. Sur la base d'une recherche qualitative menée auprès de 41 ONGS en Inde et au Ghana, le présent article étudie (1) les effets négatifs (potentiels) des conditions imposées par les bailleurs de fonds aux ONGS et (2) les stratégies qu'emploient les ONGS pour répondre à ces conditions. Nous allons voir que certaines de ces conditions sont difficiles à satisfaire dans le cadre d'un développement mettant l'accent sur la propriété locale et sur une société civile solide et autonome. Nous verrons également que les ONGS recourent à toute une série de stratégies pour faire face aux conditions défavorables des bailleurs de fonds et qu'elles ne sont pas impuissantes dans leurs rapports avec ceux-ci. Ces stratégies ne sont cependant pas toujours accessibles à toutes les organisations et peuvent avoir des conséquences indésirables. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens L'aide privée en faveur du développement est de plus en plus caractérisée par des critères d'imputabilité et par des modalités de financement plus rigoureuses. Les bailleurs de fonds qui viennent en aide aux ONGS doivent tenir compte du fait que leurs conditions de financement peuvent avoir une série d'effets indésirables. Notre étude donne un aperçu de ces conséquences, afin de permettre aux organismes donateurs de passer systématiquement en revue leurs conditions eu égard à leurs effets potentiellement négatifs. Notre étude fait en outre apparaître que, lorsqu'elles sont confrontées à des conditions irréalistes imposées par les bailleurs de fonds, les ONGS adoptent un comportement stratégique. Ce phénomène est particulièrement problématique lorsque les ONGS en viennent à manipuler les perceptions des bailleurs de fonds, ce qui entraîne l'apparition d'une « réalité papier ».

Most Southern Non-Governmental Organizations (SNGOs) depend on donor agencies for their survival. To qualify for donor funding, SNGOs typically have to meet a range of funding conditions. Critics argue that donor requirements may have undesirable consequences. Based on qualitative research involving 41 SNGOs in India and Ghana, this article explores (1) the (potentially) adverse effects of donor conditions on SNGOs and (2) the strategies that SNGOs employ to deal with these conditions. We demonstrate that certain donor conditions are difficult to reconcile with a view of development that emphasizes local ownership and a strong and autonomous civil society. We also show that SNGOs employ a multitude of strategies to deal with adverse donor conditions, highlighting that they are not powerless in their relations with donors. Yet, these strategies are not always available to all organizations and may have undesired consequences.Points for practitionersPrivate development aid is increasingly characterized by pressure for accountability and a tightening of funding arrangements. Donors supporting SNGOs need to take into consideration that their funding conditions may have a range of undesirable consequences. Our study offers an overview of these consequences, enabling donor agencies to systematically review their conditions in the light of their potentially adverse effects. In addition, our study shows that – when confronted when unworkable donor conditions – SNGOs employ strategic behaviour. This is particularly problematic when SNGOs resort to manipulating the perception of donors resulting in the creation of a paper reality.

This article examines decision making in the partnerships between three private aid agencies and their local partners in Ghana, India, and Nicaragua. Drawing upon a mixed methodology, the article maps the relative influence of these partners vis-à-vis the agencies and reveals the processes underlying decision-making outcomes. Three main findings are advanced: (a) Institutional rules regulate per topic the extent in which partners can participate in the decision making, ranging from exclusion to full decision-making authority; (b) four clusters of decision-making topics were identified reflecting the different degrees to which partners are allowed to participate in the decision making; and (c) while partners' ability to influence decisions above all is affected by the institutional rules, some have more influence than others depending on their organizational capacity and their respective project-officer.