Suchergebnisse

Preface and Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Abbreviations -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- The Resource Curse Theory -- SSA's Gold Curse -- The Choice of Countries -- Ghana -- South Africa -- Tanzania -- A Growing Role for the Private Sector -- Research Questions and Approach -- Institutionalist Perspectives -- Book Outline -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 2: Theoretical Explanations for Firm-Led Governance -- Introduction -- Defining the Resource Curse -- Dutch Disease -- The Impacts of Volatility -- The Rentier State

AbstractThis article examines the role of business, through the World Gold Council, in the evolution of the Conflict‐free Gold Standard (CFGS). Using document analysis of meeting minutes, augmented by interviews with key participants, it is demonstrated that through the use of structural and discursive power, mining firms were able to socialise other actors (governments and NGOs) into accepting a business‐friendly standard. During the consultation process, the standard was weakened sufficiently as to allow business to continue to pursue opportunities in conflict zones. It is argued that the CFGS does little to address the issue of mine site conflict, but instead serves as a mechanism to reassure gold investors and consumers. The paper concludes that the Conflict‐free Gold Standard, like many private governance initiatives, is unlikely to address the issue it purports to. And, that, firms' contribution to global governance should be cautiously viewed in this light.

Mining companies are increasingly seen as co-governors of sub-Saharan Africa's gold mining industries, sharing sovereignty with states through private governance initiatives. Using interviews with company executives from the continent's largest gold mining firms this paper highlights the private authority of these firms vis-à-vis the state. This paper firstly examines the globalization and governance literature, focusing on why states share sovereignty with non-state actors. Secondly, a "three faces of power" framework is employed to understand how authority is exercised. Thirdly, private governance regimes specific to the mining industry are outlined. Finally, individuals' and firms' attitudes towards these private governance regimes are examined through an analysis of elite interviews. The theoretical and empirical analysis demonstrates that firms are formulating rules in order to increase certainty and reduce investment risk. These firms are engaging in private governance initiatives to build reputations as industry experts thereby controlling the regulation of their sector, rather than sharing authority with states.

AbstractGlobal economic integration undermines the effectiveness of national corporate taxation regimes. Being able to shift their revenues to states where they pay little tax, multinational corporations (MNCs) legally minimise what they pay. However, corporations' reputations are precious assets that they may jeopardise if they are widely perceived to not be paying their 'fair share' of taxation. Does this affect corporate perspectives? We first consider the reality that the global economy is both geographically and economically concentrated. This market and geographical concentration is the source of MNCs' power and it affects their strategic perspective on minimising tax payments. It also supports a liberal preoccupation with shareholder value that reflects the institutional context of their major headquarters: the US. Second, we analyse indices of corporate reputation to demonstrate how this perspective dominates other attributes, particularly social responsibility. Third, we consider corporate responses to recent inquiries. We find that a liberal ideological belief in free markets and a focus on shareholder value dominate corporate conceptions of legitimacy. We therefore conclude it is unlikely MNCs will voluntarily pay their fair share of tax, but that in declaring their right not to do so they have opened the way to national and international re‐regulation.

AbstractThe Big Four professional services firms – PwC, Deloitte, KPMG and EY – promote, sanction, and regularise the behaviour and practices of business and government. This is especially the case in the area of multinational tax avoidance. This large, and growing, sector of the Big Four's business model places them at the centre of both causing and addressing the problem. Their role is not limited to advising MNCs on complex tax structures. They also advise governments and international organisations on regulatory reform of the global tax system. This article examines their role in so doing through an analysis of Australian Senate Inquiry hearings and responses to the OECD reform programme on the digitalisation of the economy. We show that advice provided by the Big Four is not purely technical, but is intended to achieve a global corporate tax system that is either globally dis‐harmonised or a matter of national regulatory incrementalism. This is despite their claims of supporting global regulation based on multilateral agreements. Ultimately, we demonstrate that the Big Four use their significant structural power to discursively undermine the ideals of the OECD, the leading international organisation working to reform global taxation.

The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) is seen as arising from a new social structure of accumulation that institutionalised a neoliberal form of capitalism post the 1980s. This gave rise to "financialization," which has increased both the power of financial markets over other economic sectors, and of financial market actors over national governments. However, while the neoliberal ideology underpinning financialization had a global impact, it sprang from the leading free market economies of the US and UK and was most readily embraced by states sharing their institutional support for it, such as Australia and Canada. But to what extent has it been questioned in these states since the crisis? In this article we examine perceptions of the legitimacy of finance via a 6 year comparative study of editorials in the mainstream press over 2007–2012. We do so because shifts in perceptions of the legitimacy suggest the extent to which the GFC produced the potential for more fundamental institutional change. We find that rather than this legitimacy having been undermined, or transformed, existing viewpoints instead hardened over the period considered. This indicates that, despite regulatory reform, the power of finance remains relatively unchanged.