Suchergebnisse

Argues that disputes arising from the FL vote in the 2000 presidential election should have been resolved by Congress rather than the Supreme Court. An analysis of Bush v. Gore maintains that the US Supreme Court's decision to remand the case & stay the recount indicates an inherent conflict of interest on the part of the justices that sets it apart from earlier election law cases reviewed by the Court. Charges of partisanship would have been avoided if the Court had left the matter to the political sphere. Claims that failure of the Court to intervene in the election would have caused a constitutional crisis are based on unfounded fears stemming from distrust of the political process. Not only is there no evidence that the political crisis would have damaged the institutions of governance, but it is likely that the dispute could have been resolved by state actors. If not, it is contended that the proper forum for determining the outcome was the US Congress, which has a framework for constraining opportunism & channeling deliberation. J. Lindroth

Three challenges affect the use of initiatives and referendums concerning bonds to fund local infrastructure. First, public officials can often make take-it-or-leave-it offers to voters, conferring substantial power on the agenda setters and not necessarily leading to policy that the voters prefer. Second, initiatives are subject to sequential-elimination agendas that can result in suboptimal policy. This problem is compounded in local direct democracy by the presence of multiple jurisdictions and an aggregate limit on bond capacity, leading to a "race to the polls." Third, in some but not all cases, voters can be faced with an information environment that precludes making reasoned decisions at the polls. The authors assess several case studies to determine whether trustworthy voting cues are available to voters in elections on infrastructure bonds.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Contributors -- Preface -- Introduction: A Dialogue on American Democratic Politics -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. Pluralism, Identity Politics, and Coalitions: Toward Madisonian Constitutionalism -- Chapter 2. Equality's Troubles: Madison in Modern America -- Chapter 3. The Majoritarian Impulse and the Declining Significance of Place -- Chapter 4. The Future of Democratic Participation: The Significance of Immigration, Race, and Class -- Chapter 5. The Future of Liberty in American Democratic Politics? Or the Future of Democracy for the Politics of Liberty? -- Chapter 6. The Rhetoric of Democratic Liberty -- Introduction -- Chapter 7. The Future of Legislatures in Democratic Politics -- Chapter 8. Legislative Politics: Institutional Democracy and Public Disaffection -- Chapter 9. The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Future Democratic Politics -- Chapter 10. The Supreme Court and Bush v. Gore: Resolving Electoral Disputes in a Democracy -- Chapter 11. Democratic Ends and Political Parties in America -- Chapter 12. Contentious Democracy: Presidential-Interest Group Relations in a Madisonian System -- Conclusion: Perspectives on the Future of American Democratic Politics -- Notes -- Works Cited -- Index

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Prolegomena for a Sampler: Extrajudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 1789–1861 -- Congressional Attitudes toward Constitutional Interpretation -- Constitutional Analysis by Congressional Staff Agencies -- Hearing about the Constitution in Congressional Committees -- The Federal Appointments Process as Constitutional Interpretation -- Lawyers in Congress -- Congressional Responses to Judicial Review -- Court, Congress, and Civil Rights -- Quasi-Constitutional Law: The Rise of Super-Statutes -- Congressional Fact Finding and the Scope of Judicial Review -- Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress -- Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria and Two Informal Case Studies -- Can Congress Be Trusted with the Constitution? The Effects of Incentives and Procedures -- About the Contributors -- Index