Suchergebnisse

"Dieser Artikel fasst die aktuelle theoretische und empirische Literatur zur effizienten Zuordnung öffentlicher Aufgaben auf verschiedene Regierungsebenen zusammen und wendet die daraus resultierenden Erkenntnisse auf die Kompetenzabgrenzungsdebatte innerhalb der Europäischen Union an. Die wesentlichen Schlussfolgerungen lauten: (1) Die präzise Ableitung eines optimalen Dezentralisierungsgrades ist aufgrund inkonsistenter und widersprüchlicher theoretischer Aussagen nicht möglich. Der jeweils adäquate Dezentralisierungsgrad kann nur von Fall zu Fall abgewogen und bestimmt werden. (2) Der Zusammenhang zwischen ökonomischer Performance und fiskaler Dezentralisierung weist keine systematische empirische Evidenz auf. Entsprechende Untersuchungen sind uneindeutig und rar. (3) Der Vergleich der aktuellen und zukünftigen Dezentralisierung von EU-Politikfeldern mit den ökonomischen normativen Empfehlungen offenbart deutliche Diskrepanzen bei Landwirtschaft (zu zentral angesiedelt) und Verteidigung (zu dezentral angesiedelt). (4) Die Entwicklung eines flexiblen Zuordnungsschemas ist eine unabdingbare Notwendigkeit, um Reversibilität in der Kompetenzverteilung zu gewährleisten und sich ändernden Rahmenbedingungen auf effiziente Weise Rechnung zu tragen. In diesem Zusammenhang hat der Europäische Konvent leider unzureichende Ergebnisse in seinem Endentwurf vom Juli 2003 geliefert." (Autorenreferat)

AbstractWe use data from the 2006 round of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey to describe perceptions of the Russian population about the transition process and the role of the state compared with that of free markets. We find that about one‐half of the Russian population is disappointed with transition and a large majority is in favour of high state regulation and state provision of goods and services. High demand for government regulation and increased state intervention coexists with a low level of trust in government institutions and recognition of high and rising levels of corruption. The findings are consistent with the theory developed by Aghion et al. (2009). In an environment with poor social capital, private business imposes negative externalities on the society and society chooses to demand more state regulation and tolerate corruption to reduce these externalities. We also find that individual perceptions of social capital and corruption co‐vary with the demand for regulation, as predicted by the theory.

This paper studies the transmission of a foreign fiscal policy shock (assumed to be generated in Germany) to key macroeconomic variables in five Central and Eastern European economies (CEE-5). We use quarterly data from 1995 to 2009 and estimate an open economy structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model identified by imposing reasonable restrictions on contemporaneous responses in the system. Our model is able to identify well-known episodes of fiscal policy action in the countries under review. We find that a foreign fiscal shock affects domestic fiscal variables and vice versa, highlighting the importance of cross-country coordination of fiscal policies within the EU. All the CEE-5 respond to a fiscal expansion abroad with fiscal easing at home (more strongly on the public spending than on the revenue side). We find negative cross-border fiscal spillovers for Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while in Poland and Hungary, output reacts positively to a fiscal expansion in Germany. For domestic fiscal shocks, which we also explore, we find Keynesian responses in Hungary and Slovakia, while non-Keynesian responses are present in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia. Our results imply that one-size-fits-all policy recommendations would be too simplistic for the CEE-5; a deeper understanding of the reasons for cross-country differences in response to fiscal shocks is required to be able to provide adequate information to policymakers in these countries.

Using survey data from 28 transition countries, we test for the complementarity and substitutability of market-relevant skills and institutions. We show that democracy and good governance complement market skills in transition economies. Under autocracy and weak governance institutions, there is no significant difference in support for revising privatization between high- and low-skilled respondents. As the level of democracy and the quality of governance increases, the difference in the level of support for revising privatization between the high and low skilled grows dramatically. This finding contributes to our understanding of microfoundations of the politics of economic reform.