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This book examines local zoning policies and suggests reforms that states and the federal government might adopt to counter the negative effects of exclusionary zoning. In this book, the author asserts that local zoning policies are the most consequential regulatory program in the United States. Many localities have created barriers to the development of less costly forms of housing. Numerous economists have found that current zoning practices inflict major damage on the national economy. Using Silicon Valley, the Greater New Haven area, and the northwestern portion of Greater Austin as case studies, the author shows in unprecedented detail how the zoning system works and recommends steps for its reform. Zoning regulations, the author demonstrates, are hard to dislodge once localities have enacted them. He develops metrics to measure the existence and costs of exclusionary zoning, and suggests reforms that the government - at both the state level and the federal level - could undertake to counter the detrimental effects of local policies. These include the cartelization of housing markets and the aggravation of racial and class segregation.

Frontmatter -- Preface -- Contents -- Introduction -- Part I. Shasta County -- 1. Shasta County and Its Cattle Industry -- 2. The Politics of Cattle Trespass -- 3. The Resolution of Cattle-Trespass Disputes -- 4. Who Pays for Boundary Fences -- 5. Disputes Arising out of Highway Collisions Involving Livestock -- 6. The Effects of Closed-Range Ordinances -- Part II. A Theory of Norms -- 7. The System of Social Control -- 8. Shortcomings of Current Theories of Social Control -- 9. The Puzzle of Cooperation -- 10. A Hypothesis of Welfare-Maximizing Norms -- 11. Substantive Norms: Of Bees, Cattle, and Whales -- 12. Remedial Norms: Of Carrots and Sticks -- 13. Procedural and Constitutive Norms: Of Gossip, Ritual, and Hero Worship -- 14. Controller-Selecting Norms: Of Contracts, Custom, and Photocopies -- Part III. The Future of Norms -- 15. Testing the Content of Norms -- 16. Conclusions and Implications -- Appendix. Research Methods -- Index

Some people dwell alone, many in family-based households, and an adventuresome few in communes. The Household is the first book to systematically lay bare the internal dynamics of these and other home arrangements. Legal underpinnings, social considerations, and economic constraints all influence how household participants select their homemates and govern their interactions around the hearth. Robert Ellickson applies transaction cost economics, sociological theory, and legal analysis to explore issues such as the sharing of household output, the control of domestic misconduct, and the owners

Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Introduction -- Part I. Shasta County -- 1. Shasta County and Its Cattle Industry -- 2. The Politics of Cattle Trespass -- 3. The Resolution of Cattle-Trespass Disputes -- 4. Who Pays for Boundary Fences? -- 5. Disputes Arising out of Highway Collisions Involving Livestock -- 6. The Effects of Closed-Range Ordinances -- Part II. A Theory of Norms -- 7. The System of Social Control -- 8. Shortcomings of Current Theories of Social Control -- 9. The Puzzle of Cooperation -- 10. A Hypothesis of Welfare-Maximizing Norms -- 11. Substantive Norms: Of Bees, Cattle, and Whales -- 12. Remedial Norms: Of Carrots and Sticks -- 13. Procedural and Constitutive Norms: Of Gossip, Ritual, and Hero Worship -- 14. Controller-Selecting Norms: Of Contracts, Custom, and Photocopies -- Part III. The Future of Norms -- 15. Testing the Content of Norms -- 16. Conclusions and Implications -- Appendix. Research Methods -- Index.

Some people dwell alone, many in family-based households, and an adventuresome few in communes. The Household is the first book to systematically lay bare the internal dynamics of these and other home arrangements. Legal underpinnings, social considerations, and economic constraints all influence how household participants select their homemates and govern their interactions around the hearth. Robert Ellickson applies transaction cost economics, sociological theory, and legal analysis to explore issues such as the sharing of household output, the control of domestic misconduct, and the ownership of dwelling units. Drawing on a broad range of historical and statistical sources, Ellickson contrasts family-based households with the more complex arrangements in medieval English castles, Israeli kibbutzim, and contemporary cohousing communities. He shows that most individuals, when structuring their home relationships, pursue a strategy of consorting with intimates. This, he asserts, facilitates informal coordination and tends ultimately to enhance the quality of domestic interactions. He challenges utopian critics who seek to enlarge the scale of the household and legal advocates who urge household members to rely more on written contracts and lawsuits. Ellickson argues that these commentators fail to appreciate the great advantages in the home setting of informally associating with a handful of trusted intimates