Suchergebnisse
Filter
21 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
Rational bubbles and public debt policy: A quantitative analysis
In: Journal of Monetary Economics, Band 96, S. 109-123
When Does Communication Improve Coordination?
In: American economic review, Band 100, Heft 4, S. 1695-1724
ISSN: 1944-7981
We study costless pre-play communication of intentions among inexperienced players. Using the level-k model of strategic thinking to describe players' beliefs, we fully characterize the effects of preplay communication in symmetric 2×2 games. One-way communication weakly increases coordination on Nash equilibrium outcomes, although average payoffs sometimes decrease. Two-way communication further improves payoffs in some games but is detrimental in others. Moving beyond the class of symmetric 2 × 2 games, we find that communication facilitates coordination in common interest games with positive spillovers and strategic complementarities, but there are also games in which any type of communication hampers coordination. (JEL C72, D83)
Time is not money
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Band 72, Heft 1, S. 96-102
In an ultimatum bargaining experiment, we study how subjects bargain over the returns to their investments of money and time. The most notable finding is that a third of the subjects demand no compensation for their time investments, whereas almost all subjects demand compensation for equally costly monetary investments.
Commitment and Conflict in Bilateral Bargaining
In: American economic review, Band 98, Heft 4, S. 1629-1635
ISSN: 1944-7981
Building on previous work by Schelling and Crawford, we study a model of bilateral bargaining in which negotiators can make binding commitments at a low positive cost c. Most of our results concern outcomes that survive iterated strict dominance. If commitment attempts never fail, there are three such outcomes. In two of them, all the surplus goes to one player. In the third, there is a high probability of conflict. If commitment attempts succeed with probability q < 1, the unique outcome that survives iterated strict dominance entails conflict with probability q2. When c = 0, analogous results hold if the requirement of iterated strict dominance is replaced by iterated weak dominance. (JEL C78, D84)
Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory
In: American economic review, Band 98, Heft 3, S. 990-1008
ISSN: 1944-7981
Desire for social esteem is a source of prosocial behavior. We develop a model in which actors' utility of esteem depends on the audience. In a principal-agent setting, we show that the model can account for motivational crowding out. Control systems and pecuniary incentives erode morale by signaling to the agent that the principal is not worth impressing. The model also offers an explanation for why agents are motivated by unconditionally high pay and by mission-oriented principals. (JEL D01, D82)
SSRN
In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit
In: American economic review, Band 94, Heft 3, S. 569-590
ISSN: 1944-7981
It is typically less profitable for an opportunistic borrower to divert inputs than to divert cash. Therefore, suppliers may lend more liberally than banks. This simple argument is at the core of our contract theoretic model of trade credit in competitive markets. The model implies that trade credit and bank credit can be either complements or substitutes. Among other things, the model explains why trade credit has short maturity, why trade credit is more prevalent in less developed credit markets, and why accounts payable of large unrated firms are more countercyclical than those of small firms.
Promises, Threats and Fairness
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 114, Heft 495, S. 397-420
ISSN: 1468-0297
Why are Long Rates Sensitive to Monetary Policy?
In: IGIER Working Paper No. 256
SSRN
Fixed or Flexible? Wage‐setting in Search Equilibrium
In: Economica, Band 70, Heft 278, S. 233-250
ISSN: 1468-0335
Why do some vacancies offer a posted wage whereas others offer a negotiable wage? The paper endogenizes the choice of wage policy in a standard sequential search model with heterogeneous workers. In particular, we identify circumstances such that there exists an equilibrium in which all firms negotiate wages. We find that this equilibrium exists if and only if the labour market is sufficiently tight and worker heterogeneity is sufficiently large.
Monitoring and Pay
In: Journal of labor economics: JOLE, Band 20, Heft 2, S. 201-216
ISSN: 1537-5307
Monetary Policy and Market Interest Rates
In: American economic review, Band 91, Heft 5, S. 1594-1607
ISSN: 1944-7981
Mandated countertrade as a strategic commitment
In: Journal of international economics, Band 40, Heft 1-2, S. 67-84
ISSN: 0022-1996
Mandated Countertrade as a Strategic Commitment
In: Journal of International Economics, Band 40, Heft 1
SSRN