Suchergebnisse

The text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement and more than 5,000 pages of individual country schedules were released in October 2015 after five years of negotiations. Its transformation from a small agreement to one of the deepest and broadest trade deals ever, with 12 members, highlights the challenges of negotiating modern comprehensive trade agreements.

Abstract
Much has been made of the "spaghetti or noodle bowl" problem of overlapping preferential trade agreements (PTA). A new PTA, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), currently under negotiation between eleven states – Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam – is intended to help address this issue. The TPP will lower or eliminate barriers to trade among the partners. But officials are not operating in a vacuum as they negotiate this new agreement. Instead, they must contend with rules created in previous agreements, many of which link TPP partners together in ways that constrain their options now. This article looks in detail at negotiations over market access in goods to better understand the tradeoffs faced by negotiators. Unfortunately, some of the decisions made so far after three years of talks suggest that the TPP market access deal could end up being just another twisted noodle in a crowded bowl.

AbstractThis article considers bargaining strategies used by government negotiators in the context of bilateral trade disputes. I argue that trade officials reach the most durable agreements by using an integrative, or value-creating, strategy and avoiding the use of threats. By contrast, a highly distributive, value-claiming strategy coupled with loud public threats is unlikely to result in a durable agreement and frequently leads to deadlocked negotiations. The irony, however, is that American officials use the latter approach more frequently than the former in bilateral trade disputes. These strategies are usually chosen unconsciously in response to perceptions of losses that drive negotiators to select risky approaches to resolve disputes.By examining bargaining strategies in the U.S. disputes with Japan and South Korea over automobiles and auto parts in the 1990s, this article identifies shifts in negotiation strategies. These shifts in approach closely track the outcomes in these two deeply contentious disputes. After protracted and contentious negotiations with Japan, the final outcome represented a failure to achieve the Americans' most important goals. A less confrontational strategy with South Korea ultimately resulted in greater market opening.

This article considers bargaining strategies used by government negotiators in the context of bilateral trade disputes. I argue that trade officials reach the most durable agreements by using an integrative, or value- creating, strategy & avoiding the use of threats. By contrast, a highly distributive, value- claiming strategy coupled with loud public threats is unlikely to result in a durable agreement & frequently leads to deadlocked negotiations. The irony, however, is that American officials use the latter approach more frequently than the former in bilateral trade disputes. These strategies are usually chosen unconsciously in response to perceptions of losses that drive negotiators to select risky approaches to resolve disputes. By examining bargaining strategies in the U.S. disputes with Japan & South Korea over automobiles & auto parts in the 1990s, this article identifies shifts in negotiation strategies. These shifts in approach closely track the outcomes in these two deeply contentious disputes. After protracted & contentious negotiations with Japan, the final outcome represented a failure to achieve the Americans' most important goals. A less confrontational strategy with South Korea ultimately resulted in greater market opening. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.