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Foreword -- Preface -- Warfare and State Formation -- Total War and Conflicts -- References -- Contents -- Contributors -- Editors -- Authors -- Part I Wars and State Formation in the Short and Long Run -- Paths to Inclusive Political Institutions -- Introduction -- The Basin of Attraction -- The Emergence of the Athenian Polis -- State and Society in Early Modern England -- The Symbiotic Relationship between State and Society -- Outside the Basin of Attraction -- The Tiv -- Leviathans -- A Paper Leviathan: Colombia -- A Despotic Leviathan: Rwanda -- The Academic Literature -- Conclusion

This article analyzes the demand for military spending in the 1920s and 1930s, based on variables arising from the international system and the selected countries. The main premise is that the military spending was an impure public good, implying that both public and private benefits drove the demand for this type of expenditure. Threats arising from the autocratic states in the 1930s increased these expenditures, and democracies overall tended to spend less. Moreover, the absence of clear international leadership by the USA or UK destabilized the international system and increased military spending, with alliances failing to produce a public good effect. Military spending resulted in joint products at the level of state and within state, and the level of economic development seemed to exert a downward pressure on the military spending of these states. There were some contradictory spillover effects felt by these states. On the whole, this article suggests that scholars should expand their explanatory models to include impure public good influences in military spending analysis. ; peerReviewed

Analysis of military acquisition policies in Finland, Sweden, and Great Britain in the period from 1920 to 1938 produces evidence of rent seeking, both quantitative and qualitative, in all three cases. The Finnish institutional environment offered the most extensive rents and collusion opportunities, which translated into tangible price advantages for domestic producers. The Swedish and British domestic producers operated under more efficient institutions and thus had to settle for more moderate rents. Evolving institutional environments determined the extent of the rent seeking.

Defence date: 2 July 2002 ; Examining Board: Prof. Mark Harrison, University of Warwick (external supervisor); Prof. Riita Hjerppe, University of Helsinki; Prof. Alan Milward, European University Institute; Prof. Jaime Reis, University of Lisbon (supervisor) ; First made available online on 11 April 2018 ; This thesis is the outcome of years of research on the complex aspects of military spending among various countries in the interwar period. It would not have been possible to complete this study without the help and encouragement of numerous individuals and organizations, although the ultimate responsibility for the remaining errors is of course mine. First and foremost, my deepest gratitude is owed to Professor Jaime Reis, whose intellectual challenges and individual support have been invaluable in order for me to reach the conclusion of this journey. Secondly, the same goes for Professor Mark Harrison's untiring efforts to sharpen and develop the theoretical and empirical premises of this thesis, as well as for his kind assistance during my recent stay at the University o f Warwick. In addition, Professor Alan Milward's comments and scholarly challenges have greatly influenced my stay here in Florence. Of the rest of the faculty here, I would also like to mention Professor Giovanni Federico's and Professor Arfon Rees' insightful seminars and intellectual companionship. The friendship and scientific challenges posed by certain of my fellow researchers have been invaluable: Gerben Bakker, Marc Prat, Tobias Witschke, Svetlozar Andreev, and Babak Rahimi. Data has been provided over the years by, among others, numerous professors and researchers: Erik Buyst, Piet Clement, Herman de Jong, Olga Christodoulaki, Thomas David, Olle Krantz, and Jan Tore Klovland. Moreover, a thank you should also be directed towards the staff of the Department of History and Civilisation during these years, especially Rita Peero and Angela Schenk. The EUI library has offered good facilities for this comparative effort, for which also Dr. Serge Noiret should be thanked.

This chapter is a review of the many perspectives from history, political science, sociology, and economics that economic historians have applied to the study of war. Here I first review some of the scholarship on the premodern period, especially the formation of European nation states and conflicts. It is fairly clear that Europeans emerged out of this period with a comparative advantage in violence, through technological innovations and repeated warfare. Fiscal innovation and expansion was a key part of this. The period of the revolutions and Napoleonic conflicts represented a change in the nature of warfare and the arrival of total war, as well as the industrial age. The period of the world wars represents perhaps the best represented area of study for economic historians as of late. New data and scholarship has shown the mechanics of mobilization and highlighted the importance of resources in deciding these conflicts. Conversely, the Cold War period has been relatively sparsely studied, at least from the perspective of conflicts or military spending. Given the availability of new data and the opening of many archives, it is highly likely that this state of affairs will change in the near future. Economic historians have clearly made an impact in the study of long-run phenomena such as state formation, empires, and democracy. Cliometrics is well suited to the study of such topics, given the new panel and time series techniques, the rapid development of computing power, and the many new online databases. ; Peer reviewed