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ABSTRACTThis study investigates the impact of investor protection on firm ownership and capital growth in a model where investor protection is allowed to vary between firms. Using panel data for Italy, we construct firm‐level variables to capture the degree of investor protection, which is observable to all shareholders. Empirical evidence indicates that the stronger the investor protection the lower the fraction of equity that is owned by insiders. Results show that higher insider equity ownership is linked to larger risk premiums and higher costs of capital. Implications suggest that the magnitude of capital stock distortions is particularly important when shareholder protection is weak and ownership concentration is high.

To facilitate the transformation of the German economy from the traditional manufacturing industries towards emerging new technologies, a new segment of the Frankfurt exchange was introduced in 1997 - Der Neue Markt. This study provides evidence that not only did many new firms obtain funding from the Neuer Markt, but that for the first time in recent history, Germany succeeded in enabling smaller firms to grow faster than larger firms. This suggests that the new policies were not only successful in promoting a new type of firm that otherwise might not exist, but in transforming the sources of growth and innovation within the German economy.