Suchergebnisse

Dr. Nikolas Emmanuel's examines the use of an incentives approach in managing intrastate conflict in Africa because in many cases, risks and costs make applications of hard power alone unfeasible. Furthermore, simply ignoring episodes of civil conflict in the hope that they will "burn themselves out"� does not appear to be a viable alternative. That said, both noncoercive and coercive incentive strategies exist and have been deployed by third parties in a variety of conflict situations. Such incentives seek to manage conflict by encouraging political bargaining. The clear intention of this approach is to shift the behavior of targeted actors away from violence and towards more peaceful interaction. Indeed, such incentives offer a good deal of underexplored opportunities to help manage discord. This research has two primary objectives. First, it furthers the discussion of how external third parties can help manage conflicts. Second, it offers a typology of the available incentive strategies, classifying them along noncoercive and coercive lines. Thus, the article outlines the possibilities offered by an incentives approach, focusing on examples drawn from recent African cases.

The following paper uses the case-study of Cameroon to examine how critical donors can shield their close allies from pressure to pursue political liberalization. As the wave of democratic reform swept through Africa in the early 1990s, similar to that going through North Africa and the Middle East today, domestic opposition pushed the ruling clique in Cameroon towards pluralism. However, in this case, instead of encouraging democracy, France helped President Paul Biya to maintain his grip on power. As will be demonstrated, massive amounts of French aid helped the regime survive both internal and external pressure for change. Under a political conditionality approach other secondary donors tried to use their foreign assistance to help push for liberal-democratic reforms in Cameroon. However, such efforts are frequently undermined by what the donor perceives as its self-interest. This research attempts to illustrate this general point by examining the relationship between Cameroon and France and the maintenance of authoritarianism in the defense of common interests.

Donors hope that their foreign aid can be influential, far beyond the development projects that they fund. Frequently, aid providers attach political conditions to their monies in the hope that these demands can serve as catalysts to improve the governance in the recipient. This is called a political conditionality approach. Few countries have felt the weight of conditionality as much as Malawi did in the 1990s. Here, donors were able to use aid sanctions to successfully encourage democratization, while strengthening the demands of domestic opposition forces. This paper argues that three factors were critical in this process: 1) aid dependency, 2) donor coordination, and 3) a strong and persistent domestic opposition. With their combined weight, foreign donors and Malawian civil society were able to change the tide in this once highly authoritarian country.

AbstractDonors hope that their foreign aid can be influential, far beyond the development projects that they fund. Frequently, aid providers attach political conditions to their monies in the hope that these demands can serve as catalysts to improve the governance in the recipient. This is called a political conditionality approach. Few countries have felt the weight of conditionality as much as Malawi did in the 1990s. Here, donors were able to use aid sanctions to successfully encourage democratization, while strengthening the demands of domestic opposition forces. This paper argues that three factors were critical in this process: 1) aid dependency, 2) donor coordination, and 3) a strong and persistent domestic opposition. With their combined weight, foreign donors and Malawian civil society were able to change the tide in this once highly authoritarian country.

The following paper uses the case-study of Cameroon to examine how critical donors can shield their close allies from pressure to pursue political liberalization. As the wave of democratic reform swept through Africa in the early 1990s, similar to that going through North Africa and the Middle East today, domestic opposition pushed the ruling clique in Cameroon towards pluralism. However, in this case, instead of encouraging democracy, France helped President Paul Biya to maintain his grip on power. As will be demonstrated, massive amounts of French aid helped the regime survive both internal and external pressure for change. Under a political conditionality approach other secondary donors tried to use their foreign assistance to help push for liberal-democratic reforms in Cameroon. However, such efforts are frequently undermined by what the donor perceives as its self-interest. This research attempts to illustrate this general point by examining the relationship between Cameroon and France and the maintenance of authoritarianism in the defense of common interests.