Introduction -- Natural resources and international law -- The Sea of Japan -- The East China Sea -- The South China Sea -- Conclusion -- Appendix: Maps of the Sea of Japan and the East and South China Seas
Ralf Emmers discusses the significance of natural resources as a source of inter-state cooperation and competition in East Asia, assessing whether the joint exploration and development of resources can act as a means to reduce tensions in contested territories. Does the joint management of natural resources in the absence of a negotiated maritime delimitation constitute a feasible strategy to de-escalate maritime sovereignty disputes in East Asia? Can cooperative resource exploitation be separated from nationalist considerations and power politics calculations? Alternatively, should the prospect for joint exploration in disputed waters be expected to raise rather than defuse territorial conflicts, especially if abundant resources are eventually discovered? If this were true, should exploration schemes be postponed until sovereignty disputes have been resolved? Emmers addresses these questions by examining the overlapping sovereignty claims in the Sea of Japan and the East and South China Seas.
Emmers questions the dichotomy implicit in this interpretation and investigates what role the balance of power really plays in such cooperative security arrangements and in the calculations of the participants of ASEAN and the ARF. He offers a thorough analysis of the influence the balance of power has had on the formation and evolution of the ASEAN and ARF and reveals the co-existence and inter-relationship between both approaches within the two institutions. The book contains case studies of Brunei's motives in joining the ASEAN in 1984; ASEAN's response to the Third Indochina Conflict; the
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In: Asia policy: a peer-reviewed journal devoted to bridging the gap between academic research and policymaking on issues related to the Asia-Pacific, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 128-130
In: Asia policy: a peer-reviewed journal devoted to bridging the gap between academic research and policymaking on issues related to the Asia-Pacific, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 42-47
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has preferred to avoid entanglement in Great Power competition since its inception in 1967. The 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration captured ASEAN's aspiration to keep Southeast Asia neutral and free of external interference. ZOPFAN accommodated divergent strategic outlooks within ASEAN while avoiding the legalities associated with the concept of neutrality. While no consensus was ever reached on ZOPFAN's specific application, neutrality is continually mentioned as a critical factor in ASEAN's success. The article argues that ASEAN neutrality is defined by impartiality and autonomy, and that this concept has evolved over time as its specific meaning has changed due to shifting geopolitical circumstances. At the organization's inception, and during the bipolarity of the Cold War, ASEAN's focus was on autonomy. However, since the early 2000s, the emphasis has evolved to impartiality due to increasing multipolarity in the Asia-Pacific region. The concept of neutrality has been tested in recent years with the intensification of the South China Sea dispute. (Contemp Southeast Asia/GIGA)
SOUTHEAST Asia accommodates a complexity of security architectures, ranging from bilateral military arrangements (such as those with the US) to multilateral expressions of cooperative security, such as those based around the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Somewhere in between, minilateral defense coalitions – small groups intended to complement the more orthodox security formations – also play a role. A notable example is the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which has been part of the Southeast Asian security environment since 1971. Superseding the 1957 AngloMalayan Defence Agreement (AMDA), the FPDA membership has consisted of Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The FPDA has sought, over the last 40 years, to complement and overlap with, rather than compete with or replace, the other forms of regional security architecture. In this sense, the merits of the FPDA are clear: although limited in role, it adds considerable flexibility and complementarity to the security framework of Southeast Asia.