Suchergebnisse

The Kakwani index of progressivity is commonly used to establish whetherthe effect of a specific tax or transfer is equalizing. In the presence ofreranking or Lambert's conundrum, however, a progressive tax could beunequalizing. While it is mathematically possible for counter-intuitiveresults to occur, how common are they in actual fiscal systems? Using anovel dataset that includes fiscal-incidence results for 39 countries, we findthat the likelihood of the Kakwani index to be progressive (regressive),while the tax or transfer is unequalizing (equalizing), is minimal, except inthe case of indirect taxes: in roughly 25 per cent of our sample, regressiveindirect taxes are equalizing (sign-inconsistent cases). Additionally, thelikelihood that the Kakwani index ranks the magnitude of the impact of atax or transfer wrongly also exists but it too is small. Finally, usingregression analysis, we find that increasing the size or progressivity of aprogressive tax or transfer is equalizing and statistically robust forsign-consistent cases. For sign-inconsistent cases, the coefficient for theKakwani index is not statistically significant. In sum, although theKakwani index could yield interpretations that are inaccurate in actualfiscal systems, the risk seems small, except for indirect taxes.

Our paper addresses why a moderate presidential candidate would select an extreme running mate, as was the case in the 2012 US presidential election. To address this question, we designed a one-dimensional policy game in which a moderate challenger uses their vice-presidential candidate as a policy tool to alter the median voter participating in the election. Our main conclusion is that the median voter is altered through a mobilization effect, by increasing own party turnout through the convincing of the more extreme segment of a party to participate in the election, rather than altering the voter's decision to vote for a particular candidate. This decision function only has a marginal effect on independent voters. Our conclusion is in line with recent empirical advances in the literature and our paper aims to more formally ground these advancements in theory. We developed a set of comparative statics to apply the theory of running mate selection more broadly, germane beyond the case of the 2012 presidential election used to frame this topic. Our model also determines the optimal difference between the platforms of a challenger and their vice-presidential candidate.