Suchergebnisse

Cambodia's youthful population is significantly responsible for a recent unexpected decline in the popularity of the Cambodian People's Party, which has governed since the end of the Khmer Rouge regime. This increasingly young electorate has lived through an era of peace and openness with regular multi-party elections and impressive economic growth resulting in rapid structural change in the economy. Compared to their parents' generation, this younger generation is better educated, highly mobile, aspires to salaried employment, and is well connected to new sources of information and technology. Because of this, their expectations, aspirations, opportunities, as well as challenges they face are remarkably different from those of older generations. However, Cambodia's institutions of governance, dominated by personalized and patron–client networks that have been propped up by the ruling elite, has effectively marginalized this emerging youth population. This marginalization from political and economic resources has produced alienation and discontent, which represents a significant political problem for the ruling party's political strategies. (Crit As Stud/GIGA)

Decentralisation has been implemented by the Cambodian government with international donor support. Western aid donors expected that decentralisation would contribute to good governance and democratisation in Cambodia. This thesis examines the actual outcomes of decentralisation, particularly at the district level, since the first election of local councils at commune level in 2002. Through extensive interviews with elected councillors, appointed local administrators, officials in central government ministries, and representatives of non-governmental organisations and aid donors, the research investigates the ways in which the decentralisation programme has been understood, designed and implemented by the government and the ruling party – the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). It also discusses the effects of decentralisation on future governance in Cambodia. Adopting a political economy approach to the study of decentralisation, the thesis argues that the donor-promoted decentralisation in Cambodia has been designed and implemented in a context where power has been successfully consolidated in the hands of the CPP and its informal patronage network within the bureaucracy, the armed forces and the private sector. Because of this, the decentralisation has helped keep the CPP in power and consequently has militated against the emergence of empowered and independent sub-national authorities operating according to rules-based governance. Thus, it has disappointed the goals envisaged by western donors. The CPP's preferred mode of governance, combining predation and neo-patrimonialism, differs sharply from the Western aid donor prescriptions for good governance being promoted through decentralisation. In this context, the behaviour of local actors – local councils and the administration – who occupy the decentralised institutions, the authority and resources given to them, and the accountability relationships that are produced by elections and reform processes can best be understood as having been shaped by rather than challenging the pre-existing power hierarchy. Consequently, the thesis shows that there are unlikely to be democratic gains from decentralisation. The research further suggests that a significant shift of political and economic power from national level elites to local leaders closer to the people, necessary for decentralisation to achieve the goals intended by western donors, is not likely to occur. This state of affairs is expected to remain unchanged in the foreseeable future in spite of the CPP's surprisingly poor performance in the July 2013 national election, when it won twenty-seven fewer seats in the National Assembly than in the 2008 election.

This article analyses how and to what extent state regulation of civil society organisations (CSOs) have resulted in elitisation, i.e., the process of obtaining elite status within and beyond civil society. This is studied in the context of emerging democracy in Indonesia and shrinking civic space in Cambodia. Combining Bourdieu's concepts of field and elite with strategic action fields, the article uses data from interviews with civil society leaders. It finds different patterns. In Indonesia, elitisation occurs through a process of CSO formalisation and bureaucratisation, with elites gaining legitimacy owing to their formal offices. As a result, competition for formal positions intensifies: This is particularly notable among national CSO leaders, who may shift their activities to the grassroots level to seek further empowerment and other capitals to legitimise their elite status, facilitate the rise of leaders in existing fields, and create pluralistic forms of elites. Regulations have also resulted in the marginalisation of non-formal elites and shifted the locus of legitimacy from activism to formalism. Meanwhile, in Cambodia, regulatory formalisation and bureaucratisation has not only reduced the space for elite competition and level of competitiveness, but also created 'most dominant actors' or 'hyper-elites' who are loyal to and support the regime and its priorities while punishing those who do not. This has resulted in a monolithic form of elites.

This article analyses how and to what extent state regulation of civil society organisations (CSOs) have resulted in elitisation, i.e., the process of obtaining elite status within and beyond civil society. This is studied in the context of emerging democracy in Indonesia and shrinking civic space in Cambodia. Combining Bourdieu's concepts of field and elite with strategic action fields, the article uses data from interviews with civil society leaders. It finds different patterns. In Indonesia, elitisation occurs through a process of CSO formalisation and bureaucratisation, with elites gaining legitimacy owing to their formal offices. As a result, competition for formal positions intensifies: This is particularly notable among national CSO leaders, who may shift their activities to the grassroots level to seek further empowerment and other capitals to legitimise their elite status, facilitate the rise of leaders in existing fields, and create pluralistic forms of elites. Regulations have also resulted in the marginalisation of non-formal elites and shifted the locus of legitimacy from activism to formalism. Meanwhile, in Cambodia, regulatory formalisation and bureaucratisation has not only reduced the space for elite competition and level of competitiveness, but also created 'most dominant actors' or 'hyper-elites' who are loyal to and support the regime and its priorities while punishing those who do not. This has resulted in a monolithic form of elites.

Elitisation in Cambodian civil society and how such processes relate to holding elite status in the state, electoral politics, and economic fields, is poorly understood. This article seeks to identify different pathways to becoming an elite within and beyond Cambodian civil society. We focus on four case studies, representing different forms of organisations within the sectors of agriculture and youth. Three main questions are explored. Firstly, we identify different forms of capital needed to reach elite status in civil society. Secondly, we explore how elite status within civil society is related to elite status within other fields, by identifying three pathways of boundary-crossing (Lewis, 2008a) from civil society into the state, electoral politics, and economic fields. Thirdly, we map the perceived possibilities and limitations of each field. In exploring these questions, this article argues for a reappraisal of Cambodian civil society, shifting attention to the networks and platforms that fall outside of the dominant focus on professional NGOs. By empirically tracing how elites move between fields, it aspires to provide a better understanding of the contours of, and relations between, civil society and other fields (including government, electoral politics, and business), including in terms of what particular forms of power pertain to each.

Elitisation in Cambodian civil society and how such processes relate to holding elite status in the state, electoral politics, and economic fields, is poorly understood. This article seeks to identify different pathways to becoming an elite within and beyond Cambodian civil society. We focus on four case studies, representing different forms of organisations within the sectors of agriculture and youth. Three main questions are explored. Firstly, we identify different forms of capital needed to reach elite status in civil society. Secondly, we explore how elite status within civil society is related to elite status within other fields, by identifying three pathways of boundary-crossing (Lewis, 2008a) from civil society into the state, electoral politics, and economic fields. Thirdly, we map the perceived possibilities and limitations of each field. In exploring these questions, this article argues for a reappraisal of Cambodian civil society, shifting attention to the networks and platforms that fall outside of the dominant focus on professional NGOs. By empirically tracing how elites move between fields, it aspires to provide a better understanding of the contours of, and relations between, civil society and other fields (including government, electoral politics, and business), including in terms of what particular forms of power pertain to each.