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This article examines the labor-market impact of opening borders to low-wage countries, exploiting time and regional variation provided by the 2004 EU enlargement in combination with transport links to Sweden from new member states. Results suggest an adverse impact on earnings of present workers in the order of 1 percent in areas close to pre-existing ferry lines. Effects are present in most segments of the labor market but tend to be greater in groups with weaker positions. The impact is also clearer in industries that have received more workers from new member states and for which cross-border work is likely to be more common. There is no robust evidence for an impact on employment or wages. We discuss the potential mechanisms driving these results.

We study the labor market impact of opening borders to low wage countries. The analysis exploits time and regional variation provided by the 2004 EU enlargement in combination with transport links to Sweden from the new member states. The results suggest an adverse impact on earnings of present workers in the order of 1 percent in areas close to pre-existing ferry lines. The effects are present in most segments of the labor market but tend to be greater in groups with weaker positions. The impact is also clearer in industries which have received more workers from the new member states, and for which across-the-border work is likely to be more common. There is no robust evidence on an impact on employment or wages. At least part of the effects is likely due to channels other than the ones typically considered in the literature.

We study the labor market impact of opening borders to low-wage countries. The analysis exploits time and regional variation provided by the 2004 EU enlargement in combination with transport links to Sweden from the new member states. The results suggest an adverse impact on earnings of present workers in the order of 1 percent in areas close to pre-existing ferry lines. The effects are present in most segments of the labor market but tend to be greater in groups with weaker positions. The impact is also clearer in industries which have received more workers from the new member states, and for which across-the-border work is likely to be more common. There is no robust evidence on an impact on employment or wages. At least part of the effects is likely due to channels other than the ones typically considered in the literature.

We study the labor market impact of opening borders to low-wage countries. The analysis exploits time and regional variation provided by the 2004 EU enlargement in combination with transport links to Sweden from the new member states. The results suggest an adverse impact on earnings of present workers in the order of 1 percent in areas close to pre-existing ferry lines. The effects are present in most segments of the labor market but tend to be greater in groups with weaker positions. The impact is also clearer in industries which have received more workers from the new member states, and for which across-the-border work is likely to be more common. There is no robust evidence on an impact on employment or wages. At least part of the effects is likely due to channels other than the ones typically considered in the literature.

We study the labor market impact of opening borders to low-wage countries. The analysis exploits time and regional variation provided by the 2004 EU enlargement in combination with transport links to Sweden from the new member states. The results suggest an adverse impact on earnings of present workers in the order of 1 percent in areas close to pre-existing ferry lines. The effects are present in most segments of the labor market but tend to be greater in groups with weaker positions. The impact is also clearer in industries which have received more workers from the new member states, and for which across-the-border work is likely to be more common. There is no robust evidence on an impact on employment or wages. At least part of the effects is likely due to channels other than the ones typically considered in the literature.

Recent decades have seen a strong trend among democratic countries to extend voting rights at subnational levels to non-naturalized immigrants, creating substantial variation across countries in terms of voting eligibility rules for non-naturalized immigrants. Our knowledge of the consequences of these different systems for immigrant political integration is, however, limited. This article seeks to shed new light on this important issue by using Swedish data to study whether immigrants who face shorter residency requirements for voting eligibility in local elections are more likely to integrate politically. We find little compelling evidence that such is the case. The results suggest that immigrants who became eligible to vote after six to seven years were as likely to naturalize and vote in future elections in both the short and long run as those who received the right to vote after only three years of residency. Thus, although expanded franchise can be of symbolic, as well as practical, value, it is unlikely to be a panacea for immigrant political inclusion. The argument that early voting rights for non-naturalized immigrants is desirable since it helps speed up immigrant political integration should, therefore, be used with some care by those advocating for such reforms.

We study the short- and long-term impact of local enfranchisement of foreign citizens born outside the EU on political integration outcomes. Local voting rights for foreigners were introduced in the Swedish electoral system in 1976. This right to vote is conditional on having spent at least three years in Sweden prior to the election. Until 1998 Swedish elections at all levels were held every three years; since then they have been held every four years. The wait time before the first opportunity to vote thus differs substantially for immigrants immigrating just before this cutoff date versus just after. Our analysis shows that immigrants whose timing of arrival makes them eligible to vote after slightly more than three years in the country are not more likely to naturalize or vote in later elections compared to immigrants whose timing of arrival means they must wait six or seven years to vote. The results suggest that earlier opportunities for political participation do not improve subsequent political integration of immigrants as measured by naturalization and voting.