Suchergebnisse

"This book traces the history of refugee resettlement to Fargo, ND, from 1980 to the present, showing how culture, political economy, and institutional transformations collectively contribute to the racialization of white cities like Fargo in ways that complicate their demographics and the space they hold in an American imaginary of the idyllic and homogenous small town. Through participant observation, discourse analysis, multi-sited ethnography, and interviews, Erickson compares citizenship practices among two social service institutions (refugee resettlement and welfare) and two groups of refugees (Bosnians and Southern Sudanese). Through the comparative study of white, secular Muslim Bosnians and black Christian Southern Sudanese, the book demonstrates how cross-cultural and transnational understandings of race, ethnicity, class, religion shape daily citizenship practices and belonging."--

1. Introduction and Overview 1. - 2. "Responsible" Arms Transfer Policy and the Politics of Social Reputation 16. - 3. History and Contemporary Trends in Conventional Arms Export Controls 44. - 4. Explaining Commitment: International Reputation and "Responsible" Arms Transfer Policy 73. - 5. Explaining Compliance: Domestic Reputation and Arms Trade Scandal 106. - 6. Conclusions and Implications 139

AbstractThis article examines why US‐made and US‐supplied weapons consistently appear in conflicts around the world, despite the United States having what is commonly lauded as the 'gold standard' of national arms export control systems. On paper, US law and policy discourage arms transfers to areas engaged in or at risk of conflict. US arms export controls also informed the creation of the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which provides legally binding conventional arms export criteria. Yet in the recent Yemen, Syria and Libya conflicts, among many others, the United States has directly supplied or indirectly facilitated the supply of weapons to conflict parties. This article highlights two factors that help to account for this apparent policy failure: the flexible design of US law and policy and the inherent challenges of ensuring that weapons in conflict zones—especially small arms—go to and stay with their intended recipients. These findings have important implications for US foreign policy, ATT implementation and the human costs of conflict around the world.

The persistence and strength of international norms are thought to depend partly on the willingness of actors to punish their violation, but norm enforcement is often inconsistent. This article investigates states' use of economic sanctions in order to gain insight into the role of metanorms (norms about enforcing norms) in international politics and explain this inconsistency. The quantitative analyses examine patterns of economic sanctions and arms embargo practices across different security norms and reveal two central findings. First, international metanorms may accommodate important interstate relationships. Although severe human rights abuse, conflict, nuclear weapons development, and support for terrorist organisations tend to attract sanctions, they are infrequent in comparison with norm violations. Valued relationships between senders and targets seem to be an accepted limit to the pursuit of costly norm enforcement. Second, norm violations nevertheless remain rare, suggesting that factors other than the prospect of material punishment may encourage compliance. Indeed, by preserving interstate relationships, international metanorms may facilitate the engagement needed for socialisation and social pressures as alternative compliance mechanisms.

AbstractThe persistence and strength of international norms are thought to depend partly on the willingness of actors to punish their violation, but norm enforcement is often inconsistent. This article investigates states' use of economic sanctions in order to gain insight into the role of metanorms (norms about enforcing norms) in international politics and explain this inconsistency. The quantitative analyses examine patterns of economic sanctions and arms embargo practices across different security norms and reveal two central findings. First, international metanorms may accommodate important interstate relationships. Although severe human rights abuse, conflict, nuclear weapons development, and support for terrorist organisations tend to attract sanctions, they are infrequent in comparison with norm violations. Valued relationships between senders and targets seem to be an accepted limit to the pursuit of costly norm enforcement. Second, norm violations nevertheless remain rare, suggesting that factors other than the prospect of material punishment may encourage compliance. Indeed, by preserving interstate relationships, international metanorms may facilitate the engagement needed for socialisation and social pressures as alternative compliance mechanisms.

Why do states take the lead in diffusing norms they once resisted? I address this question in the context of new humanitarian arms trade norms, culminating in the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Although most major arms exporting states have supported the ATT and similar initiatives, only some have chosen to invest resources in becoming leaders of these initiatives to spread new norms beyond their borders. I examine British and German arms export policies and practices to argue that states that choose leadership following costly norm adoption may do so as a means to share the costs of those norms with other international actors and reduce future adaptation costs. By delving deeper into the agency of norm diffusion, the article offers insights into powerful states' motivations for norm leadership following costly norm adoption, the dynamics of norm diffusion, and the institutional form international norms eventually take.

This article examines sending state compliance with arms embargoes. Arms embargoes are one of the most frequently used types of economic sanctions but they are perceived as one of the least effective. One major problem with arms embargoes, many argue, is sending states' failure to implement them. Yet studies tend to focus on cases of arms embargo violations, not compliance in the context of arms export practice more broadly. Using a series of new arms embargo variables, I conduct a statistical analysis of the relationship between arms embargoes and small and major conventional arms transfers from 1981 to 2004. Contrary to popular expectations, I find that arms embargoes on average restrain sending states' arms exports. If arms embargoes do indeed have difficulty changing targets' behavior, or achieving other measures of 'success', additional explanations must also be considered. I suggest that arms embargo target selection and the intractable challenge of cutting off illicit arms flows are two important plausible alternatives. This finding also provides optimism for compliance with international commitments in the absence of institutionalized enforcement mechanisms. Major exporters overall appear to implement sanctions, despite strong economic incentives to ignore them and a lack of formal accountability mechanisms to punish violators.

Arms transfers are both an economic necessity for the European arms industry and a potential obstacle for the EU's emerging normative power role. Nevertheless, research on how well EU members' arms trade mirrors EU normative power rhetoric is scarce. To help fill this void, I use regression analysis to examine the relationship between EU arms exports and human rights, conflict, and democracy in recipient states from 1990 to 2004. A case study of the China embargo debate provides a more in-depth assessment of the politics behind EU arms transfers. Both analyses reveal a questionable relationship between EU norms and arms transfer practices. The findings suggest, first, that domestic-level material and normative concerns remain important to the formation and execution of EU foreign policy and, second, that low levels of EU socialization may hinder the creation of a single European external identity. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd. & ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research.]