Mål och medel : Uppsala kommun som byggupphandlare 1870–1975
This dissertation is about municipal procurement of construction projects. Public procurement is often portrayed as inefficient since public organizations can have several, potentially conflicting, objectives. In this dissertation, I use Uppsala municipality as a case to study how procurement worked during a time when municipal procurement was not regulated by law. The main interest is how the administration balanced procedural and outcome-related objectives and how its choices can be explained. Earlier research has suggested that public organizations use discretionary decision-making and so-called low-powered incentives (negotiations and cost-plus contracts) to a lesser extent than private clients do, making procurement less efficient. Rigid rules and fear of corruption are usually mentioned as explanations. The results of this dissertation show that low-powered incentives and discretionary decision-making became more common when there were more rules and a more bureaucratized administration. It is suggested that the structure and institutions of the construction sector, in combination with government financing policies and the municipality's organizational capability, can explain the pattern. The results have implications for the literature on public procurement as well as on the development of the public administration in Sweden. First, they indicate that the relationship between formal rules and procurement practices is more complicated than previously suggested. Second, they highlight how discussions about the public administrative system can benefit from incorporating the local level as well as informal institutions and practices.
