Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of tables -- List of contributors -- Preface -- 1 Introduction: making the unelected safe for democracy -- 2 Strategies for repairing legitimacy deficits -- 3 Reasoned administration: the European Union, the United States, and the project of democratic governance -- 4 Power, money, knowledge and the European Central Bank -- 5 Reputational threats and democratic responsiveness of regulatory agencies -- 6 Accountability and inter-institutional respect: the case of independent regulatory agencies -- 7 Accountability beyond control: How can parliamentary hearings connect the elected and the unelected? -- 8 Expertise and the general will in democratic republicanism -- 9 Values in expert reasoning: a pragmatic approach -- 10 Experts: from technocrats to representatives -- Index.

Intro -- Preface and Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Chapter 1 Introduction: The Predicaments of Differentiation -- Differentiate or Bust? -- The Development of a Differentiated Europe: Core and Periphery -- Three Orders of Differentiation -- Calls for Differentiation -- Equal Freedom for All -- Irregular Politics -- Systemic Effects: Segmentation and Hegemony -- Contesting Political Differentiation -- Part I: A Politically Differentiated Europe -- Part II: Overcoming Illicit Divergence -- References -- Chapter 2 Autonomy Versus Arbitrary Rule -- Introduction -- Features of Political Differentiation -- A Politically Differentiated Europe -- Interstitial Change -- Popular Sovereignty and Political Autonomy -- Rational Consensus as Punctum Archimedis -- Deliberative Governance? -- The Democratic Sovereign -- Segmented Differentiation -- Specialised Selection -- Framing and Path Dependence -- Dominance and Democratic Autonomy -- Arbitrary Rule -- Illegitimate Intrusion -- Hegemony as Structural Dominance -- Dimensions of Dominance -- Conclusion -- References -- Part I A Politically Differentiated Europe -- Chapter 3 Dimensions of Political Differentiation in Europe -- Introduction -- Vertical Differentiation in the EU -- Differentiation in the EMU: The Crisis-Management Regime -- Horizontal Differentiation in Europe -- The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) -- Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) -- Common Foreign and Security Policy -- Single Market and Trade -- Vulnerability not Dominance -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 4 Dominance Through Segmentation -- Introduction -- The Institutional Development of the Eurozone Regime -- The Crisis-Management Regime -- Structural Decoupling -- The Dominance Effects of Segmentation -- Differentiation in Disguise -- Pre-emption of Choice -- Loose Couplings and Legitimacy Deficits.

How is arbitrary rule – dominance – to be avoided when political differentiation is on the rise in the multilevel constellation that makes up the European Union? The EU is a power-wielding entity, that, due to its democratic deficits, is an instance of arbitrary rule, which differentiation only serves to exacerbate. This article discusses which political framework prevents dominance under conditions of asymmetric and complex interdependence, and economic integration in Europe. Under these conditions, the framework of international law is deficient, as the agreements with the associated non-members – the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA) and Switzerland – document. Here dominance appears to be self-incurred but nevertheless in breach with political freedom. Another is the framework suggested by Jürgen Habermas, of a pouvoir constituant mixte. Also, this framework raises the danger of arbitrary rule, as there is a risk that the autonomy of citizens would be pre-empted by the sovereignty of their states. The article holds the framework of a regional cosmopolitan federation – a rights-based polity with a distinct territorial reach – as more promising.

Deliberation has not only epistemic and moral value, it also has transformative value. Even if deliberation faces the problem of indeterminacy, it is assumed to have explanatory power. This article spells out why this is so and suggests a way to establish the causing effect of deliberation. It outlines a reason-based (RB) model of political decision-making applicable also to international affairs. By specifying a theory of argumentation on collective decision-making, we get to the nuts and bolts of deliberative decision-making, which, when supported by institutional powers, ensures a justified and well-grounded decision. The model contains a set of rules of inference and offers 'mechanismic' accounts of social events. It allows for explanations, but not predictions. The RB model conceives of decision-making as consisting of three sequences: claims-making, justification, and learning, each containing a set of explanatory mechanisms: values referring to conceptions of the common good, mandatory norms concerning the right thing to do, and evidence to the fact that non-compliance is wrong. The explanatory potential of this scheme is exemplified with reference to agreement making in the European Union. Some actors changed opinion voluntarily with regard to empowering the European parliament.

AbstractAt first glance, one might view the political differentiation in the European Union as a reflection of the autonomy of its member states, signifying flexibility and the dispersion of democratic control. However, under conditions of complex interdependence and economic integration, political differentiation can undermine the fundamental conditions for democratic self‐rule. Political differentiation may cause dominance. It is argued in this article that we must move beyond Philip Pettit's conception of dominance as the capacity to interfere with others on an arbitrary basis, in order to properly identify the undemocratic consequences of differentiation. Political freedom is also a question of institutional provisions to co‐determine laws. From this vantage point, differentiation raises the spectre of dominance in the form of decisional exclusion and the pre‐emption of political autonomy. Drawing on a re‐conceptualisation of dominance, the effects of differentiation on the possibility of self‐rule are examined, and two systematic effects of political differentiation are identified. It is argued that segmentation is the systemic effect of differentiation in the vertical dimension of integration. Here, dominance occurs in the form of exclusion from decision‐making bodies and the denial of choice opportunities. In the external horizontal dimension, the systemic effect of differentiation is hegemony. Some states are vulnerable to arbitrary interference and the pre‐emption of public autonomy. The article discusses developments within the Eurozone as a case of segmentation and the statues of associated non‐members as a case of hegemony. With regard to the latter, we are faced with the phenomenon of self‐incurred dominance.