Suchergebnisse

The idea that there is such a thing as a human right to health has become pervasive. It has not only been acknowledged by a variety of international law documents and thus entered the political realm but is also defended in academic circles. Yet, despite its prominence the human right to health remains something of a mystery - especially with respect to its philosophical underpinnings. Addressing this unfortunate and intellectually dangerous insufficiency, this book critically assesses the stipulation that health is a human right which - as international law holds - derives from the inherent dignity of the human person. Scrutinising the concepts underlying this stipulation (health, rights, dignity), it shall conclude that such right cannot be upheld from a philosophical perspective..

In this book, Christian Erk examines the ethical (im)permissibility of killing human beings in general and of selected killings in particular, namely suicide, lethal selfdefence, abortion and euthanasia, as well as organ transplantation and assisted suicide. He does so by addressing a range of important ethical questions: What does it mean to act? Of what elements is an action comprised? What is the difference between a good or evil action and a permissible or impermissible action? How can we determine whether an action is good or evil? Is there a moral duty not to kill? Is this duty held by and against all human beings or only persons? What and who is a person? What is human dignity and who has it? What is it that is actually taken when somebody is killed, i.e. what is life? And closely related to that: What and when is death? By integrating the answers to these questions into an argumentative architecture, the book offers a comprehensive exploration of one of the most fundamental questions of mankind: Under which conditions, if any, is killing human beings ethically permissible?

Main description: The idea that there is such a thing as a human right to health has become pervasive. It has not only been acknowledged by a variety of international law documents and thus entered the political realm but is also defended in academic circles. Yet, despite its prominence the human right to health remains something of a mystery - especially with respect to its philosophical underpinnings. Addressing this unfortunate and intellectually dangerous insufficiency, this book critically assesses the stipulation that health is a human right which - as international law holds - derives from the inherent dignity of the human person. Scrutinising the concepts underlying this stipulation (health, rights, dignity), it shall conclude that such right cannot be upheld from a philosophical perspective.

"Unsere Gesundheitswesen stehen vor großen Herausforderungen, die sich nicht zuletzt aus der wachsenden Lücke zwischen den Kosten und den zur Deckung dieser zur Verfügung stehenden Ressourcen ergeben. In der resultierenden Debatte über Priorisierung und/ oder Rationierung nimmt der Begriff der (sozialen) Gerechtigkeit eine Schlüsselrolle ein. Nicht zuletzt aus diesem Grunde lohnt sich eine vertiefte Auseinandersetzung mit der Frage, was unter (sozialer) Gerechtigkeit zu verstehen ist. Der vorliegende Artikel möchte einen Beitrag zu dieser Debatte leisten, indem er sich auf Basis der (im onto-teleologischen Sinne verstandenen) Tugendethik mit der Bedeutung und Rolle der (sozialen) Gerechtigkeit im Kontext von Gesundheit und dessen Implikationen auf das Gesundheitswesen auseinandersetzt. Wie argumentiert werden wird, hat (soziale) Gerechtigkeit aus einer solch onto-teleologischen Perspektive nicht primär mit Gleichheit, sondern vor allem mit Rechten und Pflichten sowie dem Gemeinwohl zu tun." (Autorenreferat)

The idea that there is such a thing as a human right to health has become pervasive. It has not only been acknowledged by a variety of international law documents and thus entered the political realm but is also defended in academic circles. Yet, despite its prominence the human right to health remains something of a mystery— especially with respect to its philosophical underpinnings. Addressing this unfortunate and intellectually dangerous insufficiency, this book critically assesses the stipulation that health is a human right which— as international law holds— derives from the inherent dignity of the human person. Scrutinising the concepts underlying this stipulation (health, rights, dignity), it shall conclude that such right cannot be upheld from a philosophical perspective.