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As a rule, citizens appreciate local more than central government. This paper proposes a new research agenda for multilevel trust studies by arguing that it is premature to believe that citizen's proximity to officials by definition trumps distance. As in country-comparative studies, close attention needs to be paid to institutional quality in analyses of multilevel trust. To put this argument to work, a closer investigation of Sweden is conducted. Tracking three indicators of trust, with time-series stretching over two decades, Sweden turns out to be a curious outlier from the international pattern: Swedes trust their local government less than the state. To make this observation intelligible – while simultaneously aiming to contribute to a more nuanced theoretical understanding of multilevel trust – the mix of three features is identified for bringing this circumstance about: (1) the principal role Swedish municipalities have successively been given in implementing core welfare state assignments; (2) that several of the municipalities' assignments are susceptible to corruption; and (3) that the increase in municipal responsibilities has neither been accompanied with institutions that guarantee accountability of politicians nor the impartiality of local bureaucracies.

There are good reasons to expect that citizens will appreciate local government more than central government. Sure enough, previous studies have found support for this assumption. Nevertheless, I will argue that it is theoretically far too simple to think that decentralization and citizen's proximity to decision-making by definition trumps centralization and distance. As with comparative country studies, institutional quality must be taken into account in analyses of local government and multilevel trust. To illustrate this point, a closer investigation of Sweden - a decentralised, high-trust and low-corruption country - is conducted. Looking back over the past 20 years, and studying several indicators of trust, Sweden turns out to be a curious outlier from the general pattern: Swedes trust municipalities far less than the state. Ex ante, these findings are puzzling. To make them intelligible, while at the same time aiming to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of multilevel trust, I argue that the unfortunate combination of three factors have brought about this curious circumstance: 1) the far-reaching decentralisation and principal role Swedish municipalities have successively been given in implementing assignments which lie at the heart of Swedish welfare state policies; 2) that several of the municipalities' assignments are particularly susceptible to corruption; and 3) that the increase in responsibilities as well as the increased danger zones for corruption has not been accompanied by institutions that ensure transparency and checks-and-balances in local government, ultimately leaving Swedish local government with institutions that obfuscate accountability.

The purpose of this research note is to demonstrate the usefulness ofrational choice models in making party‐system stability intelligible. First, the 'problemof collective action among potential party‐entrepreneurs' makes it puzzling that newpolitical parties emerge at all. Secondly, if the original collective‐action problem isovercome somehow, the 'problem of voter coordination' makes it hard for new partiesto attract voters. Finally, established competitors have incentives and resources to holdnewcomers back. I conclude by maintaining that simple, well‐known rational choicemodels explain the empirical observation by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) that partysystems tend to be 'frozen'. Instead, the genuinely puzzling thing is why new politicalparties emerge and gain support at all. ; Tilgangur þessarar greinar er að sýna fram á nytsemi skynsemiskenninga við að útskýra af hverju flokkakerfi eru stöðug. Hugsanlegir flokksfrumkvöðlar lenda fyrst í "vanda sameiginlegra athafna" sem gerir það að ráðgátu að nýir flokkar myndast yfir höfuð. Ef vandi sameiginlegra athafna er leystur, þá eiga nýir flokkar erfitt með að fá kjósendur til fylgis við sig vegna þess að enginn vill kjósa flokk sem enginn annar kýs. Að lokum þá hafa keppinautar til langs tíma hvata og getu til að halda nýjum keppinautum niðri. Niðurstaða mín er sú að einfaldar og vel þekktar skynsemiskenningar útskýri vel þá niðurstöðu Lipset og Rokkan (1967) að flokkakerfi hafi tilhneigingu til að frjósa. Hin sanna ráðgáta felst í því af hverju nýir flokkar verði til yfir höfuð og njóti fylgis. ; Original Publication: Gissur Ó Erlingsson, Why do party systems tend to be so stable? A review of rationalists' contributions, 2009, Bifröst Journal of Social Science, (3), 1. Licensee: Bifröst University, Iceland http://bjss.bifrost.is/index.php/bjss/index

Transparency is recognized as a crucial condition for accountability, good governance and democracy. As right to information (RTI) laws have spread, it is crucial to ask whether ambitious legislative frameworks translate to de facto transparency. In this article, we test how well local governments in Sweden – a 'most-likely country' for implementing RTI-laws – comply with its comparatively ambitious Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act. As a side-effect, we also gauge if New Public Management-reforms, here illustrated by increased public ownership of enterprises in local government, implies lessened compliance with RTI-legislation. Requesting information from 462 randomly selected public administrations and municipally owned enterprises, counter-intuitive findings are observed. Less than half of the organizations respected the RTI-legislation, and no significant differences were found between the public administrations and publicly owned enterprises. The findings have methodological as well as empirical implications. They highlight the importance of not only studying legislative frameworks, but also analyzing actual implementation of RTI-frameworks in everyday situations. Also, they demonstrate that problems relating to openness can be observed in low-corrupt, mature democracies with strong bureaucratic capacity that traditionally are hailed for their long history of ambitious RTI-laws. Lastly, and contrary to much popular belief, the findings indicate that publicly owned corporations not necessarily do imply a 'accountability deficit'.

Being elected to a governing body for the first time has been described as both a unique and transforming experience. Accordingly, theorists of elite political socialisation assume that deepened political participation fosters internal political efficacy and satisfaction with democracy. Does this assumption hold for individuals who step up from being grass-root members to become local councillors? In a novel, explorative approach to the question, a longitudinal panel design is employed where perceptions and attitudes of 71 elected and 66 unelected candidates that stood for the 2014 local elections in Sweden are traced over a four-year period. The respondents answered three surveys: right before the 2014 election, mid-term 2016, and close to the 2018 election. We test if the elected newcomers' internal efficacy and satisfaction with decision-making structures became stronger the more deepened, formal political experience they got. However, this hypothesis is solidly rejected. Contrary to theoretical expectations, strengthened internal efficacy and increased satisfaction with decision-making structures do not follow from four years of formalised political experience as a councillor.

Does corruption affect the incentives for potential entrepreneurs to start businesses? The traditional view holds that entrepreneurship is inhibited. However, a few recent studies indicate the contrary, supporting a "grease the wheels" perspective. In a novel approach to this question, we combine a local government corruption index and individual-level register data on start-ups in a low-corruption setting: Sweden. We disaggregate the analysis to individual entrepreneurs, focus on corruption in local institutions and hypothesize that local corruption deters potential entrepreneurs. Our findings are twofold. First, rejecting the "grease the wheels" hypothesis, local corruption has a strong local deterring effect on potential entrepreneurs. Second, a minority of entrepreneurs relocate their start-ups from home municipalities to elsewhere. However, contrary to expectations, relocaters could embody "non-productive" or "destructive" entrepreneurship: they migrate from relatively low-corrupt to relatively high-corrupt municipalities. While migrating is uncommon, and the effect is weak, it nonetheless indicates that relocaters are attracted to conditions where rent-seeking opportunities are present.

Transparency is recognized as a crucial condition for accountability, good governance and democracy. As right to information (RTI) laws have spread, it is crucial to ask whether ambitious legislative frameworks translate to de facto transparency. In this article, we test how well local governments in Sweden – a 'most-likely country' for implementing RTI-laws – comply with its comparatively ambitious Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act. As a side-effect, we also gauge if New Public Management-reforms, here illustrated by increased public ownership of enterprises in local government, implies lessened compliance with RTI-legislation. Requesting information from 462 randomly selected public administrations and municipally owned enterprises, counter-intuitive findings are observed. Less than half of the organizations respected the RTI-legislation, and no significant differences were found between the public administrations and publicly owned enterprises. The findings have methodological as well as empirical implications. They highlight the importance of not only studying legislative frameworks, but also analyzing actual implementation of RTI-frameworks in everyday situations. Also, they demonstrate that problems relating to openness can be observed in low-corrupt, mature democracies with strong bureaucratic capacity that traditionally are hailed for their long history of ambitious RTI-laws. Lastly, and contrary to much popular belief, the findings indicate that publicly owned corporations not necessarily do imply a 'accountability deficit'.

Transparency is recognized as a crucial condition for accountability, good governance and democracy. As right to information (RTI) laws have spread, it has become crucial to ask whether ambitious legislative frameworks translate to de facto transparency. In this article, we test how well local governments in Sweden – a 'most likely country' for implementing RTI laws – comply with its comparatively ambitious Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act. As a side effect, we also gauge if New Public Management reforms, exemplified by increased public ownership of enterprises in local government, imply lessened compliance with RTI legislation. Requesting information from 462 randomly selected public administrations and municipally owned enterprises, counterintuitive findings were observed. Fewer than half of the organizations respected the RTI legislation, and no significant differences were found between the public administrations and publicly owned enterprises. The findings have methodological as well as empirical implications. They highlight the importance of not only studying legislative frameworks – as has frequently been done in previous work – but also of analyzing actual implementation of RTI frameworks in everyday situations. Additionally, the findings demonstrate that problems relating to openness can be observed in low corrupt, mature democracies with strong bureaucratic capacity. Lastly, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the findings indicate that publicly owned corporations do not necessarily imply an 'accountability deficit'.