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The main objective of al-Qaeda and other global jihadists is to federate while decentralising, and to place an ideology that was once marginal in the heart of the Muslim and Arab world. Our main objective must be to divide and marginalise; but this is also our main difficulty, because many of our actions have had the opposite result. This is particularly true of the Bush administration's 'global war on terror'. Some European policies have also inadvertently reinforced Bin Laden's claim to represent all Muslim grievances. To be effective, our policies must deal in a differentiated manner with three different circles: al-Qaeda in its 11 September incarnation; terrorist movements which, though permeable to global Islamist ideology, nevertheless have local objectives and roots; all those in the Muslim and Arab world who may feel increasingly attracted to jihadist ideology and feel compelled to transform their discontent into action. (Survival / SWP)

The damage that has been done to the transatlantic alliance will not be repaired through grand architectural redesigns or radical new agendas. Instead, the transatlantic partners need to restore their consensus and cooperation on key security challenges with a limited agenda that reflects the essential conservatism of the transatlantic partnership during the Cold War and the 1990s. There will inevitably be big challenges, such as the rise of China, where transatlantic disparities in strategic means and commitments preclude any common alliance undertaking. Yet such limits are nothing new. Th

The damage that has been done to the transatlantic alliance will not be repaired through grand architectural redesigns or radical new agendas. Instead, the transatlantic partners need to restore their consensus and cooperation on key security challenges with a limited agenda that reflects the essential conservatism of the transatlantic partnership during the Cold War and the 1990s. There will inevitably be big challenges, such as the rise of China, where transatlantic disparities in strategic means and commitments preclude any common alliance undertaking. Yet such limits are nothing new. Th.