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The relationship between firm age and innovation has been an enduring topic of interest. We contribute to this research by studying how the effect of firm age on the quality of explorative and exploitative innovations is affected by the firm-specific and industry tenure of the talent resources (employees) that the firm utilizes. We start with the baseline predictions that firm age is related to the development of better exploitative innovations and worse explorative innovations. However, the tenure of employees intervenes in these relationships, by way of bringing in new knowledge, mental models, and beliefs. We predict that longer firm-specific and industry tenure of employees enhances the positive effect of firm age on the quality of exploitative innovations, while amplifying the negative effect of firm age on the quality of explorative innovations. In addition, for both the baseline and the moderating effect, we also formulate a prediction comparing the quality of explorative innovations with those of exploitative innovations. We find support for the moderating effects of human capital tenure for the quality of explorative innovations, but not for the quality of exploitative innovations. We reason that the latter may be due to the need for some level of exploration even in exploitative innovations, at least in the setting we study—the video game industry. Our results suggest that the negative effects of firm age on the quality of explorative innovations can be mitigated by talent resources (employees) the firm uses who have lower firm-specific and industrywide tenure.

This paper argues that the effect of dense social ties, or network closure, on a knowledge worker's performance depends on the predominant role this worker plays with his or her exchange partners in the relationships affected by that closure. Using data on informal exchanges among investment bankers in the equities division of a large financial services firm operating in Europe, Asia-Pacific, Africa, and the Americas in 2001, we find that network closure in relationships in which the banker acts as an acquirer of information increases his or her performance, whereas closure in relationships in which the banker acts as a provider of information decreases it. We also find that these effects are moderated by the bankers' ability to employ alternative means (such as formal authority) to induce the cooperation of exchange partners in their acquirer role, as well as by the extent to which the bankers can benefit from being free from the control of exchange partners in their provider role. Our findings highlight the two sides of the normative control associated with network closure: control benefits people when they need to induce exchange partners to behave according to their preferences, but it hurts them when it forces them to behave according to the preferences of those partners.

Prior research assumes that high-status actors have greater organizational influence than lower-status ones, that is, it is easier for the former to get their ideas and initiatives adopted by the organization than it is for the latter. Drawing from the literature on ideology, we posit that the status-influence link is contingent on actors' ideological position. Specifically, status confers organizational influence to the degree that the focal actor is ideologically mainstream. The more an actor's ideology deviates from the mainstream the less will her status translate into increased organizational influence. We find support for this hypothesis using data on the work of legislators in the House of Representatives in the U.S. Congress. By illuminating how and under what conditions status leads to increased influence, this study qualifies and extends current understandings of the role of status in organizations.

We study the relationship between choice homophily in instrumental relationships and individual performance in knowledge-intensive organizations. Although homophily should make it easier for people to get access to some colleagues, it may also lead to neglecting relationships with other colleagues, reducing the diversity of information people access through their network. Using data on instrumental ties between bonus-eligible employees in the equity sales and trading division of a global investment bank, we show that the relationship between an employee's choice of similar colleagues and the employee's performance is contingent on the position this employee occupies in the formal and informal hierarchy of the bank. More specifically, homophily is negatively associated with performance for bankers in the higher levels of the formal and informal hierarchy whereas the association is either positive or nonexistent for lower hierarchical levels.

We study the effects of actors audience-specific reputations on their levels of success with different audiences in the same field. Extending recent work that has emphasized the presence of multiple audiences with different concerns, we demonstrate that considering audience specificity leads to an improved understanding of reputation effects. Using data on emerging artists in the field of contemporary art from 2001 to 2010, we investigate the manner in which artists audience-specific reputations affect their subsequent success with two distinct audiences: museums and galleries. Our findings suggest that audience-specific reputations have systematically different effects with respect to success with museums and galleries. Our findings also illuminate the extent to which audience-specific reputations are relevant for emerging research on the contingent effects of reputation. In particular, our findings support our predictions that audiences differ from one another in terms of the extent to which other signals (specifically, status and interaction with other audiences) enhance or reduce the value of audience-specific reputations. Our study thus advances theory by providing empirical evidence for the value of incorporating audience-specific reputations into the general study of reputation. ; Funding Agencies|Oxford University Centre for Corporate Reputation; European Research Council under the European Union [324233]; Riksbankens Jubileumsfond [DNR M12-0301:1]