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Tesis doctoral inédita. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Facultad de Derecho, Departamento de Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales, 2007

Along with the mobilization of political support, repression is one of the two basic instruments dictators use to stay in power. Yet, there is no systematic investigation analyzing whether repression actually helps dictators retain power. This article fills this gap by addressing the simultaneous relationship between survival and repression. The results reveal that repression certainly increases the likelihood of dictators' survival. Furthermore, this article also analyzes different types of authoritarian leader exit and repression. The article distinguishes between, on the one hand, nonviolent and regular exits and, on the other hand, violent and irregular exits as well as between political terror and restrictions on civil liberties. It argues that terror is effective against threats from organized groups, while restrictions on civil liberties essentially serve to prevent collective action. The empirical evidence confirms that political terror only reduces the likelihood of nonviolent and regular exits. Instead, restrictions on civil liberties are effective in deterring both sorts of threats.

Este trabajo explora qué factores explican la supervivencia de los dictadores en el poder centrándoseen las estrategias de compra de lealtad. Se muestra así que los dictadores que son capaces deincorporar en las estructuras del régimen a aquellos que necesita para estabilizar su cargo y a laoposición potencial permanecen mayor tiempo en el poder. Para lograrlo, los gobernantes autoritariosrecurren a la distribución de rentas y, en caso de que sectores más amplios deban ser cooptados,a creación de instituciones. Se muestra, además, cómo diferentes grupos tienen distintas utilidadeso preferencias respecto a qué bienes pueden comprar su lealtad. Para evitar ser derrocado porla propia elite, es crucial repartir rentas procedentes de la exportación de materias primas. Las institucionesdictatoriales ayudan a prevenir intervenciones militares y de la propia elite, mientras quelos cambios derivados de movimientos populares pueden ser evitados mediante bienes públicoscomo el crecimiento económico.

This article explores how international sanctions affect authoritarian rulers' decisions concerning repression and public spending composition. Rulers whose budgets are not severely constrained by sanctions will tend to increase spending in those categories that most benefit their core support groups. When budget constraints are severe, dictators are more likely to increase repression. Using data on regime types, public expenditures and spending composition (1970–2000) as well as on repression levels (1976–2001), I show that the empirical patterns conform well to the theoretical expectations. Single-party regimes, when targeted by sanctions, increase spending on subsidies and transfers which largely benefit their key constituencies. Likewise, military regimes increase their expenditures on goods and services, which include military equipment and soldiers' and officers' wages. Conversely, personalist regimes targeted by sanctions reduce spending in all categories and thus increase repression more than other autocracies.

This article tests the hypothesis that group power affects development policy by holding dictators accountable through different mechanisms. New data on dictators' modes of exit for the period 1946—2000 allow us to estimate the predicted likelihood that a given authoritarian head of government will be toppled by the elite, the military or the citizenry. When the predicted odds are used as a measure of group strength, the results of simple growth regressions reveal that a stronger citizen opposition or a greater military threat compels the ruler to improve economic growth rates. In contrast, elite power is negative for growth, although it turns positive when a country reaches a certain level of industrialized development.

This article studies the impact of economic sanctions on the duration and outcome of intrastate conflicts. Sanctions are argued to foster the convergence of beliefs over parties' capacity, to reduce the utility of victory and to increase the costs of continuing fighting. Using a sample of 87 wars and new data on sanctions and sanction types, the author shows that sanctions and their durations are statistically associated with shorter intrastate conflicts. It is also shown that total economic embargoes are the most effective type of coercive measure in these cases and that sanctions imposed either by international organizations or by other actors have similar negative effects on war duration. In the second part of the article, the dependent variable is disaggregated, and I demonstrate that sanctions imposed by international institutions increase the likelihood of conflict resolution, whereas those sanctions not imposed by such institutions tend to increase the probability of a military victory. Moreover, if the targeted state is a member of the international institution imposing the sanctions, the effect of such coercion is even greater. Economic embargoes are also proven to increase the likelihoods of a military and a negotiated end, whereas international arms embargoes reduce the likelihood of a military victory.