Suchergebnisse

"One-half of 1%": geopolitics, geoeconomics, and USAID -- "In the world for keeps": from the Marshall Plan to the Vietnam War -- Geoeconomics ascendant: development, interdependence, and neoliberalization -- Two decades of neoliberalization: from the Cold war to the War on Terror -- Development in reverse: crisis, austerity, and the future of USAID

In current geopolitical and geoeconomic discourses, hunger is understood as both a threat to be contained, resulting in an often severe social and spatial localization of food insecurity, and a humanitarian problem to be solved through diffuse global flows of food and other aid. The resulting scalar tensions demonstrate the potentially contradictory alignment of geopolitics and geoeconomics within processes of globalization and neoliberalization. This article examines the geopolitical and geoeconomic place of hunger and the hungry through a critical analysis of the food-for-work (FFW) approach to combating hunger. FFW programs distribute food aid in exchange for labor, and have long been used to plan and deliver food aid. While debate continues as to whether and under what conditions FFW programs are socially and economically just, governments, international institutions, and NGOs tout them as a flexible and efficient way to deliver targeted aid, promote community development, and improve long-term prospects for economic development and food security. In the post-9/11 period, FFW programs are also cited as effective deterrents to terrorist recruitment strategies, while development and food security more broadly have been incorporated into national security strategies, especially but not only in the United States. The food-for-work approach attempts to resolve the scalar contradictions of hunger through the imposition of a labor requirement that disciplines the threat of the hungry while enforcing global connection. Case studies of FFW programs in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Indonesia illustrate this contradiction, and highlight the development and possible future of approaches to hunger under neoliberal geopolitics.

Food-for-work programs distribute food aid to recipients in exchange for labor, and are an important mode of aid delivery for both public and private aid providers. While debate continues as to whether food-for-work programs are socially just and economically sensible, governments, international institutions, and NGOs continue to tout them as a flexible and cost-effective way to deliver targeted aid and promote community development. This paper critiques the underlying logic of food-for-work, focusing on how this approach to food aid and food security promote labor force participation by leveraging hunger against poverty, and how the ideological and practical assumptions of food-for-work become enmeshed within discourses of geopolitical security. I rely on a case study examination of US-funded food-for-work programs implemented in Jakarta, Indonesia following the 1997 financial crisis. The crisis produced acute food insecurity and poverty in Indonesia, provoking fears of mob violence by the hungry poor and the spread of radical Islamism in the post-crisis political vacuum. Food-for-work programs were, in this context, meant to resolve the problems of both food insecurity and geopolitical insecurity by providing food to targeted populations, employment to those otherwise thrown out of work, and resituating the hungry poor in relation to broader scales of local, national, and global power.

Food-for-work programs distribute food aid to recipients in exchange for labor, and are an important mode of aid delivery for both public and private aid providers. While debate continues as to whether food-for-work programs are socially just and economically sensible, governments, international institutions, and NGOs continue to tout them as a flexible and cost-effective way to deliver targeted aid and promote community development. This paper critiques the underlying logic of food-for-work, focusing on how this approach to food aid and food security promote labor force participation by leveraging hunger against poverty, and how the ideological and practical assumptions of food-for-work become enmeshed within discourses of geopolitical security. I rely on a case study examination of US-funded food-for-work programs implemented in Jakarta, Indonesia following the 1997 financial crisis. The crisis produced acute food insecurity and poverty in Indonesia, provoking fears of mob violence by the hungry poor and the spread of radical Islamism in the post-crisis political vacuum. Food-for-work programs were, in this context, meant to resolve the problems of both food insecurity and geopolitical insecurity by providing food to targeted populations, employment to those otherwise thrown out of work, and resituating the hungry poor in relation to broader scales of local, national, and global power.

This paper examines recent changes at the US Agency for International Development (USAID) regarding the connections between trade liberalization, development, and security. USAID has adopted "trade capacity building" as a framework for development, and, in conjunction with new US national security discourses, now operates under the assumption that underdevelopment is a source of state weakness that produces insecurity. I argue that these changes in how USAID understands and undertakes development constitute the neoliberalization of development. In accordance with these shifts, USAID has redefined critical aspects of its development mission, undergone internal restructuring, and altered its relationship with other US state institutions and capital. The actual prospects for achieving security or development are slim, however, as the agency remains wedded to definitions of both that suggest the only acceptable role for the state lies in facilitating further neoliberalization and promoting the stability of capitalist class relations. An overview of USAID's historical development, and a closer examination of the place of food aid and food security in the agency's development work, demonstrate this

This paper addresses the ways in which policy coordination, and technical assistance and training programs operated by the United States Department of Agriculture's Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) have helped produce, internationalize, and enforce a neoliberal approach to the regulation of biotechnology, genetically modified crops, and food safety, through the reductionist discourse of sound science. The internationalization of US standards forms a major component of US agrofood trade strategies, while the contentious nature of biotechnology within international trade makes standards harmonization an important political battleground within ongoing processes of neoliberalization. Relying on appeals to sound science that posit US regulations as scientific and objective, and therefore superior to other regulatory models, FAS facilitates the rollout of neoliberal institutions within both the US state and in developing and post-Communist countries to harmonize biotechnology and food safety standards in line with US-led neoliberalization and capitalist internationalization. I examine the political and scientific contours of the sound science discourse, and offer two examples through which FAS has incorporated and deployed sound science in undertaking neoliberal rollout—first by creating a new internal Biotechnology Group, and second through focusing aspects of its Cochran Fellowship Program, a longstanding development and training program for foreign regulators, on biotechnology issues.

Abstract
Most foreign ministries use a rotational system in deploying personnel abroad, with diplomats moving between foreign posts every few years and earning salary premiums based on the risks, dangers, and hardships associated with different foreign posts. We examine rotationality and hardship in diplomacy, identifying these as spatial and institutional practices for managing a global network of diplomatic personnel and sites. These are institutionalized in foreign ministries' processes for assessing and compensating hardship and danger, and embodied in the design, function, and locational contexts of embassy buildings in foreign capitals. We rely on empirical examples from the US and Canadian foreign services, looking at US embassies in Berlin and Baghdad, and "Havana syndrome" among American and Canadian diplomats and their family members. We conclude that security-heavy forms of hardship assessment and management can limit diplomats' ability to build local knowledge and constrain the interaction and openness usually prized in diplomatic practice.