Suchergebnisse

Introduction, David Estlund. - I. Classic Questions. - 1. Authority, A. John Simmons. - 2. Equality, Elizabeth Anderson. - 3. Justice, Richard Arneson. - 4. Freedom, Philip Pettitt. - 5. Property, Gerald Gaus. - II. Approaches. - 6. Classical Liberalism, John Tomasi and Jason Brennan. - 7. Social Contract Approaches, Samuel Freeman. - 8. Left-Libertarianism, Peter Vallentyne. - 9. Marxist and Socialist Perspectives, Andrew Levine. - III. Democracy. - 10. Democracy, Jeremy Waldron. - 11. Deliberation, Robert Talisse. - 12. Religion and Politics, Robert Audi. - 13. Money and Politics, Thomas Christiano. - IV. The Globe. - 14. Global Justice, Matthias Risse. - 15. Human Rights, Allen Buchanan. - 16. War, Jefferson McMahan. - V. Injustice. - 17. Historical Injustice, Jeff Spinner-Halev. - 18. Race, Tommie Shelby. - 19. Gender, Debra Satz. - 20. Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory, Zophia Stemplowska and Adam Swift. - VI. In Retrospect. - 21. Rawls, Leif Wenar. - 22. Nozick, David Schmidtz and Christopher Freiman

Abstract:Does social justice lose all application in the (imaginary, of course) condition in which people are morally flawless? The answer, I will argue, is that it does not — justice might still have application. This is one lesson of my broader thesis in this paper, that there is a variety of conditions we would all regard as highly idealistic and unrealistic which are, nevertheless, not beyond justice. The idea of "circumstances of justice" developed especially by Hume and Rawls may seem to point in a more realistic direction, but we can see that this is not so once we distinguish between conditions of need for norms of justice, conditions of their emergence, and conditions of applicability of the standard of justice. Justice, I argue, can have application even in conditions where no mechanism of justice is present or needed, such as the case of internalized motives of justice.

In Human Nature and the Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy, I argued that justice might require things of people that they cannot bring themselves to do. A central step was to argue that this does not entail an inability to 'do' the putatively required thing. David Wiens challenges that argument of mine, and this piece is my reply.

AbstractIt is often argued that if one holds a liberal political philosophy about individual rights against the state and the community, then one cannot consistently say that a state that violates those principles is owed the right of noninterference. How could the rights of the collective trump the rights of individuals in a liberal view? I believe that this debate calls for more reflection, on the relation between liberalism and individualism. I will sketch a conception of liberalism ("liberal associationism") in which there is nothing awkward about saying that associations, as such, have some moral (not just, say, legal) rights to noninterference. If liberal associationism is compelling in general terms then, if states (or some of them) can be shown to be associations in the relevant respects, then liberalism itself will supply the moral basis for a right of that kind, held by a state or people as such, to nonintervention.