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Abstract
During the Cold War, U.S. strategic leaders had to deal with policies and issues in every part of the globe. The main theater was in Europe, but there were other regions that demanded attention. Korea was an important one. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the peninsula was on the brink of conflict as North Korea initiated a series of operations that were legitimate acts of war. There was a strong desire among South Korean government officials for a military response, but U.S. government leaders said no. Officials in Washington recognized the limits of U.S. power at the time, and designed their responses to maintain the status quo. The story of how the United States handled its undertakings in areas of marginal importance was a chapter in the larger history of the Cold War. A number of historians have suggested that the Third World played a key role in shaping developments in the Cold War, but U.S. actions in Korea indicate something a bit more complicated. Knowing when to become involved and when to limit losses was crucial in how the United States managed events along the periphery of the Cold War.