Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in January 2021 has sparked analysis of the so-called 'positive obligations' under Article 6, requiring states parties to address prior harm caused by the testing or use of nuclear weapons to both individuals and the environment. But although there has been much discussion of victim assistance under Article 6(1), there has been comparatively little assessment of the environmental remediation obligation under Article 6(2) that requires affected states to remediate areas contaminated by the past testing or use of nuclear weapons through 'necessary and appropriate measures'. This article represents an attempt to begin filling this lacuna by considering various issues and questions concerning the scope and limits of the environmental remediation obligation established by Article 6(2). Specifically, this article identifies the geographical scope of application of Article 6(2) to illustrate precisely where TPNW parties' remediation efforts should be applied, considers the meaning and underlying objectives of 'remediation' activities required by Article 6(2), and finally examines certain facets concerning the temporal dimension of the environmental remediation provision. Ultimately, this discussion aims to clarify the contours of the environmental remediation provision of the TPNW, and hopes to offer practical insight for states parties and encourage further consideration of the operationalisation of Article 6(2) in due course.

The recent targeted strike resulting in the death of Qassem Soleimani has received extensive attention for its violations of international law by the US. However, one area that has not been considered following the 3 January 2020 attack is the possible consequences this may have for Iran's nuclear non-proliferation legal obligations. Iranian officials have previously alluded to the possibility of Iran withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 1968 following the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in May 2018 and re-imposition of targeted economic sanctions against Iran. This article considers whether Iran can withdraw from the NPT, thus freeing Iran from its legal commitments not to develop nuclear weapons. It revisits the withdrawal provisions found in Article X of the NPT and examines the invocation of the 'extraordinary events' clause by other states in relation to other instruments too. In light of this, the discussion considers whether Iran can legally withdraw from the NPT, before concluding with some thoughts as to whether it should in fact pursue this option.