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Abstract.A vote-maximizing incumbent government is expected to adjust discretionary spending and taxation in ways that increase its probability for re-election. Unequal voters per electoral district in Canada distort this calculation in favour of small electoral districts. Using two measures of federal expenditures, and one of income taxes, between the years 1961–2000, empirical estimates indicate that greater representation per capita (lower relative electoral district populations) results in higher federal spending, and lower income taxes, per capita, even after controlling for income and unemployment.Résumé.Un gouvernement en place tentant de maximiser les votes en sa faveur est censé ajuster les dépenses discrétionnaires et les impôts de manière à augmenter la probabilité de sa réélection. L'inégalité du nombre d'électeurs des districts électoraux au Canada crée une distorsion en faveur des districts de petite taille. En utilisant deux mesures des dépenses fédérales et une mesure des impôts sur le revenu entre 1961 et 2000, nos résultats empiriques montrent qu'une plus forte représentation par habitant (plus petits districts électoraux) entraîne des dépenses fédérales plus importantes et des impôts sur le revenu moins élevés par personne, même en contrôlant pour le revenu et le taux de chômage.

Two concepts that provide new directions for public policy, environmental justice and sustainability, are both highly contested. Each has tremendous potential to effect long-lasting change. Despite the historically different origins of these two concepts and their attendant movements, there exists an area of theoretical compatibility between them. This conceptual overlap is a critical nexus for a broad social movement to create livable, sustainable communities for all people in the future. The goal of this articleis to illustrate the nexus in the United States. The authors do this by presenting a range of local or regionally based practical models in five areas of common concern to both environmental justice and sustainability: land use planning, solid waste, toxic chemical use, residential energy use, and transportation. These models address both environmental justice principles while working toward greater sustainability in urbanized areas.

Two concepts that provide new directions for public policy, environmental justice & sustainability, are both highly contested. Each has tremendous potential to effect long-lasting change. Despite the historically different origins of these two concepts & their attendant movements, there exists an area of theoretical compatibility between them. This conceptual overlap is a critical nexus for a broad social movement to create livable, sustainable communities for all people in the future. The goal of this article is to illustrate the nexus in the United States. The authors do this by presenting a range of local or regionally based practical models in five areas of common concern to both environmental justice & sustainability: land use planning, solid waste, toxic chemical use, residential energy use, & transportation. These models address both environmental justice principles while working toward greater sustainability in urbanized areas. 1 Table, 2 Figures, 1 Appendix, 45 References. [Copyright 2003 Sage Publications, Inc.]

In a context of higher reliance on irrigation schemes to ensure food security, it is crucial to understand institutional success of water resource management. In addition to other factors explored in great depth by the CPR literature, the actions of long-term appropriators contribute to the success of institutions. However, only a limited amount of work has attempted to examine the actual relationship between length of tenure and institutional success. To examine these relationships, we analyze a long-enduring CPR, the Mwea irrigation scheme (MIS) in Kenya, a network created in the 1950s and whose appropriators have held different lengths of tenure. We explore payment of operation and maintenance (O&M) fees of 71 irrigation units over two consecutive years. We examine 422 household surveys in eight out of the 71 irrigation units on the practice of institutions. We find that length of tenure impacts institutional success by influencing the behaviors of appropriators. Appropriators with longer tenure promote institutional success by provisioning the resource in a more sustainable manner through achieving high payments of O&M fees. Relatively dissatisfied with the implementation of the rules, they use formal and informal means to criticize institutions and to promote institutional change and adaptation. In contrast, appropriators with shorter tenure achieve lower payments of O&M fees, they complain less, and are more satisfied with the existing implementation of the rules. They are satisfied with the status quo. Hence, it is through the pressure of experienced appropriators that institutions such as the MIS evolve and adapt to become more successful. ; U.S. National Science Foundation [SBE1115009] ; This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.

In a global context of climate change and increased water scarcity, the development of efficient irrigation schemes in sub-Saharan Africa where rainfed agriculture still prevails could significantly support food security. However, developing efficient irrigation schemes is highly challenging and necessitates the resolution of a number of collective action problems. Since the 1980s, a large body of research has explored the conditions needed for successful collective action, sustainable use of the resource in irrigation schemes, and the development of efficient institutions. Although there is no agreed-upon definition of what successful, sustainable, or efficient governance schemes or institutions are, there is a common understanding that institutions that last over a long period of time are successful. However, past work mostly paints a homogenous and holistic picture of institutional efficiency across a given CPR, while limited research has investigated differences in terms of institutional efficiency between appropriators with various levels of institutional experience. In order to deepen our understanding of institutional efficiency, this study investigates how appropriators in one irrigation scheme, with different lengths and types of institutional experience, practice institutions. Building on existing literature, we ask how institutional efficiency relates to institutional experience at the levels of both irrigation units and the appropriators of water. To answer this research question, we conducted our analysis in the Mwea irrigation scheme (MIS) in Kenya, an irrigation scheme that has not only persisted but expanded over time since the 1950s. We analyze payment of operation and maintenance (O&M) fees for 71 irrigation units over two consecutive years. We also explore the results of 422 household surveys on the practice of institutions conducted in eight irrigation units with distinct duration and types of institutional experience. This work sheds new light on the dynamic formation and definition of institutional efficiency by highlighting the importance of farmers' experience and empowerment in supporting adaptive institutions. We show that under the pressure of experienced and empowered appropriators, institutions can evolve and adapt to become more efficient. Irrigation schemes can only alleviate food insecurity when farmers are deeply involved in local institutions. This study shows their central role in correctly appropriating and provisioning the resource but also in using their knowledge and authority to critique the rules in place and promote the adaptation of institutions.

AbstractBeginning in 2002, Kenyan water governance transitioned from a monocentric, top‐down system to one exhibiting traits of polycentricity. In this paper, we investigate the changes made to water policy following the 2002 reform, outcomes produced in a collection of community‐ and catchment‐level user groups in the Mount Kenya region, and the conformance of these changes and outcomes with principles of polycentricity. A new framework is used to capture the complex institutional arrangements and interactions existing before and after the polycentric transformation. Unlike many previous polycentricity studies, the present research focuses primarily on the outcomes of the polycentric shift and determines if these correspond to predictions from polycentricity theory. We utilize survey data collected in 2013 from water managers, as well as archival research to interrogate congruence with principles of polycentricity. This study contributes to the broader discussion on polycentricity in two fundamental ways: (i) It documents the functioning of a water management system following a top‐down imposed polycentric reform, and (ii) It empirically inspects whether these polycentric reforms have produced benefits predicted by polycentricity theorists, such as experimentation by local water users, increased collective action, and improved coordination between levels of management.

Efforts to promote forest conservation have focused on two separate types of policy reforms. Decentralization reforms have attempted to make local forest governance more accountable to demands from voters. Meanwhile, Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes like the REDD program (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) have sought to use economic incentives to promote conservation. These programs make different assumptions about the incentives most likely to work in forest conservation. Decentralization reforms assume that citizen pressures on politicians will encourage conservation, while PES approaches assume that an economic incentive—money—is the best approach. Which type of incentive works best in settings with weak institutions? Here, using a unique longitudinal dataset of forest policy in 100 Bolivian municipalities, we examine the relationships between citizen pressures and economic incentives on forest policy. We find that both types of incentives are positively and significantly associated with government investments in forest conservation, and that the magnitudes of these relationships are similar. Further, we find that economic incentives may be especially effective at promoting conservation where citizen pressures are weak or absent.