Suchergebnisse

The decisions that shape the policy of weapons procurement are an important area of national security policy. This is all the more true for China, which during recent decades has vacillated between different sources and directions of military build-up. This book explores the politics of military procurement in China under the successive leaderships of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. It shows how China's political and military leaders have sought to adjust military procurement policy to meet China's strategic objectives, to relate it to non-military needs, to strike a balance between t.

Sceptics query China's economic and political ability to realize its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Less attention has been paid to BRI's implications for one of the defining features of China's foreign policy: low engagement in areas beyond its traditional sphere of influence. The Middle East is such a case. Addressing this issue, the article explores the mutual impact of China's low political involvement in the Middle East and BRI's realization. Distinguishing cross-border connectivity projects from other BRI-associated activities, the article examines the challenges to executing BRI-related projects in Israel. It finds that realizing connectivity projects – the essence of the BRI vision – will require China to increase its regional engagement, a shift that it has so far avoided. (China Q/GIGA)

Since the end of the Cold War, arms embargoes have typically been imposed on isolated and relatively weak states. Exceptionally, the 1989 US-led arms embargo on China is imposed on an influential world power that has various means to deal with it. Moreover, it has so far failed to change the behavior of and reduce arms imports by the targeted state—two basic parameters of arms embargo success. Attempting to explain the endurance of China arms embargo and building on the vast literature of international sanctions, the article closely examines the embargo's changing goals, costs, and implementation over the years. Arguing that the evolvement of these three components has kept the embargo cost-effective, the article enhances our understanding of the effectiveness of US China policy and concurrently illustrates the capacity of international sanctions to expose the true goal hierarchy, means, and political processes that underlie foreign policies. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

In recent years, the ties between Asian powers and Middle Eastern countries have grown significantly, and the consequence of this development is a gradual spin-off of intra-Asian political process to the Middle East. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides an intriguing illustration of such a possible spin-off. Japan's response to BRI is mostly negative but less clear is the possible implications of the China–Japan confrontation over BRI for their interaction with the Middle East. Japan's responses to the BRI and China's perceptions thereof can expand the set of factors that shape the two Asian powers' involvement in that region.

As most studies on Middle East-East Asian relations focus on the interregional dimension, the manner in which relations between East Asian powers influence, and are influenced by, their policies in the Middle East are largely overlooked. Attempting to add another layer to the study of Sino-Japanese relations, this article explores whether Sino-Japanese rivalry extends to the Middle East. This undertaking requires a conceptual distinction between measures related to Sino-Japanese competition in the Middle East and measures which are related to their rivalry. Building on a minimal definition of interstate rivalry, the article argues that neither the effort to secure energy supply nor their economic or political competition there is shaped by their rivalry. The only field that can be associated with that rivalry is Japan's quasi-military activity in the Middle East, which may enhance its security policy's revision. That, in turn, causes much concern and criticism in Beijing, thus assigning the region a certain role in their relations. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

Since the early 2010s, there have been mounting calls in China to intensify its role in the Middle East. But seeing the region as highly turbulent, Beijing seems to restrain its political involvement there. So what role does China actually strive for in the Middle East? To answer this question, the article first presents China's discourse on its future role in the region; next, it analyzes China's involvement in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the Syrian civil war, focusing on three diplomatic initiatives it has made concerning these issues. The argument here is that China strives to be part of major processes in the Middle East and attempts to advance its values and interests there, but in a unique pattern of big-power involvement in the region, it tries to achieve this without intensive investment of political, economic, and military resources.

Israel's China policy has traditionally been influenced by Washington's explicit and perceived pressure. In the early 2010s, Israel started to explore a more independent path in regard to China. In view of global developments, such a change seemed reasonable. However, prevailing conditions prevent Israel from developing an independent China policy.

Since the early 2010s, there have been mounting calls in China to intensify its role in the Middle East. But seeing the region as highly turbulent, Beijing seems to restrain its political involvement there. So what role does China actually strive for in the Middle East? To answer this question, the article first presents China's discourse on its future role in the region; next, it analyzes China's involvement in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the Syrian civil war, focusing on three diplomatic initiatives it has made concerning these issues. The argument here is that China strives to be part of major processes in the Middle East and attempts to advance its values and interests there, but in a unique pattern of big-power involvement in the region, it tries to achieve this without intensive investment of political, economic, and military resources.

Technological ties between Israel and China have always been a central and constant element of their relationship. Defense contracts played a leading role here but were also responsible for the severe crisis that erupted between the countries in the early 2000s after Israel, capitulating to US pressure, backed off from its commitment to provide China with military technologies. This not only forced Israel to sever its defense relations with China but also made US-Israel relations a principal factor in the Sino-Israeli connection and imposed tight constraints on Israel's technology transfers to China generally. For Israel, this placed the dilemma of commercial versus political and national security interests at the forefront, since technology connections allowed it to promote its economic, political, and strategic causes through China. Indeed, while technology ties between the states have not stopped entirely—they have shifted to the civilian sphere—technology transfers to China are subject to heavy limitations, and Israel's export control mechanism faces greater challenges to screen them. As China's economic and political influence is ever increasing, Israel's cautious approach to technology transfers to China may be expected to come under mounting pressure.