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Cover -- CONTENTS -- THE END OF THE COMMODITY SUPERCYCLE AND GDP GROWTH: THE CASE OF CHILE -- A. Introduction -- B. Copper Price Outlook: Temporary or Structural Decline? -- C. Does the Level of Commodity Prices Affect Long-Term Growth? -- D. Conclusion -- References -- TABLE -- 1. Theoretical Impact on GDP of A Decline in Commodity Price -- APPENDICES -- 1. Spectral Analysis Concepts -- 2. A Simple Model of Copper Prices -- 3. Theoretical Effects of Commodity Price Shocks on GDP Growth -- 4. Econometric Results -- ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE STRUCTURAL REFORM AGENDA IN CHILE -- A. Introduction -- B. Quantifying the Structural Gaps -- C. Assessing the Reforms Within a General Equilibrium Model -- D. Conclusions -- References -- BOX -- 1. Tax Reform: How Much Does it Affect Tax Rates on Capital Income? -- FIGURES -- 1. Infrastructure and Human Capital Gaps -- 2. Alternative Measures of Infrastructure -- 3.a. Credible Versus Non Credible Policies -- 3.b. High Speed versus low speed in implementation -- 4. Impact of Reforms on Real GDP

The purpose of this paper is to assess Madagascar's competitiveness in recent years, using both price and nonprice indicators and an exchange rate assessment of the currency. We estimate the distance between the equilibrium and the actual real exchange rates using three methods: the macroeconomic balance approach, the external sustainability approach, and the reduced-form equilibrium real exchange rate approach. These methods suggest that in the medium term the real exchange rate is only slightly overvalued. We also carry out a comparative analysis of nonprice indicators and find that Madagasc

The purpose of this paper is to examine factors that have constrained South Africa's growth since the end of apartheid by comparing its GDP components and its saving and investment performance with those of 10 faster-growing countries. The study finds that sluggish investment has undermined growth since 1996 and that the underinvestment is in part explained by limited saving. Thus, over the last decade, interactions between investment, saving, and production may have perpetuated slow growth in South Africa

Cover -- Contents -- Abstract -- I. Introduction -- II. Vertical Gap and Balance in Decentralized Settings -- III. What Determines the Vertical Fiscal Gap? -- IV. How Large Should the Vertical Fiscal Gap be? -- A. The Vertical Fiscal Gap as a Residual -- B. The Vertical Fiscal Gap as the Desired Level of Transfers and Subnational Borrowing -- C. Combining the Two Approaches -- V. How Should the Vertical Fiscal Gap be Covered? -- A. Revenue-Sharing -- B. General Purpose Transfers -- C. Block Transfers -- D. Specific Transfers -- VI. How to Achieve a Suitable Vertical Fiscal Balance? -- VII. Conclusion -- Appendix: Accounting Relationship Between Vertical Fiscal Gap and Decentralization Ratios -- References -- Box -- 1. Taxonomy of Intergovernmental Transfers -- Figures -- 1. Vertical Fiscal Gaps Across OECD Countries -- 2. Revenue and Expenditure Decentralizations and Vertical Fiscal Gap -- 3. Financing Structure of Subnational Expenditure -- 4. A Normative Model of Fiscal Decentralization -- 5. An alternative Model of Decentralization -- 6. Typology of Transfers -- 7. Vertical Fiscal Gap and Decentralization Mismatch

Cover -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. The Setting: Public Debt On An Upward Trend -- III. Past Reforms of the Fiscal Framework -- IV. Track Record Under The SGP -- V. Pending Issues and Areas for Further Progress -- A. The Growing Complexity of the Framework -- B. The Difficult Migration from Nominal to Structural Balance Targets -- C. Reconciling Fiscal Sustainability and Growth Objectives -- D. Dealing with Multiple Monitoring Schemes -- E. Enforcement: the Limits of Peer Pressure -- VI. Issues for Discussion and Policy Options -- VII. Conclusions -- Tables -- 1. Decomposition of Debt Changes in the Euro Area Between end-2007-end-2013 -- 2. Measurement Error of the Structural Stance -- A.1. Reforms of the Preventive Arm of the SGP -- A.2. Reforms of the Corrective Arm of the SGP -- A.3. Euro Area: General Government Overall Balance, 1999-2013 -- A.4. Euro Area: General Government Debt, 1999-2013 -- A.5. Euro Area: General Government Structural Balance, 1999-2013 -- A.6. Cyclical Sensitivity of the Structural Fiscal Effort -- A.7. Cyclical Sensitivity of the Structural Fiscal Balance -- A.8. Cyclical Sensitivity of the Structural Fiscal Effort, IV Estimation -- Figures -- 1. Public Debt Ratio -- 2. Main Objectives of Past Fiscal Governance Reforms -- 3. Non-compliance with European Fiscal Rules -- 4. Structural Balance and Output Gap -- 5. Public Debt -- 6. Supranational Constraints and Rules on Fiscal Aggregates -- 7. Number of Federations with Central Constraints on Subnational Entities -- 8. Simulated Debt Reduction in 2019 -- 9. Real-Time Estimation Error of the Output Gap -- 10. Investment in the Euro Area -- 11. Euro Area: Share of Non-Compliers -- Boxes -- 1. The Bottom-Up Approach To Estimating Discretionary Revenues -- 2. Is There a Trade-Off Between Fiscal Consolidation and Structural Reforms?.

In many countries the decentralization of spending responsibilities has outpaced the decentralization of revenue powers. Sub-national governments have then to rely on transfers from the center and borrowing to finance their spending. When this occurs, we find that the overall fiscal deficit tends to increase. This result is based on cross-country econometric evidence from OECD countries, and is particularly strong in the presence of regional disparities. Fiscal discipline can be strengthened by ensuring that sub-national taxing powers are adequate to meet spending obligations

The purpose of this paper is to assess whether expenditure decentralization has contributed to weakening fiscal performance in Europe. Using a panel of EU15 countries for the period 1995-2011, we estimate three econometric models and ask the following questions: (1) does the form of spending decentralization affect the general government fiscal balance?; (2) is there evidence of spending duplication?; and (3) are soft budget constraints prevalent at the subnational level in Europe? Our results indicate that current decentralization models may have some shortcomings and efforts to achieve fisca