Suchergebnisse

Climate change -- Emissions trading : a new tool for environmental management -- The Kyoto protocol -- The EU emissions trading scheme -- US carbon markets -- Emissions trading in Australia -- Other emerging mandatory schemes -- Voluntary offsetting market -- Conclusion : carbon markets in the age of uncertainty.

Progress on improving energy efficiency of UK homes has stalled in recent years and the question arises how much more potential for further energy savings exist across the housing stock. Whilst there are some high-level estimates of the potential for buildings energy efficiency in the UK, a more granular assessment is needed to understand exactly where this potential lies and what form it takes. Our analysis fills this gap. It is based on the best available evidence on the remaining potential for energy efficiency improvements within UK residential buildings. Using UK government criteria for investment appraisal, we demonstrate that there is a significant resource of untapped energy-saving opportunities in UK homes. Specifically, our estimates suggest that: one quarter of the energy currently used in UK households could be cost effectively saved by 2035; and this could increase to one half if allowance is made for falling technology costs and the wider benefits of energy efficiency improvements. However, these estimates are sensitive to the assumptions made about capital, energy and carbon costs, and capturing this potential will require both significant policy change and large-scale investment.

International audience ; Better leverage of public funding is essential in order to trigger the invest-ment needed for energy efficiency. In times of austerity governments in-creasingly look at policy instruments not funded by public expenditure and Energy Savings Obligations represent one option. Because Energy Savings Obligations are paid for by all energy customers, the degree to which they are able to raise additional private capital for energy efficiency invest-ments is crucial with regard to the financial burden on consumers. In this paper, we systematically assess how successful Energy Savings Obliga-tions were in levering capital from parties other than the obligated entities including private investors and other public bodies. We analyse three countries with substantial experience with Energy Savings Obligations, identify the main design differences and the effect this has on the degree of leverage. We conclude that the design of Energy Savings Obligations largely determines the degree of leverage and that that there appears to be a trade-off between high leverage and additionality.

International audience ; Better leverage of public funding is essential in order to trigger the invest-ment needed for energy efficiency. In times of austerity governments in-creasingly look at policy instruments not funded by public expenditure and Energy Savings Obligations represent one option. Because Energy Savings Obligations are paid for by all energy customers, the degree to which they are able to raise additional private capital for energy efficiency invest-ments is crucial with regard to the financial burden on consumers. In this paper, we systematically assess how successful Energy Savings Obliga-tions were in levering capital from parties other than the obligated entities including private investors and other public bodies. We analyse three countries with substantial experience with Energy Savings Obligations, identify the main design differences and the effect this has on the degree of leverage. We conclude that the design of Energy Savings Obligations largely determines the degree of leverage and that that there appears to be a trade-off between high leverage and additionality.

International audience Better leverage of public funding is essential in order to trigger the invest-ment needed for energy efficiency. In times of austerity governments in-creasingly look at policy instruments not funded by public expenditure and Energy Savings Obligations represent one option. Because Energy Savings Obligations are paid for by all energy customers, the degree to which they are able to raise additional private capital for energy efficiency invest-ments is crucial with regard to the financial burden on consumers. In this paper, we systematically assess how successful Energy Savings Obliga-tions were in levering capital from parties other than the obligated entities including private investors and other public bodies. We analyse three countries with substantial experience with Energy Savings Obligations, identify the main design differences and the effect this has on the degree of leverage. We conclude that the design of Energy Savings Obligations largely determines the degree of leverage and that that there appears to be a trade-off between high leverage and additionality.

International audience ; Better leverage of public funding is essential in order to trigger the invest-ment needed for energy efficiency. In times of austerity governments in-creasingly look at policy instruments not funded by public expenditure and Energy Savings Obligations represent one option. Because Energy Savings Obligations are paid for by all energy customers, the degree to which they are able to raise additional private capital for energy efficiency invest-ments is crucial with regard to the financial burden on consumers. In this paper, we systematically assess how successful Energy Savings Obliga-tions were in levering capital from parties other than the obligated entities including private investors and other public bodies. We analyse three countries with substantial experience with Energy Savings Obligations, identify the main design differences and the effect this has on the degree of leverage. We conclude that the design of Energy Savings Obligations largely determines the degree of leverage and that that there appears to be a trade-off between high leverage and additionality.

International audience ; Better leverage of public funding is essential in order to trigger the invest-ment needed for energy efficiency. In times of austerity governments in-creasingly look at policy instruments not funded by public expenditure and Energy Savings Obligations represent one option. Because Energy Savings Obligations are paid for by all energy customers, the degree to which they are able to raise additional private capital for energy efficiency invest-ments is crucial with regard to the financial burden on consumers. In this paper, we systematically assess how successful Energy Savings Obliga-tions were in levering capital from parties other than the obligated entities including private investors and other public bodies. We analyse three countries with substantial experience with Energy Savings Obligations, identify the main design differences and the effect this has on the degree of leverage. We conclude that the design of Energy Savings Obligations largely determines the degree of leverage and that that there appears to be a trade-off between high leverage and additionality.

International audience ; Better leverage of public funding is essential in order to trigger the invest-ment needed for energy efficiency. In times of austerity governments in-creasingly look at policy instruments not funded by public expenditure and Energy Savings Obligations represent one option. Because Energy Savings Obligations are paid for by all energy customers, the degree to which they are able to raise additional private capital for energy efficiency invest-ments is crucial with regard to the financial burden on consumers. In this paper, we systematically assess how successful Energy Savings Obliga-tions were in levering capital from parties other than the obligated entities including private investors and other public bodies. We analyse three countries with substantial experience with Energy Savings Obligations, identify the main design differences and the effect this has on the degree of leverage. We conclude that the design of Energy Savings Obligations largely determines the degree of leverage and that that there appears to be a trade-off between high leverage and additionality.