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Bringing sophisticated philosophy to bear on real-life historiography, Values, Objectivity, and Explanation in Historiography rekindles and invigorates the debate on two perennials in the theory and methodology of history. One is the tension between historians' values and the ideal—or illusion—of objective historiography. The other is historical explanation. The point of departure for the treatment of values and objectivity is an exceptionally heated debate on Cold War historiography in Denmark, involving not only historians but also the political parties, the national newspapers, and the courts. The in-depth analysis that follows concludes that historians can produce accounts that deserve the label "objective," even though their descriptions are tinged by ineluctable epistemic instability. A separate chapter dissects the postmodern notion of situated truths. The second part of the book proffers a new take on historical explanation. It is based on the notion of the ideal explanatory text, which allows for not only causal—including intentional—but also nomological, structural, and functional explanations. The approach, which can accommodate narrative explanations driven by causal plots, is ecumenical but not all-encompassing. Emergent social properties and supernatural entities are excluded from the ideal explanatory text, making scientific historiography methodologically individualistic—albeit with room for explanations at higher levels when pragmatically justified—and atheist. The Open Access version of this book, available at http://www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-No Derivative License.

The first part of this article offers a critique of Andrew Moravcsik's and Alan Milward's attempts to present theories to replace neofunctionalism, arguing that Moravcsik's framework of `liberal intergovernmentalism' is short on explanatory power while Milward's `rescue of the nation-state' thesis is short on evidence. The second part substitutes a triangular model of Autonomy-Community-Suzerainty for the conventional dichotomy of sovereignty and supranationality employed by integration scholars. States aim to maximize control — meaning autonomy for oneself and suzerainty by oneself over others — if this can be achieved without detriment to other objectives. They may opt for community, however, in order to rid themselves of suzerainty or to prevent autonomy by other states whose actions may affect themselves positively or negatively. The third part applies the triangle to the history of European integration, showing how it can shed light on the ECSC, the EDC, the EEC, the internal market, and monetary union.

The article surveys the history of economic warfare from the Seven Years' War to the present. Three different aspects of economic warfare are studied: international law, effectiveness, and strategies. From the seventeenth century until World War I economic warfare scholarship was dominated by the perspective of international law. But as belligerents ignored jurists' rules of acceptable conduct in economic warfare, the international law approach receded into irrelevance. Practitioners and analysts alike have differed over the effectiveness of economic warfare. Its lack of success against Germany in World War II was a severe blow to the prestige of the blockade weapon. Economic warfare protagonists had underestimated the capability of a determined power elite, controlling the army, to retain power despite economic hardship. In general, economic warfare seems able to do little more than shorten conflicts. Strategies of economic warfare have two dimensions: the institution of blockades and other measures `at large', and the question of according to which principles one should draw up lists of prohibited items. Developments on the first dimension have gone full circle, from Napoleon's Continental self-blockade prohibiting imports from the United Kingdom while promoting exports, to the CoCom embargo of the USA and its allies restricting exports to the Warsaw Pact countries without attempting to prevent imports. On the second dimension, lists of contraband swelled until by World War II they became all-encompassing. In modern wars every good can have relevance to the war effort. Economists have even pointed out that the most strategic item is not the one having the greatest military use but the one relatively most expensive for the adversary to produce domestically and therefore bringing the greatest gains from trade.