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This article utilizes the statistical analysis of an original dataset of African legislative seat volatility levels and three case studies to demonstrate that the size and configuration of politically salient ethnic groups bear a strong relationship with patterns of legislative seat volatility in Africa. Legislative seat volatility is highest in countries where either no social group is large enough to form a majority on its own, or a majority group contains within itself a second smaller majority group; it is lowest in countries where one, and only one, group forms a majority. In contrast, most standard explanations for volatility, including variations in economic performance, democratic period of origin and democratic duration, do not appear relevant in the African context.

This article utilizes the statistical analysis of an original dataset of African legislative seat volatility levels and three case studies to demonstrate that the size and configuration of politically salient ethnic groups bear a strong relationship with patterns of legislative seat volatility in Africa. Legislative seat volatility is highest in countries where either no social group is large enough to form a majority on its own, or a majority group contains within itself a second smaller majority group; it is lowest in countries where one, and only one, group forms a majority. In contrast, most standard explanations for volatility, including variations in economic performance, democratic period of origin and democratic duration, do not appear relevant in the African context (British Journal of Political Science/ FUB 2010)

This article argues that a key step in King's iterative approach toR×Cecological inference problems—the aggregation of groups into broad conglomerate categories—can introduce problems of aggregation bias and multimodality into data, inducing model violations. As a result, iterative EI estimates can be considerably biased, even when the original data conform to the assumptions of the model. I demonstrate this problem intuitively and through simulations, show the conditions under which it is likely to arise, and illustrate it with the example of Coloured voting during the 1994 elections in South Africa. I then propose an easy fix to the problem, demonstrating the usefulness of the fix both through simulations and in the specific South African context.

We argue that there are strong reasons to believe that continuous competitive, multiparty elections produce different growth dynamics than first competitive elections. We test this conjecture by looking at the effects of competitive elections & their endurance on growth rates in African countries from 1970 to 2001. We find that initial competitive elections do not offer a growth dividend over having no elections at all, although noncompetitive elections may result in a growth penalty. However, over time, countries that hold competitive elections slowly begin outperforming those without them -- especially those that hold noncompetitive elections. Africa's poor growth experience may therefore be related less to an unwillingness to experiment with democracy, than to an inability to consolidate democratic reforms once in place. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.