Suchergebnisse

This paper analyzes the Australia – Anti-Dumping Measures on A4 Copy Paper panel report, the second recent WTO dispute to involve a challenge to Indonesia's paper industry. The Indonesian paper industry benefits from reduced-cost inputs because of the Indonesian government's influence and subsidies over the timber and pulp market. The report offers the first interpretation of "particular market situation" under Article 2.2 of the WTO's Anti-Dumping Agreement. At the same time, it raises questions regarding the appropriateness of using anti-dumping measures to address what are fundamentally subsidy issues. While the panel ultimately found that Australia's measure was inconsistent with Article 2.2, the paper shows that the panel's interpretation of "particular market situation" increases the relative attractiveness of using anti-dumping duties instead of countervailing measures. Two key points on the welfare implications of the decision can be made. The first relates to the motivations of the Australian paper industry and the imperfectly competitive market in which Australian Paper operates. The second is the importance of challenging subsidies rather than imposing anti-dumping duties where the subsidies in question have negative environmental effects.

AbstractThis paper investigates how national economic regulation shape the impacts of reducing external barriers to services trade for a sample of European countries. Notwithstanding far-reaching integration of services markets there is significant heterogeneity in domestic regulation and governance across European economies. We show this affects the potential downstream productivity effects of external services trade policy. In some cases, liberalization can substitute for weak regulation; in others there is a complementary relationship. Thus, the productivity effects associated with services market access liberalization depend on the quality of domestic economic regulation. EU-specific measures to promote internal trade in services – proxied by implementation of the Services Directive – are found not to have such moderating effects. An implication of our findings is that EU governments should do more to assess how specific dimensions of domestic regulatory regimes influence the size and distribution of the effects of services trade reforms.

AbstractMany agreements to liberalize trade in services tend to be limited in scope. This is a puzzle considering the high share of services in total employment and value added and relatively high barriers to trade in services in many countries. In this paper we argue that neglected complementarities between services trade policies and domestic regulation may help to understand the limited ambition on services observed in many trade agreements. We show that the productivity effects of services trade liberalization are conditional on regulatory quality. Our findings suggest that greater effort to design trade agreements with a view to improving regulatory quality may be a necessary condition for deepening the services coverage of trade agreements and will enhance the welfare gains from services trade liberalization.

This paper studies the determinants of liberalization commitments in the context of trade in services used as intermediate inputs. Compared to goods, services inputs are mostly complementary to other factors of production and non-tradable. We build a theoretical trade policy framework in which (i) foreign investment as a way to contest a market for non-tradable services can be restricted by the government and (ii) the role of services as complementary inputs explains unilateral commitment to services trade liberalization. Commitment helps governments to avoid political pressures that would result in protectionist measures leading downstream producers to inefficiently reduce their production. In addition we provide new results on the influence of lobbying by both national firms and foreign multinationals. We discuss how the bargaining power of the government, the size of national services sectors and the difference in valuation between national and foreign contributions affect the willingness of the government to sign a services trade agreement.

Why do governments sign services trade agreements? This paper focuses on the role of international agreements in the context of trade in services when services are used as intermediate inputs in downstream industries. Compared to goods, services inputs are mostly non-tradable and complementary to other factors of production. We build a theoretical trade policy framework in which firms use foreign investment to contest foreign markets in services sectors and governments can restrict the entry of multinationals. Commitment helps governments to avoid political pressures that would result in protectionist measures leading downstream industries to inefficiently reduce their production. First we show that the role of services as complementary inputs is central to explain governments' commitment to services trade liberalization. Second we provide new results on the influence of lobbying by both national firms and foreign multinationals on trade policies and the gains from commitment. Finally we discuss how the bargaining power of the government, the size of national services sectors and the difference in valuation between national and foreign contributions affect the willingness of the government to sign a services trade agreement.

First published online: 07 July 2020 ; Widespread use of trade policy to maximise access to medical supplies may have had significant knock-on effects internationally. While robust government intervention is arguably critical in emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic, recent experience offers at least six lessons for external policy coherence.

This paper empirically investigates the role of governance institutions in shaping the economic impact of services trade reform. The analysis focuses on the effects of services trade policy on the productivity of manufacturing sectors that use services as intermediate inputs. We find that these effects depend on the quality of governance institutions in the country implementing trade and investment reform. The moderating effects of horizontal (cross-cutting) and services sector-specific dimensions of economic governance institutions are found to differ. For some services activities market access opening can substitute for weak regulation/governance; in others bad regulatory governance is a binding constraint and needs to be addressed directly for market opening to have the greatest benefits. Our empirical findings suggest these complementarity and substitution relationships may be associated with the types of market failure that arise in different services sectors and the effectiveness of regulatory regimes in addressing them. We also find that positive effects of services trade and investment reforms are higher in EU member states.