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AbstractFiscal discipline, the sustainable balancing of government outlays with revenues, is one of the most extensively theorized and empirically investigated objects of inquiry in political economy. Yet, studies covering European Union (EU) countries have mostly ignored the oversight of national budgets via the EU excessive deficit procedure. I explain why this surveillance engenders lower deficits and investigate its effects across all EU member countries. Results indicate that the impact of surveillance during budget drafting offsets that of a two‐year shortening of expected government duration, the addition of one party to a government coalition when debt is high, or a leftward shift in government ideology when the risk of replacement is low. Moreover, estimates from exact matching on treatment histories indicate that these effects peak after four to five years. These findings have important normative implications for democratic policy‐making in European countries and the fledgling EU‐wide fiscal policy.

This article analyses the social bases underpinning the widely different trajectories of nuclear energy policies across Western European countries. Employing a set of surveys carried out in the last thirty years, it examines the conditional effects of ideology and geographical proximity to a nuclear power plant on attitudes toward nuclear energy, as well as the long- and short-term dynamics of belief updating after the occurrence of major accidents. Results highlight how proximity can strengthen, weaken or have no effect on the ideological component of these attitudes. Moreover, the publics of most countries with experience in nuclear energy display the traits of Bayesian dynamics of belief updating, especially in the vicinity of a plant. The article also shows the fairly exceptional traits of French public opinion. In conclusion, the broad social constraints within which governments operate, across time and space, shed light on the different policy trajectories of European countries. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis article analyses the social bases underpinning the widely different trajectories of nuclear energy policies across Western European countries. Employing a set of surveys carried out in the last thirty years, it examines the conditional effects of ideology and geographical proximity to a nuclear power plant on attitudes toward nuclear energy, as well as the long‐ and short‐term dynamics of belief updating after the occurrence of major accidents. Results highlight how proximity can strengthen, weaken or have no effect on the ideological component of these attitudes. Moreover, the publics of most countries with experience in nuclear energy display the traits of Bayesian dynamics of belief updating, especially in the vicinity of a plant. The article also shows the fairly exceptional traits of French public opinion. In conclusion, the broad social constraints within which governments operate, across time and space, shed light on the different policy trajectories of European countries.

Slapin (2011) and Finke et al. (2012) represent the best theory-based book-length studies of the most active period of treaty reform in the history of the European Union -- from the Treaty of Amsterdam to the Treaty of Lisbon. These works offer the opportunity to assess the extent to which liberal intergovernmentalism -- a 'baseline' theory of regional integration -- has withstood empirical scrutiny. I first address what I consider a misinterpretation of liberal intergovernmentalism -- the presumed pre-eminence given to a country's relative capability. I then identify challenges to this framework. Methodologically, they concern the measurement of preferences, value of disagreement and opportunities for linkages in treaty negotiations. I then assess evidence of lower-than-unanimity thresholds for treaty reform, which may represent a theoretical challenge. Finally, I suggest that focal points and bargaining dynamics deserve greater scholarly attention. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Slapin (2011) and Finke et al. (2012) represent the best theory-based book-length studies of the most active period of treaty reform in the history of the European Union – from the Treaty of Amsterdam to the Treaty of Lisbon. These works offer the opportunity to assess the extent to which liberal intergovernmentalism – a 'baseline' theory of regional integration – has withstood empirical scrutiny. I first address what I consider a misinterpretation of liberal intergovernmentalism – the presumed pre-eminence given to a country's relative capability. I then identify challenges to this framework. Methodologically, they concern the measurement of preferences, value of disagreement and opportunities for linkages in treaty negotiations. I then assess evidence of lower-than-unanimity thresholds for treaty reform, which may represent a theoretical challenge. Finally, I suggest that focal points and bargaining dynamics deserve greater scholarly attention.

Three books studying European immigration from the perspectives of economics, political science and sociology reach different conclusions on some key aspects of this policy. I suggest three avenues for future research. First, there is a need to develop institutionally richer political economy models of migration to examine the conditional nature of state control over immigration. Second, case selection bias in assessing the legacy of immigration for nationality laws should be redressed starting with a more encompassing theory of policy reform. Third, the impact of national welfare policies on the mode of integration of immigrants in the receiving countries could be a promising area of investigation. I illustrate this using employment protection legislation and family policies.

Abstract. This article tests four theories of portfolio distribution within the European Commission and assesses whether experience plays a role in the process of allocating policy responsibilities. The share of portfolios that each Member State is assigned, through its Commissioners, is strongly related to its resources and voting power, as predicted by the proportionality norm and bargaining theory, respectively. Additionally, Member States with Commissioners that have experience in the relevant portfolios are assigned shares that are significantly above what one may expect from these two theories. For half of the portfolios, Commissioners have moderate views along the dimension of the policy they manage, but appointed Commissioners also have significantly more experience in both supranational portfolios and similar national portfolios than the median Commissioner. The difference in experience in supranational and, more weakly, national portfolios significantly accounts for the difference in preference between the appointed and the median Commissioner. Finally, salience matters as well. Left/right leaning Commissioners are significantly more likely to be assigned portfolios with a left‐wing/right‐wing ideological profile, but this strong relation disappears for Commissioners with above average experience in the Commission, in the relevant supranational portfolios or in national governments.