The year 1997 was critical for Thailand. A severe economic crisis hit in July calling into question years of economic growth and increasing prosperity. A few months later Thailand adopted a new Constitution that aimed at reforming the political system, and at making corruption and vote buying less prevalent. While this article shows that the economic turmoil was a prime catalyst for political change, it was not as simple as saying that public outcry over the economic crisis forced conservative parliamentarians into voting to accept the proposed constitution. While public outcry did matter, what is vitally important is that elite political leaders, the heads of the major parties, ministers, and generals, were renegotiating their alliances and ties both with one another, and with various groups in society that were pushing for change. Elite resignation to political pressure and policy shifts among the top leaders is what ultimately allows for the passage of the constitution and for Prime Minister Chavalit's departure. This article takes a closer look at Thai politics and tries to answer the following questions: Did the economic crisis lead to (meaningful) political reform and why or why not? Since the codification of the 1997 constitution has Thai politics become more democratic? It is my analysis that the consolidation of democracy was in reach in 1997 but today has slipped further from Thai citizens' grasp. The explanations, or the independent variables for both the successful reforms of the political system in 1997 and the backsliding away from democratization, are largely the same. When both internal and external pressures prod democracy along, reforms take place. When pressures are pushing in different directions democratic reforms become threatened. Internal pressures include the military, civil society, and the behavior and power of political and economic elites; and external ones are the IMF, national security concerns, and globalization in general. When conditions or variables change, and when elite priorities or preferences shift, as this article will show, we can see the results in Thai politics.
In: Anthropos: internationale Zeitschrift für Völker- und Sprachenkunde : international review of anthropology and linguistics : revue internationale d'ethnologie et de linguistique, Band 112, Heft 2, S. 685-686
High commodity prices in 2007-2008 and again in 2011, particularly for crops such as rice and corn, have forced countries in Southeast Asia to look more closely at their agricultural and trade policies for rice and grains. While all countries in the region are heavily dependent on rice for food security, there is significant variation in countries' abilities to be self-sufficient in rice production. This paper examines the factors that contribute to food insecurity in SEA, which communities are hit hardest, and the diversity of responses to this situation. And, the paper asks what the prospects might be for greater cooperation in coordinating rice (and other crops more generally) policies so as to better ensure reliable access for more citizens in the region. Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia are all major exporters of rice; whereas Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines are all importers of rice. Since the sharp spike in prices in 2008, countries which import rice have developed more comprehensive plans to become self sufficient in rice production. Individual country's policies will have dramatic effects on regional trade relations and dynamics. There have been some regional attempts to create a more cooperative framework for addressing food security, but these efforts have not yet played a significant role in reshaping domestic policies. This paper will assess the chances of further cooperation and success (or the chance of failure and less engagement) in the future. (Pac Rev/GIGA)
AbstractThis article explores the impact of Muslim organizations and Muslim political parties in Indonesia and Malaysia and their relationship to democracy. Questions addressed are as follows: How does the political system (broadly described) facilitate or constrain the goals of various Muslim organizations (both groups in society and political parties)? What roles do these Muslim organizations play in impacting politics and where (or in what areas of) in the political process are they most effective? Under what circumstances have Muslim associations and/or parties been a force for (or antagonistic to) democratization? Given the ethnic and regional diversity in Malaysia and Indonesia, the initial hypotheses for these questions are as follows: under authoritarian and semi-authoritarian rule Muslim organizations actually have greater opportunities to polarize rhetoric as they appeal to citizens based on claims of moral supremacy, fulfillment of social welfare needs, and some level of criticism of a restricted or corrupted political order. At different times the Pan-Malayan Islamic Association (PAS), the leading Muslim party in Malaysia (and a dominant opposition party) has had limited appeal to voters. Under more democratic conditions, Islamic groups or parties may need to moderate their appeals, and/or build coalitions with secular or non-Islamic groups in order to win power and influence in the larger political system. Muslim political parties exist in both Malaysia and Indonesia; their power and influence have varied over time. This project aims to explain why these parties have had more support at some times than others and under what conditions they may moderate their demands and policy choices to accommodate pluralist leanings.
After 1997, Thailand and Indonesia experienced dramatic political change. Indonesia is now on its fourth post-Suharto president, the constitution was changed, new political parties formed, the military's role in politics shrunk, and local governments have greater control and authority. In Thailand, a new constitution was ratified in the wake of the financial crisis and a new party took control in 2001. However, former Prime Minister Thaksin acted in ways that curtailed democracy and made a mockery of the 1997 reform movement. What happened to the post-1997 reforms? This article argues that democracy has been weakly consolidated in Indonesia and that Thailand has slid further from democracy. (Asian Aff/GIGA)